



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200






800042886Y

34.

330.



by

(1911)

INTRODUCTION

and
ne-
the
put
inci-
you
bout
-eize
ation
each,
ideas
tand-
to ac-
or for-
refer
nes of
quire.

FOR AMERICAN

thy
ie day
ie nobl
ng to prom
note that of

Entered, according to Act of Congress, by Flagg, Gould and Newman, in the
Clerk's Office, of the District Court of Massachusetts, in the year of our
Lord, 1834.

1834

DEDICATION.

TO MY SON.

For you, my dear son, this little work was undertaken, and *to* you I dedicate it. Convinced that nothing is more necessary, than early to accustom ourselves to systematize the knowledge we acquire, I have thought it my duty to put within the reach of your youthful capacity, the first principles of General Grammar, in order that they may serve you as a guide in the study of languages, to which you are about to devote the first years of your education. If you seize these principles,—if, by their light, you discover the relation which ought to subsist between the different parts of speech, in order faithfully to express the connexion of those ideas which unite in forming the conclusions of our understandings—the diversity of means which languages employ to accomplish this end, will present to you nothing painful or forbidding. You will, in this way, accustom yourself to refer to well digested general principles, the different branches of each of those sciences which you may successively acquire, and you will contract the happy habit of connecting your ideas, of combining them, of tracing back consequences to principles, effects to causes, and thus of weighing well your own opinions and those of the persons with whom you may associate. In whatever condition you may be called to serve your country, you will reap the fruits of this method, peculiarly fitted, as it is, to train up the understanding, and to preserve the heart from the illusions and enchantment of the passions.

May heaven deign to bless these first efforts of thy father, to form thy mind and heart, and to render thee one day worthy of the Eternal Author of thy being, and of the noble destination to which he calls thee, that of laboring to promote *thine own* happiness, in contributing to promote that of *thy species* !

ADVERTISEMENT.

By the Author.

THE little work which I now publish, under the title of "Principles of General Grammar, fitted for the capacity of Youth," is little else than an abstract of the best writings on this subject which have appeared in France, and, specially, of the Portroyal "General and Rational Grammar," of "Beauzée's General Grammar," and of "The Natural History of Speech," and the "Universal Grammar," by Court de Gebelin. In adopting the greater part of the principles of these learned writers, I have disposed them in the order which appeared to me the most fitted to show their justice and to portray them distinctly; I have stripped them of every metaphysical and polemical discussion, and have discarded, as far as possible, every scientific expression, although shorter and more convenient, to substitute for them terms taken from ordinary discourse.

I have made no application of the principles of General Grammar to particular examples taken either in the French or any other language, except so far as was necessary to make myself intelligible. This has appeared to me an indispensable precaution in order to give the greatest possible generality to the principles, and to avoid generalizing what is peculiar to certain languages. Many valuable writers, in treating of the principles of universal Grammar, have not, in my opinion, taken sufficient care, to avoid this last mistake. If I myself have sometimes swerved from the rule, it has only been to show that the peculiar usages of certain languages do not contradict general principles.

I have entirely suppressed that part of universal grammar which relates to the elements of speech and the art of writing. The consideration of the first of these subjects, viz. of the natural organs of speech, and of the nature and variety of the sounds and articulations which we produce by their help, is, without doubt, well fitted to cause us to admire the power and wisdom of the Creator, as well as the variety of the means which he uses to accomplish his de-

signs. It is also of great use in researches into the science of etymology, and into the comparative grammar of ancient and modern idioms. It belongs not, however, to primary, nor even to ordinary, instruction. It is nature and imitation which teach children the use they must make of their organs of speech, in order to pronounce their mother tongue ; and it is, also, by imitation, and not by a scientific knowledge of the organs of speech and of the principles of grammar, that the man more advanced in life learns articulations foreign to the language of the country which gave him birth. As to the art of writing—that ingenious method of rendering speech permanent, by painting articulate sounds, and thus making the communication of ideas independent of distance of time or space—the sound and luminous principles of general grammar ought to be considered as a perfect theory, from which all nations which have adopted an alphabetical or syllabical method of writing have more or less departed. However imperfect may be the usage in point of orthography, nevertheless to that we must yield ; from that, we must learn how each nation has agreed to write the words which compose its language. A *total* reform in orthography, which should aim to render writing perfectly conformable to pronunciation, must be regarded, as it respects most nations, as a philosophical chimera to which custom will never yield ; and a *partial* reform, which, correcting, in certain points, the discordance existing between writing and pronunciation, should suffer a part of the abuses to remain, would, in some sort, consecrate those it had spared, and would not, moreover, be without great disadvantages, especially as it regards the science of etymology.

For the same reasons, I have suppressed what *might* be said on the subject of *punctuation*, the system of which is so imperfect, even among those nations which have most multiplied its signs.

I have almost always preserved those technical expressions which were consecrated by usage, however imperfect they were, that the child who shall have studied these Principles, may nevertheless be able to make use of those elementary books designed for the study of the languages.

Many paragraphs and even whole Chapters will be found enclosed in []. These should be passed over by children

who are studying for the first time these Principles of Grammar.

I may sometimes have fallen into error, especially on a subject to which I have devoted no very large portion of my time. Perhaps too I may not, always, have seized the most simple, the most precise, and at the same time the most intelligible expression. I shall receive with gratitude the remarks of all whom their natural talents, a profound study of these subjects, or long experience in the department of public instruction, shall have qualified to rectify the mistakes into which I may have fallen. I shall esteem myself happy if this little work should merit their attention, and if they should judge it fitted to render easy to children a study sufficiently dry of itself, and often forbidding from the aspect under which it is presented. To make myself useful is my only wish : to have attained this end, will be to me the most flattering reward.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.*

I have permitted the preceding Advertisement to remain as in the first edition; but I ought to add a word in relation to the changes I have made in this. Those who will take the trouble to compare the two editions will find that the alterations consist in a few corrections, some difference in the arrangement of the matter, and a great many additions. The reception with which the public has honored the first edition of these "Principles of General Grammar," imposed an obligation upon me to spare no labor in order to render them more exact and complete; and by habitual application of these principles, by meditation upon the difficulties which presented themselves, and, finally by comparing the habits of many different languages, whose particular grammars I have studied for that purpose, I have collected a mass of observations which have enabled me to resolve difficulties and to reduce to a common analogy things which appeared widely to deviate from it. The corrections and additions made in this new edition are, at least for the most part, the fruit of this labor.

I do not pretend, however, that among these additions there are not many which can with difficulty be understood by children and beginners. Of this number is the disquisition concerning the extension and comprehension of Appellative Nouns into which I have entered in Chap. 4th of Part 1st. I could not however omit these remarks, as they were necessary to serve as a foundation for the distinction which I was about to make between Circumstantial and Qualificative Adjectives, which appears in Chap. 7th of the same Part. The 3d Chap. of Part 2d, in which I treat the subject of Cases, has received a great many additions, which, I think, cannot but throw light upon the design of these grammatical inflexions which are unknown to our language. Chap. 4th of the same Part, in which I have treated of Tenses and the 8th Chap. on the subject of the Modes of Verbs, have been considerably enlarged, and, so to speak, entirely made anew: these two Chapters are those in which I have discovered the greatest number of inaccuracies. What relates to the Tenses, will present, I think, no serious difficulties: as to the theory of Modes, it was necessary either to renounce the

* See note on p. 156.

idea of explaining it, or to ascend to the operations of our intellectual faculties, to analyse them, to classify them, and deduce from them the variations of modes: it was necessary further, in order to complete the subject, to consider Propositions which are the expressions of the operations of the understanding and the motions of the will, at first independently, and then under those relations which bind and chain them in discourse. Had I possessed more talent, I might perhaps have infused more interest into the explanation of this truly philosophical subject; but, at least, I may give this testimony for myself, that I have neglected no means which could enable me to treat it with precision and perspicuity.

The 3d Part, with the exception of the 1st Chapter and a portion of the 2d is entirely new; and the models of Analysis of the English and Latin languages contained in the 5th and 6th Chapters, must be considered as the result of the whole work. This 3d Part should not be studied, until a perfect knowledge of the first two parts has been acquired: the 4th Chapter, especially, requires a mind already familiar with analysis.

I must here insist upon the advice which I have already given, not to require beginners to study in the first two parts, those portions included in brackets. A distinction should also be made between these portions of the work themselves: some should be studied at a second perusal, while the study of others should be deferred still later.

It is only by repeated application of these principles that we can hope to naturalize them, as it were, in the minds of children, and to awaken their understanding, which must act in this work still more powerfully than their memory. It is, therefore, the duty of instructors, after being thoroughly imbued with these principles themselves, to cause their pupils to apply them often, and to a great number of examples. In this way the pupils will, as it were, instinctively employ them, or rather, they will discover in themselves, by the exercise of their own understanding, those principles which were at first trusted to their memories; and when they shall thus have appropriated them to themselves, they will run no risk of forgetting them. In giving propositions or phrases to be analysed, however, this kind of labor should be proportioned to the degree of the pupil's advancement; and if he meet with problems, the solution of which he has never been taught (which

should be avoided as much as possible) great care should be taken to cause them to be understood, that he may never find the system at fault.

I ought, perhaps, to apologize for having coined some terms which may possibly displease fastidious ears. My justification in this respect is confined to the remark, that I have used with the greatest caution a liberty which cannot be denied to him, who is obliged to look at objects under new points of view, and thus to create new existences, so to speak, in the intellectual world.

Among the number of the most flattering testimonies of approbation, which the first edition of these "Principles of General Grammar" has obtained, I ought to reckon the pains which Mr. N. Lang Nissen, professor of the Greek language at Copenhagen, has taken, to translate it into the Danish language, at the request of Messrs. Münter and Gulberg: and I seize this opportunity of presenting my thanks to these learned men for the favorable opinion which they have expressed in respect to my work, and to M. Nissen in particular, for the observations he has made in the preface to his translation, relative to some principles which I had adopted, and which he believed ought not to be allowed. I have weighed the remarks of M. Nissen with the greatest attention and he will see that, after his example, I have made of the Numeratives, in this edition, a chapter by itself. If I have not yielded to his other observations respecting the words to which he assigns the usual denominations of Demonstrative, Relative or Conjunctive, Possessive, Indefinite and Interrogative Pronouns, it is because I still continue convinced, that none of these words belong to the *class* of Pronouns. Without entering into any discussion of this subject, as it would be contrary to the plan of my work, I was yet bound to throw more light upon my principles, and further to unfold the motives of my opinion. It was a homage which I owed to the worth of M. Nissen, and perhaps I shall be so fortunate as to obtain his suffrage.

I could have wished to have been able to connect with this second edition a sketch of Latin grammar, drawn up conformably to my system: the last chapter of Part III. will supply to a certain extent the place of such a work, which multiplied avocations have prevented me from executing.

PREFACE BY THE TRANSLATOR.

It will, perhaps, be a considerable *a priori* recommendation of the following treatise, that its author is the Baron De Sacy, one of the most profound linguists of the age. His devotion to the science of language, and his extensive acquirements in this department of literature, more especially in the study of the Oriental tongues, certainly give uncommon promise of success in the preparation of a work like the present. To the public, however, the decision respecting its intrinsic value must be surrendered.

The Translator is conscious that its worth, whatever it may be, is by no means enhanced by the dress in which it now appears; but he submits it with diffidence to the clemency of those under whose eyes it may chance to fall, hoping that youth and inexperience may "cover a multitude of sins" against the accuracy and beauty of a perfect version.

It is proper to acquaint the public with the manner in which the Translator has proceeded, in adapting this little treatise to American use. He has omitted, in many places, discussions about words belonging to the French language alone, especially such as could be of no use to an English reader;* he has used his best judgment in substituting poetical examples drawn from the store house of English literature for such poetical examples in French as were used by the author, and could not, from the nature of the case, be properly translated into English; he has altered some French proper names to names more in accordance with the genius of the English language; he has not confined himself to an exactly literal translation of every word as it respects mode, tense &c. when another form of the word appeared preferable in English; and, lastly, he has here and there, though but seldom, inserted a short note of his own, distinguished from the rest by the letter T.

When technical words are found in this translation which do not belong to the English language, the reader will bear in mind that they are translations (literally so) of words equally strangers to the French.

Several slight mistakes will be observed in the first few sheets which were printed while the Translator was at a distance from the press, and could not conveniently revise them. These, however, it is hoped, will easily be rectified.

JANUARY, 1834.

* See, e. g. pp. 173. 174. 175—& 195. 196, 197 of the original.

CONTENTS.

PART I.

	Page.
CHAP. I. Of the <i>Proposition</i> . It is necessarily composed of a subject, an Attribute and a Verb, and always accompanied by a <i>Compellative</i> , expressed or understood . . .	13
CHAP. II. Of the <i>Verb</i> . Substantive and Attributive Verbs. Active, Passive and Neuter Verbs . . .	16
CHAP. III. Of the <i>Subject</i> and <i>Attribute</i> of a Proposition. The Subject may be either Simple or Compound: the Simple Subject may be either Complex or Incomplex. The Attribute may be either Simple or Compound: the Simple Attribute may be either Complex or Incomplex . . .	19
CHAP. IV. Of the <i>Noun</i> . Proper Nouns. Appellative Nouns. Abstract Nouns. Extension and Comprehension of Appellative Nouns . . .	24
CHAP. V. Of the <i>Article</i> . Determinative Article. Demonstrative Article . . .	29
CHAP. VI. Of the <i>Pronoun</i> . Pronouns of the 1st 2d and 3d persons. Reflexive Pronouns . . .	32
CHAP. VII. Of the <i>Adjective</i> . Two different uses of the Adjective. Circumstantial Adjectives. Qualificative Adjectives . . .	34
CHAP. VIII. Of <i>Numeratives</i> . . .	41
CHAP. IX. Of the <i>Preposition</i> . Distinction between the employment of words in an <i>Absolute</i> and in a <i>Relative</i> manner. Definition of a Relation. It is composed of an <i>Antecedent</i> and a <i>Consequent</i> . Exponent of a Relation. A short account of Cases. Several consecutive Relations. The Consequent term is also called the Complement . . .	42
CHAP. X. Of the <i>Adverb</i> . . .	46
CHAP. XI. Of the <i>Conjunction</i> . . .	49
CHAP. XII. Of the <i>Interjection</i> . . .	53
CHAP. XIII. <i>Mixed Words</i> . Pronominal Adjectives. Conjunctive Adjectives. Other Conjunctive words. Negative, Affirmative and Prohibitive Adverbs . . .	53

PART II.

CHAP. I. Of Numbers. Singular, Plural and Dual Numbers. Numbers of Pronouns, Adjectives and Verbs	61
CHAP. II. Of Genders. Masculine, Feminine, Neuter and Common Genders. Genders of Pronouns, Adjectives and Verbs	64
CHAP. III. Of Cases. Declension	69
CHAP. IV. Augmentatives and Diminutives	74
CHAP. V. Degrees of Comparison. Positive, Comparative, Superlative and Intensive	76
CHAP. VI. Of Tenses. Indefinite and Definite Tenses; Present, Past and Future; Past and Future near and remote, anterior and posterior, absolute and relative	77
CHAP. VII. Of the persons of Verbs	85
CHAP. VIII. Of the Modes of Verbs. Different kinds of Propositions. They are divided into three principal Classes, according as they express <i>doubt, judgment or will</i> ; subdivisions of these three classes. Relations which different Propositions bear to each other in discourse. <i>Modes of Verbs. Personal Modes. Impersonal Modes. Absolute Modes. Relative Modes</i>	86
CHAP. IX. Of the Voices of Verbs. Subjective, Objective and Neuter Voices. Absolute, Relative, and doubly Relative Verbs. Transitive and Intransitive Verbs. Reflexive Verbs. Derived forms of Verbs. Verbs whose <i>subject</i> is expressed in an indefinite manner	97

PART III.

CHAP. I. Of Syntax. Difference between Syntax and Construction. Of Syntax properly so called. Rules of Agreement. Rules of Government	107
CHAP. II. Of Construction. Natural Construction. Inversion	108
CHAP. III. Of Ellipsis	110
CHAP. IV. Of Analysis. Logical and Grammatical Subject. Logical and Grammatical Attribute. Logical and Grammatical Complement. Logical and Grammatical Compellative. Apposition and Appositive. Every Verb in the Infinitive Mode, employed as the complement of another Verb or of a Preposition, is an elliptical expression, the analysis of which gives a Conjunctive Proposition. <i>Sur-attribute</i> , another expression equivalent to a Proposition	114
CHAP. V. Continuation of the same subject. Example of Analysis in the English language	124
CHAP. VI. Continuation of the same subject. Example of Analysis in the Latin language	133

PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL GRAMMAR.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE PROPOSITION.

It is necessarily composed of a Subject, an Attribute and a Verb, and *always accompanied by a Compellative expressed or understood.*

We speak only to make known our thoughts to others. Suppose a dumb man, wishing to inform us that he has been bitten by a mad dog, presents us a picture, in which he himself is represented to the life, followed by a dog whose tail hanging between his legs, haggard eye and bristling hair, point out the malady with which he is attacked; and that this dog is represented as holding between his teeth the unfortunate man's leg;—at the sight of this picture, we should immediately understand that he who presented it to us had been bitten by a mad dog, and we should feel ourselves inclined to procure for him the assistance he needed. Could this man, enjoying the use of *speech*, approach us and say, "I have been bitten by a mad dog"—these words would inform us of his misfortune as fully as the painting which he might have shown us. Words, then, are the *picture* of our thoughts, and serve to give other men a knowledge of the objects which are present to our minds, and of the judgment which we form concerning them.

Whenever we form a judgment of anything, we can distinguish the thing of which we are thinking, from the *quality* which we perceive connected with that thing. The thing of which we are thinking, is called the Subject; the *quality* which we perceive connected with it, is called the Attribute. If I say, "Victor is little," "Victor" is the Subject, for it is that about which I am thinking; "little," is the Attribute, for it is the quality which I perceive connected with Victor. In saying "Victor is little," I inform those who hear me, that I judge the quality of "*little*" to belong to "*Victor*." In this phrase "*Victor's father is too good*," the Subject is expressed by the words "*Victor's father*," and "*too good*" is the Attribute. In this expression, "*Children who will not learn are like the brutes*," the Subject is expressed by the words "*Children who will not learn*" and the Attribute by "*like the brutes*."

Besides the idea of a thing and the idea of a quality, every judgment of our minds includes also the idea of the *union* of the *thing* with the *quality*. When I form the judgment that "Victor is little" I have present to my mind the idea of a thing "Victor" and the idea of a quality "littleness;" but this is not all. I have also the idea of the union of this thing with this quality. I believe that the subject really exists *with* this Attribute; and it is in this that the judgment of my mind properly consists.

Since language is the *picture* of our thoughts, it is not enough, in order to represent the judgments which we form, that the words should express merely the Subject and the Attribute: they must also express their *union*, the existence of the Subject *with* the Attribute. This is, in fact, the case in the examples given above. In "Victor is little," the word "Victor" expresses the thing of which I think, i. e. the Subject; the word "little" expresses the *quality* which I perceive connected with that thing, i. e. the Attribute. The

word "is" expresses the *connection* of the *thing* with the *quality*, the existence of the Subject with the Attribute.— This word, which serves to express the connection of the Subject with the Attribute, is called the *Verb*. It is this which gives life to language, which without it would be weak and unintelligible. If I should say simply "Victor little," I should expose myself to be imperfectly understood by those whom I addressed, because I should not have expressed, with sufficient clearness, the *connection* which I perceived between the *Subject* and the *Attribute*; but when I add the word "is" and say "Victor *is* little" it is immediately comprehended that I judge that Victor exists with the quality expressed by the word "little."

Every collection of words, composed of a Subject, an Attribute and a Verb, is called a Proposition, and there can be no Proposition, unless there is an union of a Subject, a Verb and an Attribute.

[There are some languages in which the Verb can be suppressed, but its place is supplied by certain forms which the Subject and Attribute then assume, and which express the idea of the existence of the Subject with the Attribute as perfectly as the Verb itself could do it. Even in English, although regularly the Verb must be expressed; yet, if you suppress it, as children and foreigners often do, the thought might be made intelligible, either by the arrangement of the words which compose the proposition, by means of gesture, or the tone with which it is pronounced. If Stephen, for instance, speaking of his little brother, should say, "My brother little; me larger than he;" we should easily understand that he meant to say "My brother is little, and I am larger than he."]

We make use of speech, only to communicate our thoughts to others, and consequently our language is always addressed to some one. That those to whom

we speak may know that we are addressing them, we call upon them, either by name, or some equivalent expression, proper to fix their attention. Thus, I say "Victor, you are not attentive;" "Lord! I am thy creature;" "Sir, are you my friend?" These words, "*Victor*," "*Lord*," "*Sir*," make no part of the Proposition. I shall call this part of speech a *Compellative*, from a Latin word which signifies "to address, to accost."—All discourse *supposes* a Compellative, but it frequently happens that the Compellative is left understood, inasmuch as the circumstances, the gesture, the attitude of him who speaks, or the situation of those who listen, readily supply it.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE VERB.

It is the Verb, as we have already remarked, which gives life to discourse, for it is this which connects the Subject and Attribute, and upon this connection, the whole sense of the Proposition depends. It is therefore necessary, first of all, to endeavor thoroughly to understand the nature of the Verb. The only Verb to be found in the Propositions which we have heretofore given as examples, is the Verb, "*To be*." This might suffice for the expression of all the judgments of our minds. There is however a large number of other Verbs, which serve to vary and abridge discourse. The Verb "*to be*" expresses simply the existence of the Subject and its connection with the Attribute, but it does not determine that Attribute, and another word must be employed to express it. If, for example, I say, "The soup is salt," "The candle is extinguished," the Attribute is not expressed by the Verb "*is*," but by the words "*salt*" and "*extinguished*." Every other Verb than the Verb "*to be*" comprises in itself the Verb

and Attribute. When I say "Augustus plays" the word "*Augustus*" expresses the Subject, the word "*plays*" is a Verb which includes in itself the sense of the Verb "*to be*," and of the Attribute "*playing*:" for "Augustus plays" is the same thing as "Augustus is playing." In this phrase "God sees what we do, and hears what we say," the words "*sees*," "*do*," "*hears*" and "*say*" are Verbs which include the sense of the Verb "*to be*" and an attribute. It is the same thing as to say "God is seeing what we *are* doing, and he is hearing what we *are* saying."

Every word which comprises in itself the sense of the Verb "*to be*" and that of an Attribute, is Attributive Verbs. therefore, a Verb. I call these Verbs *Attributive* or *Concrete Verbs*, because they comprise an *Attribute* joined to the idea of existence.* The Verb "*to be*," which expresses only the idea of *existence* with relation to an *in-* Substantive Verb. *determinate* Attribute, is called a *Substantive* or *Abstract Verb*.

[The Verb "*to be*" is often employed as an Attributive Verb, for example, in the following phrase, "God is before all ages;" it is then synonymous with "exist." It is as if it were said, "God exists or is existing before all ages."]

The Attribute comprehended in the signification of an Attributive Verb, sometimes expresses Active Verb. an *action* which the *subject* performs, and then the Verb is called an Active Verb. Example: "Charlotte studies." This is the same as to say "Charlotte is studying," which shows that the verb "studies" is an Attributive Verb. The Attribute "studying" denotes an action which Charlotte,

* The word "Concrete," which comes from the Latin, signifies *compounded, formed from the union of several things*. It is precisely the reverse of "Abstract," a word also derived from the Latin, signifying *separated*.

who is the subject, performs. Thus "studies" is an **Attributive Active Verb**.*

Passive Verb.

Sometimes the Attribute comprehended in the signification of the Verb, denotes an action which the subject does not perform, but which is performed upon it by something else and which the subject sustains in spite of itself, or at least, without its concurrence. In this case the Verb is called **Passive**. When I say, "Sophia beats her dog," which means "Sophia is beating her dog," I use an **Attributive Active Verb**: for "beats," denotes an action performed by Sophia, who is the subject; but if I say "The dog has been beaten," I use an **Attributive Passive Verb**, for "to be beaten" does not express an action of the dog who is the subject, but an action performed by some one else upon the dog, in spite of himself, or, at least, without his concurrence.

In English the **Passive Verb** is always compounded of the **Substantive Verb** and another word which expresses the **Attribute**; but in some languages, the **Passive Verb** expresses by a single word, the idea of the Verb, together with that of the **Attribute**. In Latin, for instance, we say actively "*Victor verberat*," *Victor beats*; and passively "*Victor verberatur*," *Victor is beaten*. The single word "*verberatur*," signifies as much as the two English words "is beaten."

Neuter Verb.

Sometimes the **Attribute**, comprehended in the signification of the Verb, expresses neither an action performed by the subject, nor an action performed upon the subject by something else, but a quality of the sub-

* I place among the number of **Active Verbs**, those which signify *possession*, as in English, the verbs "*to have*," "*to possess*;" for we may consider *possession* as an action exerted by him who possesses, upon the thing possessed; and in fact "*to possess*" is susceptible of the **Passive** form "*to be possessed*." In Latin, we say in the same manner "*habere*," *to have*; and in the **Passive** "*haberi*," *to be had*, *to be possessed*, *to be held*, etc.

ject independent of all action ; simply a mode of being. Then the verb is called Neuter. This word denotes that it is neither Active nor Passive. In this proposition "God exists from all eternity," the attributive verb "exists," which means "is existing," is a Neuter Verb, because the Attribute "existing" denotes neither an action of God, nor an action performed upon God by something else, but a simple quality. It is the same with the following proposition, "The book belongs to me ;"* the word "belongs" is an Attributive Neuter Verb ; for the Attribute "belonging" expresses only a simple quality, a mode of being independent of all action.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE OF A PROPOSITION.

The *Subject* may be either *Simple* or *Compound*. The *Simple* Subject may be either *Complex* or *Incomplex*. The *Attribute* may be either *Simple* or *Compound*. The *Simple* Attribute may be either *Complex* or *Incomplex*.

We have before said that every Proposition is necessarily composed of a Subject, a Verb and an Attribute ; the Verb serving to *connect* the two other parts of the Proposition. On the knowledge of this depends the knowledge of the Subject and Attribute. It is easy to discover the Verb in a Proposition, since it is always either the Substantive Verb "*to be*," or an Attributive Verb, that is to say, a word which is equivalent to the Verb "*to be*" and an Attribute.

Having shown the nature of the *Verb*, we will now treat

* I have changed the example, because the one adduced by the author cannot be appropriately expressed in English.—Tr.

of the different kinds of words which serve to express the two other parts of a Proposition, the Subject and Attribute. We must first, however, learn to distinguish with accuracy these two parts; hence, strict attention must be paid to the following observations.

The Subject may be Simple or Compound.

Simple Subject. The Subject is *Simple*, when it denotes but a single thing, whether the nature of that thing be determined by one idea merely, or by several ideas which all conspire to its determination. It is *Compound*,

Compound. when it denotes several things, the nature of which is determined by ideas independent of each other. When I say, "Peaches are an excellent fruit;" the Subject "Peaches" is *Simple*, it denotes one thing, the nature of which is determined by a *single idea*. If I say, "Autumnal peaches which are very much exposed, and arrive to perfect maturity, are an excellent fruit," the subject is still *Simple*, for it denotes but one thing; but the nature of this thing is determined by *several ideas* which all conspire to complete the full idea of the Subject.

On the contrary, in this phrase, "peaches, apricots and plums are excellent fruits," the subject is *Compound*; for it comprehends several things, the nature of which is determined by ideas independent of each other.

Complex and Incomplex. A *Simple Subject* may be either *Incomplex* or *Complex*.* It is *Incomplex* when it denotes a

thing, the nature of which is determined by a single idea only; *Complex*, when it denotes a thing, the nature of which is determined by several ideas. Thus in an example already given, "peaches are an excellent fruit," the Simple Subject is at the same time *Incomplex*. In the other exam-

* *Complex*, a word derived from the Latin, signifies that which embraces or comprehends in itself several parts, no one of which can be abstracted without changing the nature of the whole composed of these various parts.

ple, "autumnal peaches, which are very much exposed and arrive to perfect maturity, are an excellent fruit," the Simple Subject is Complex ; for the principal idea "peaches" is modified by *that* of the *season, autumn*, and those of a *favourable exposure* and *perfect maturity*.

It is the same with the Attribute ; this is either Simple or Compound.

The Attribute is Simple when it expresses but a single quality of the subject, whether that quality be determined by a single idea or by the union of several which depend upon each other. It is Compound when it expresses different qualities of the same subject, determined by ideas independent of each other.

Simple
Attribute.

Compound.

If, then, I say, "peaches are excellent," the Attribute is simple and determined by a single idea. If I say, "peaches are more agreeable to the taste, than the other fruits which nature presents us in the same season," the Attribute is still simple, because it expresses but a single quality ; but this quality is determined by several ideas which all unite to complete its representation.

On the other hand, in this sentence, "Peaches are agreeable to the taste, delight the smell and charm the sight," the Attribute is Compound, because it expresses three distinct qualities entirely independent of each other.

A Simple Attribute may be either Incomplex or Complex. It is Incomplex when the quality which it expresses, is determined by a single idea ; Complex, when this quality is determined by several ideas. In the first example of a Simple Attribute, above given, viz. "Peaches are excellent," the Simple Attribute is Incomplex. In the second, "Peaches are more agreeable to the taste than the other fruits which nature presents us in the same season," the Simple Attribute is Complex.

Complex and
Incomplex.

It follows from what has been said, that a Compound Subject is a union of several Subjects to all which belong the same Attribute, and that a Compound Attribute is a union of several Attributes, all which belong to the same Subject. To ascertain whether the *Subject* of a Proposition be Simple or Compound, we have only to observe whether this Proposition can be resolved into several, which shall all have the same Attribute and different Subjects. For example: we perceive that in the proposition, "Peaches, apricots and plums are excellent fruit," the Subject is Compound, inasmuch as we can substitute in place of the above sentence the three following propositions,

"*Peaches* are excellent fruit;,"

"*Apricots* are excellent fruit;,"

"*Plums* are excellent fruit."

These three propositions have all, it is seen, the same *Attribute*, but each has for its subject, a part of the Compound subject of the original proposition.

It is otherwise with this proposition; "The peaches which I have eaten this year were very fine." The subject "The peaches which I have eaten this year," is Simple, for I cannot divide the proposition to which it belongs, into several. We may in like manner, ascertain whether the *Attribute* be compound by attempting to separate the proposition into several propositions which shall all have the same Subject, but different Attributes. We perceive, for example, that in this proposition, "Peaches are agreeable to the taste, delight the smell, and charm the sight," the Attribute is Compound, because we can substitute for this proposition the three following:

"Peaches are agreeable to the taste;,"

"Peaches delight the smell;,"

"Peaches charm the sight."

These three propositions have all the same Subject, but they

have each for an Attribute a part of the Compound Attribute of the original proposition.

It is otherwise with this proposition, "Peaches are preferable to all other fruits which nature produces in our climate." Although the Attribute "preferable to all other fruits which nature produces in our climate," is composed of several ideas, it is yet Simple; for we cannot separate it into several particular Attributes, to each of which we can give for a subject "Peaches," and form by this division several propositions independent of each other.

[Hence, if it is inquired, whether, in this proposition, "The love of virtue, and the hatred of virtuous men are irreconcilable sentiments," the Subject be Simple or Compound, it will not be difficult to discern that it is Simple, although at first sight and without regard to the Attribute, it might appear to be Compound. We have only to see whether it be possible to separate this proposition into two propositions, in each of which we can employ the Attribute. If we cannot say "The love of virtue is an irreconcilable sentiment," "The hatred of virtuous men is an irreconcilable sentiment," (which sentences are in fact nonsense), it follows that the Subject is Simple.

It is the same with the Attribute in the following proposition, "To endure reproof without ill temper is a thing equally proper and difficult."]

CHAPTER IV.

THE NOUN.

Having learned to distinguish in a Proposition the Subject, the Verb, and the Attribute, we proceed to examine what are the different kinds of words which enter into the composition of the Subject and Attribute.

Noun.

As the object of thought is always a single thing, it is necessary when we wish to communicate our thoughts to others, by means of speech, that we should *inform* them of this thing. If it were before our eyes and the eyes of those whom we addressed, it would be sufficient to point it out to them ; but if its nature be such that it cannot be perceived by the eyes, or if it be not present at the very moment, we can communicate an idea of it, only in designating it by its name. Suppose that while Victor is engaged in play and not thinking of his cousin Joseph, Joseph suddenly enters ; as soon as Victor sees him, he recognizes him. If, before Joseph has entered, some one should say to Victor, "Joseph is coming," the mere pronunciation of the name "Joseph," would recall his entire image to the mind of Victor as perfectly as if he had seen him. It would not be merely some one of the qualities of Joseph which Victor would perceive, it would be Joseph entirely, and Joseph only. Names, or, in the language of Grammar, Nouns, are therefore words which designate beings in a definite manner, by recalling the idea of their nature.

Proper Nouns. Nouns may be divided into several classes.

Some designate beings by the idea of their individual nature, that is to say, in such a manner that this designation is applicable only to a single thing, to a single

individual. Thus, Paris, Rome, Alexander, Vespasian are names each of which belongs to one being only, and designates that being in a *manner* which is *applicable* to that only. These Nouns are called *Proper Nouns*.

Other Nouns designate beings by the idea of Appellative Nouns. a nature common to all the individuals of a species. Such are the words, "man," "horse," "cat," which do not of themselves call to mind the idea of any individual in particular, but are applicable to all the individuals of the same species; to every man, to every horse, to every cat; because they call to mind only the nature which is common to all. Every man is a man, but every man is not Alexander; this is the name of a single individual of the human species. Every horse is a horse, but every horse is not Bucephalus; this is the name of a single individual of the horse kind. Every cat is a cat, but every cat is not Selima;* this is the name of a single individual of the cat kind. These nouns, applicable to all the individuals of a species, are called *Appellative Nouns*.

Lastly, there are nouns which denote neither Abstract Nouns. individuals, nor entire classes of beings, but *qualities, modes* of being, or action, considered independently of the beings in which they are found or which are their object; such are the words "friendship," "precipitation," "fear," "joy," "perfection," "virtue," etc. These are termed *Abstract Nouns*, because they denote only a *mode* of being, separated from the beings themselves and from their other qualities. *Abstract Nouns* are often confounded in one class with Appellative Nouns.

[As Appellative Nouns express only the nature common to

* In the original the name *Rominagrobos* is employed, taken from one of Fontaine's Fables, in which a cat is thus designated. (Book 7, Fable 16); but as this would appear uncouth to English eyes, I have substituted for it a name equally consecrated by poetic usage. (See Gray's Odes.) TR.

Comprehension
of Appellative
Nouns. all the individuals of the same species, when we employ these nouns we abstract every thing which characterizes any individual in particular, and consider in each one of the individuals comprised in the extension of the Appellative noun, only what is common to all without exception.

The word "*being*" for example, designates all the substances to which it is applied, only by the simple idea of existence; the word "animal" adds to the idea of existence, those of a compound, corporeal, complete, organized substance, endowed with sensibility and with locomotion, i. e. the power of transporting itself from place to place; the word "quadruped" adds further to these ideas, that of moving upon four feet; lastly, the word "horse" increases the sum of these ideas by all the particular ideas of the peculiar form which distinguishes the horse from other species of quadrupeds.

Thus the word "horse" comprehends a greater number of particular ideas than the word quadruped;" this latter comprehends less than the word "horse," but more than the word "animal;" and, finally, this last, inferior to the word "quadruped" as to the number of ideas it contains, is superior in this respect to the word "being."

The *number of particular ideas* comprehended in an Appellative noun, forms the *Comprehension* of that Noun. This is the greater, the more of them the Noun comprehends.

Extension of
Appellative
Nouns. Of Appellative nouns, some are applicable to a single class of beings only, others to a more or less large number of different classes. The word "horse," for instance, includes *all individuals* of the horse kind, without distinction of country, age, sex, or colour; but the word "quadruped" which designates four-footed animals, comprises besides horses, a multitude of other species, as dogs, cats, oxen, lions, etc.; it has therefore a

much greater *Extension* than the word "horse." It is the same with the word "animal" in relation to the word "quadruped." The first of these words, besides four-footed beasts includes man and all the animals which the earth, air and water contain ; it therefore greatly surpasses the word "quadruped" in *extension*. But animals are themselves but a small part of "beings," and consequently, the Appellative noun "being," which comprises all existences, spiritual and corporeal, has a still greater *extension* than the noun "animal."

The number of individuals or classes of beings, comprised in the signification of an Appellative noun, forms the *Extension* of that noun. This is the greater, the more of them the noun comprises.

From the definitions we have just given of the *Comprehension* and *Extension* of an Appellative noun, it follows that the *greater Comprehension* an Appellative noun possesses, the *less* is its *Extension*. The word "being" *comprehends* but a single idea, that of *existence*, and *extends* to every thing which exists. The word "animal" *comprehends several* particular ideas, but it *extends* only to corporeal, complete beings, endowed with animal life and with locomotion ; it excludes all others.

The word "quadruped," *comprehends* one idea more than the word "animal," hence it *extends* to a part only of the tribe of animals, to those which have received from nature four feet upon which to move ; it excludes man, birds, fishes, etc. Finally, the word "horse," includes a great number of particular ideas, which are not comprised in the word "quadruped," but it *extends* only to a single class of fourfooted animals and excludes all the rest.

What we have said of *Appellative* Nouns applies also to *Abstract* nouns. The word "indolence," for instance, *comprehends* a greater num-

Comprehension
and Extension
of Abstract
Nouns.

ber of particular ideas than the word "vice," and hence has less *extension* than this last word, which extends to indolence, pride, gluttony, anger, etc.

Peculiar
Nouns.

There are in most languages Appellative Nouns, whose *Comprehension* is very limited, and whose *Extension* is almost boundless, because they designate beings by the simple idea of existence, common to them all, and augmented only by some accidental or external relation whether to the person who speaks, to those who listen, or to others.

Such in English are the words "this," "that," "these," and "those," which are equivalent to "this *person*," "this *being*," "this *thing*," "that *person*," "that *being*," "that *thing*," etc. These are genuine Appellative Nouns which join to the general idea expressed by the words "person," "being," "thing," that of demonstration, that is to say, the particular circumstance of being under the eyes of those who speak or listen; and it is precisely because these objects are *corporeally* present, or because he who speaks has already designated them in such a manner as to render them present to the *minds* of his auditors, that we are content to recall them by Nouns so vague and of such unlimited *extension*. The words "each," "whoever," "whatever," "somebody," etc. belong also to the class of Appellative nouns, and the *extension* of their signification should not exclude them from it.]

CHAPTER V.

OF THE ARTICLE.

Proper Nouns designate beings in a definite manner, so that there is no need of any sign to point out the particular individuals to which they are applied. *Appellative* Nouns, on the contrary, being common to all the individuals of the same species, when we wish to apply them to a single individual or to a certain number of individuals of this species, or, lastly, to the entire species, it is of use to employ particular signs to indicate these various applications.

It is the same with *Abstract* nouns; they designate a quality or an action in a general manner and independently of the shades of difference of which it is susceptible, and which in some sort, denote different things. Thus the word "indolence" includes alike indolence of *body* and indolence of *mind*; the dulness which we feel on rising from bed and the indolence which prevents the performance of our duties. The word "virtue" includes alike prudence, temperance, docility, etc. Hence, when we employ Abstract nouns to express qualities or actions, considered in a particular manner in relation to a subject in which they are found or to something which is their object, this employment of them must be denoted by particular signs.

The words which serve to determine the *extension* of Appellative and Abstract Nouns are denominated *Articles*. Such in English are the words "the," "this," "that," "these," "those."* Let us make this apparent by examples.

* The words "a" and "an" are usually regarded as *Articles*. I think it is without reason, that they are thus regarded. They ap-

The word "man" denotes the union of all the qualities necessary to make a man, and common to all the individuals of the human species. It is found with this sense in the following sentence, "To merit the name of *man* we must act like men, and not like animals destitute of reason." In this case, I neither mean to designate the entire species, or all the individuals collectively which compose it, nor to point out a particular individual. If I wish to speak of a certain man in particular, I make use of the article Determinative Article. "the," as in saying, "The man who built this house, was rich." We may denominate this Article, the *Determinative Article*.

Demonstrative Article. If the man of whom I was speaking, were present, or if I had previously pointed him out in such a manner, that he was; as it were, under the eyes of those whom I addressed, I should employ the Article "this," or "that." I should say, for example, "This man whom you see, is a rogue." This Article may be called the *Demonstrative Article*.

The *Determinative* Article frequently serves to denote that the Appellative noun is used with the whole of its *extension*, and this happens especially when we wish to characterize a whole species in opposition to another. When I say, "The *woman* has sensibility for her share, but strength is the attribute of the *man*," it is plain that I oppose the entire class of the masculine, to that of the feminine, sex, and the Article adds energy and precision to the expression.

The *Demonstrative* Article, on the contrary, always *confines* the extension of the Appellative noun, by limiting its signification to a part of the individuals to whom it is appli-

pear to me to be nothing more than *Numeratives* employed to designate the singular which is scarcely different from the plural in most modern languages.

cable by itself. When I say, "these men," "these horses," I never speak of the whole class of men or of horses; I speak only of a determinate *part* of this species.

[Some languages, as the Biscayan and Danish, employ for Determinative articles, instead of separate words, terminations suffixed to the nouns. There are moreover some languages, as the Latin and Persian, which make no use of Determinative Articles.]

The Determinative Article is frequently employed in English and in most modern languages in an improper manner, and contrary to its primitive intention. Although in many of these cases, we can by means of subtilties, justify its use, there is a large number in which we can offer no other excuse for it than the caprice of custom. It is thus that in Greek, the Determinative Article is placed before Proper Nouns, and that in that language together with the Arabic, the Determinative and Demonstrative Articles are often united. It is thus also, that in these languages the Article is used before both the Noun and the Adjective; so that they say, "the door, the great," instead of saying as in English, "the great door." Besides, in most modern languages, although not in the English, the Determinative Article is of great use in *distinguishing gender and number*; and perhaps it is this, more than any thing else which has contributed to render its use so extensive. The number of Demonstrative Articles may be large or small. Some languages, for instance, have different Demonstrative Articles for things which are near and things which are distant, while others do not. This distinction of signification is expressed in French by the addition of the Adverbs "here" or "there," according as the object is near or remote. The Demonstrative Article may be different, moreover, according as the Noun to which it is attached, denotes a rational animal or a brute, an animated or an inanimate being. There might

even be different Articles, both Determinative and Demonstrative, according to the rank or quality of the persons to whose names these Articles were attached, and according to their relations of superiority or inferiority to the person who speaks.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE PRONOUN.

Every judgment of our minds has something for its object ; hence every Proposition, it being only the picture of a judgment of our minds, must have for its subject a *noun*, which recalls the idea of a *thing*. It often happens that we do not *name* the thing, the idea of which we wish to recall, but content ourselves with designating it another way. Thus, when I myself am the subject of the Proposition, I do not name myself, but in place of my name, I use the word "I." I do not say, when speaking of myself, "*Antony* wishes to sleep," I say, "*I* wish to sleep."

When a female to whom I am speaking, is herself the subject of the Proposition, I do not name her, but in place of her name, I employ the word "thou."—Thus, in speaking to Antoinette, I do not say "Antoinette plays," but "thou playest." When the person or thing which is the subject of the Proposition is sufficiently understood by those whom I address, whether it be because I have already named it or because it is present, and I point it out with my finger ; instead of employing its name, I make use of the words "he," "she," or "it." Thus after having said, "Charlotte writes badly," I should not add, "but *Charlotte* sews well, *Charlotte* speaks but little, *Charlotte* is still ;" I should say "but

she sews well, *she* speaks but little, *she* is still." In the same way when Victor holds his book without learning any thing, when speaking of him to his mother, I do not say, "Victor holds his book, but Victor learns nothing;" I say, "He holds his book, but he learns nothing." The words "I," "thou," "he," "she," "it," "we," "you," "they," are called Pronouns, which name denotes that they stand in the place of Nouns.

The person who speaks, is called the "*first* person," he who is addressed, the "*second* person," and he of whom we speak, the "*third* person."

Persons of
Pronouns.

"I" and "we" are Pronouns of the first person, "thou" and "you" of the second person, "he," "she," "it," and "they" of the third person.

When the person who acts is at the same time the person upon whom the action falls, the Pronoun which serves to denote the object of the action is called "Reflexive." Such, in English, are the Pronouns "myself," "thyself," "himself," "herself," "itself," and their plurals; as in these phrases; "she saw herself in a mirror," "she killed herself with a sword," etc.

Reflexive
Pronouns.

Pronouns, therefore, as appears from what we have just said, are words designed to denote the *part* which each person or thing plays in the act of speech. This is the literal meaning of the word "person," borrowed from the Latin "persona" which may be translated "actor."

[Some languages have no Reflexive Pronouns, and supply their place in another way. The Arab, for instance, says, "I have wounded *my* soul," "thou hast wounded *thy* soul," for "I have wounded myself," "thou hast wounded thyself."]

A custom has been introduced into many languages, of employing the *Plural* Pronoun of the second person, instead of the Singular. Thus, in English, we say, "What do *you* want," and not "What dost *thou* want."

In some languages, different Pronouns are used, according to the different degrees of the superiority or inferiority of him who speaks, in relation to him who is addressed. An example of this is seen in the Biscayan language, which possesses three singular Pronouns of the second person.

This shade of difference in the signification of Pronouns may extend to the three different persons, and does, in fact, in the language of the Japanese. The words which are employed in that language to express "I," "thou," "he," express at the same time with extreme precision the different relations of superiority or inferiority, subsisting between the interlocutors.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ADJECTIVE.

We often consider beings with relation to their qualities, whether essential to their nature or accidental. We are then obliged to add to the Proper or Appellative Noun which is the name of the thing of which we speak, the name of this quality, and to make known the connexion which we suppose to exist between the being and the quality.

Thus, in these examples, "The man who has reason," "The king who has courage," "The sun who has brightness," the words "reason," "courage," "brightness," express the qualities which I observe in the beings of which I speak, which are "the man," "the king," the sun."

But this manner of expression is long and monotonous. We can attain the same end in a shorter way by saying, "The *reasonable* man," "The *courageous* king," "The

bright sun." The words "reasonable," "courageous," "bright," are called *Adjectives*.*

The word "Adjective" signifies, *which is designed to add*, and in fact, Adjectives are designed to add to the *Noun*, which recalls the idea of the nature of beings, a *quality* which may belong as properly to beings of a different nature, insomuch, that they cannot designate any particular beings unless they are joined to a noun. When I say "white," "courageous," "shining," "rational," I do not call up in the mind the idea of any being; but if I join these Adjectives to Nouns, and say "white wine," "courageous man," "shining sun," "rational animal," there results from the union of the Noun and Adjective the idea of a *being* which is denoted by its nature and considered as possessing a certain quality.

If I should say, "Black are more common in France than white;" you could not understand what I meant to express; you would not be able to determine whether what I meant to express was true or false, and you might reasonably inquire of what I was speaking. The reason is, that not having employed any *Noun*, I could not have called to mind the idea of any *being*, and that as the qualities "white" and "black" may be applied to a multitude of entirely different beings, they could not point out any one in particular. But if I should say "Black *horses* are more common in France than white *horses*," you would understand me perfectly, and you could judge that what I said was true.

* The use of the Adjective is only a compendious method of expression, and is not absolutely necessary. It is for this reason, that one language has not Adjectives corresponding to all of another. Thus in Arabic, there are no Adjectives answering to our Adjectives "every," "each," "no," "some," "what," etc. so that in place of saying, "Every man," "No man," "Each man," "Some men," "What man is that?" etc. they say, "The totality of men," "Not one among men," "The totality of one among men," "A portion of men," "What of man is that?" The Latin Adjectives "tot," "quot," etc. cannot be translated into our language except by the two words "so many," "how many," etc.

Adjectives are more frequently employed with Appellative and Abstract Nouns, than with Proper Nouns, because, as Proper Nouns designate individuals in a manner which can apply only to them, it is not necessary to express their qualities in order to cause them to be recognized by those whom we address. Appellative Nouns on the contrary, being applicable to all the individuals of the same species, when we wish to confine their signification to a part only of the individuals of the species, we may make use of Adjectives for the purpose.

Thus, when I say, "Horses are very useful animals," the Appellative noun "Horses," comprises all the individuals of this species; but, if I wish to speak of horses of a certain color, of a certain age, or of a certain country only, I might restrict the signification of the Appellative noun by connecting with it an Adjective, as in the following Propositions: "White horses are rare," "Old horses are not capable of fatiguing labor," "French horses are robust and agile."

It is the same with Abstract Nouns, nouns which designate a quality or an action considered in a general way. This idea is susceptible of being restricted or modified and it is often done by means of an Adjective. Thus the word "love," which denotes, in general, the inclination of the heart towards some object, may be modified by Adjectives in a thousand ways, and we may say, "*divine* love," "*profane* love," "*lively*," "*ardent*," "*celestial*," "*timid*," "*reserved* love," etc. etc.

Proper Nouns are more rarely connected with Adjectives for the reason I have stated above; this happens, nevertheless, somewhat frequently. For example; we join an Adjective to a proper noun when the same name is common to several individuals and we wish to distinguish them from each other; and then this Adjective becomes, as it were, a part of the proper noun. Thus we say, "Charles the bald,"

"Charles the Great," "Louis the Just," and "Louis the Debonair," to distinguish these princes from others who have borne the name of Charles or Louis.

We also join an Adjective to a Proper noun to point out a certain quality of the individual designated by the noun, a quality to which alone we direct our attention at the moment. In saying, for instance, "the *modest* Fenelon," I evince that I am considering Fenelon, at that moment, not as a learned, eloquent, pious, or benevolent man, but simply as a modest man.

[Adjectives may be employed in discourse with two different functions ; sometimes the Adjective forms of itself the Attribute of a Proposition, as in this expression : "Nero was cruel,"—sometimes it enters either into the Subject or into the Attribute, or into some other accessory part of the Proposition, to qualify the noun with which it is connected. It is thus that it appears in these propositions : "an *obedient* son is the joy of his father ;" "Solomon was a *just* king ;" "innocence is a *strong* consolation in the midst of the most *terrible* adversity." When the Adjective forms the *Attribute* of a Proposition, it belongs to the noun which serves as the *Subject* of the Proposition, and cannot be joined to any other Noun, since it is of the Subject that we affirm the quality expressed by this Adjective.

Two different
uses of the Ad-
jective.

Every where else, as the Adjective performs only the functions of a qualificative, it must necessarily be joined to a Noun, and if at any time the noun be suppressed, it is only because it can easily be supplied by those whom we address.

Thus in this proposition : "black horses are more common in France than white," there are three Adjectives, "*black*," "*common*," and "*white*." The first qualifies the noun "*horses*," which expresses the Subject ; the second, "*common*," forming the Attribute, cannot be united to a

Noun ; as to the last, the word "white," it must be connected with a noun. This noun is understood, but there is no one who could not readily supply it. It is the noun "horses," which ought to be repeated after this Adjective, and the sentence is only an abridgment of the following : "black horses are more common in France, than white horses are common in France."

In this sentence, "the righteous will be eternally happy, and the wicked eternally miserable," are found four Adjectives without a single noun ; these Adjectives are the words "*righteous*," "*wicked*," "*happy*," and "*miserable*." As the two last form the Attributes of the two propositions of which this sentence is composed, it is not necessary that they should be connected with Nouns. The two other Adjectives can, it is true, designate determinate beings, only by connexion with a Noun ; and although this is not expressed, it is only because every body sees that it must be "men," and that this sentence is equivalent to the following : "righteous *men* will be eternally happy, and wicked *men* will be eternally miserable."

Adjectives, with reference to the influence which they exert over the nouns they qualify, may be divided into two classes. Some qualify the Noun to which they are attached, by a *circumstance* entirely extraneous of the subject expressed by that Noun. Such are the Adjectives, "*all*," "*every*," "*each*," "*none*," "*some*," "*one*," "*two*," "*three*," "*four*," etc. I shall denominate these

Circumstantial Adjectives. Others define the Noun to which they are united, by a *quality* which exists in the subject expressed by that Noun. Such are the Adjectives "*good*," "*beautiful*," "*red*," "*royal*," "*my*," "*thy*," "*our*," "*first*," "*second*," "*third*," "*fourth*," etc. I call the Adjectives of this second class, *Qualificative Adjectives*. These two kinds of Adjectives have nearly the

same relation to each other as exists between the Determinative and Demonstrative Articles. *Circumstantial* Adjectives, like the Determinative Article, affect only the *extension* of Appellative Nouns, without influencing in any degree their *comprehension*. *Qualificative* Adjectives, like the Demonstrative Article, affect at the same time their *extension* and *comprehension*, diminishing the former and increasing the latter. Let us make this apparent by several examples.

When I say, "this cloth is fine," "the blue cloth is dear," "my cloth is excellent," "the first cloth is the best;" I add to the ideas comprised in the Appellative Noun "*cloth*," that of being present to the sight of him whom I address, or of being of a blue colour, or of being in my possession, or lastly of holding the first rank among several cloths; and by this means I greatly diminish the extension of the word "*cloth*," inasmuch as I exclude all cloths which either are out of my sight, or of any other colour than blue, or in the possession of any other individual than myself, or lastly, which occupy any other than the first rank.

On the contrary, when I say, "wine is the product of the vine," "each wine has its peculiar taste," "every wine loses by age a part of its strength," "some wines last scarcely three years," "there are two wines which I prefer to all others;" I restrict, it is true, the *extension* of the word "wine," or else I indicate that I use it in *all* its extension, but I neither add any particular idea to those which the word "wine" *comprehends*, nor take any away from them.

From the fact that the extension and comprehension of Proper Nouns can neither be enlarged nor diminished, it would seem that they could not from their very nature be connected with either Articles or Adjectives. Yet they sometimes take both, as I have already stated. When they are common to several individuals, the addition of the article or adjective serves to diminish their *extension* by increas-

ing their *comprehension*, and to render them thus *individual*, as they should be from their nature. This connexion takes place in the examples I have adduced ; viz. "Louis the Debonair," "Louis the Just," "Charles the Great," "Charles the Bald."

When the *Proper Noun* can designate but a *single* individual, as in an example I have presented, "the modest Fenelon," or in this, "the cruel Caligula," the addition of the Article and Adjective is yet made with the same intention as in the preceding case. In fact, the Noun "Fenelon" seems to include the ideas of an *eloquent* man, a *learned* man, a *sensible* man, etc. and the noun "Caligula," on the contrary to comprise the ideas of a *debauched*, *imbecile*, *besotted* man, as if there were so many different persons classed under one name. By adding an Adjective to these Nouns I enlarge their *comprehension* and diminish their *extension*. I exclude, by a process of abstraction purely mental, the *eloquent* Fenelon, the *learned* Fenelon, the *sensible* Fenelon, that I may speak only of the *modest* Fenelon. By the same operation of the mind, I exclude the *imbecile* Caligula, the *debauched* Caligula, the *besotted* Caligula, that I may see only the *cruel* Caligula, to whom alone I wish those who hear me to direct their attention.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF NUMERATIVES.

Appellative Nouns are from their nature applicable to all the individuals of the same species. We have seen that by means of Articles and Adjectives we may confine them to a part or even to one of these individuals. If the number of individuals to which we desire to confine their extension is not precisely determined, we make use of Adjectives, such as "several," "some," or of Nouns, as "a portion," "a number," etc. If this number *be* definite, in all languages words are employed which are intended for the special purpose of numeration, as in English "one," "two," "four," "hundred," "thousand." I denominate words designed for this purpose *Numeratives*. These words may be either Nouns or Adjectives. In English, they are true Adjectives of that class which I have named Circumstantial Adjectives.* We have, however, *Nouns* which are made use of for numeration, but in a collective way, that is to say, as if all the individuals numbered composed but a single mass. It is thus we say, "a couple," "a dozen," "a score," "a million," etc.

In some other languages all the Numeratives are Nouns. In Arabic, the number "one," is an Adjective, all the others are Nouns.†

* It is true that we often employ our Numeratives as Nouns; as for instance when we say, "I have seen all *the five*;" but there is then an ellipsis of the Noun, as when we say, "the rich despise the poor." It seems to me that the construction of Numeratives in Greek, Latin, and English, is always or at least generally the same as that of the Adjectives *πολύς*, multi, plures, several, some, which without hesitation are regarded as Adjectives.—AUTHOR.

† Their relation to the thing numbered is indicated in a manner analogous to that in which *we* express the relation existing between

[It follows from what has been said, that the Numeratives do not form of themselves a distinct class of words; but that they belong to the class of Nouns or of Adjectives, according to the genius of different languages.]

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE PREPOSITION.

Use of words in an absolute and a relative manner.

We are often obliged to unite several words, in order fully to express the idea of the thing of which we are speaking. If I say, "give me a horse," the word "horse" of itself fully expresses the thing of which I speak; but, when I say, "give me a horse of pasteboard," I unite the idea of a "horse" to that of "pasteboard," that I may make the representation of the thing I speak of, complete. If some one should ask me, "what are you doing," I might answer, "I am writing," and this single word would give him an idea of the action about which I was employed; but if I wished to give him a more definite knowledge of what I was doing, I might say, "I am writing a lesson in Grammar;" he would then know not merely that I was writing, but that I was writing a *lesson*, and that this lesson was a lesson in *Grammar*. In the first case, when I use but a single word to paint the idea of a thing or an action, this word is used in an *absolute* manner; when the principal word which characterizes the thing or action is followed by one or more nouns which are related to it and

two Nouns; and yet by a very remarkable singularity, there exists between them and the thing numbered, an agreement of *genders* similar to that which exists in some languages (the French for instance), between the Noun and the Adjective; so that their form is varied according as the thing numbered is of the masculine or feminine gender.—AUTHOR.

modify the principal idea, this word is employed in a *relative* manner. In the example, "Give me a horse," the noun "horse" is employed in an *absolute* manner; in the example "give me a horse of pasteboard," the same word "horse" is employed in a *relative* manner, and the noun with which it is in relation is "pasteboard." In the example, "I am writing," the Verb "to write" is employed in an *absolute* manner; in the other example, "I am writing a lesson in Grammar," the same verb "to write" is employed in a *relative* manner, and the noun with which it is in relation is *lesson*; but this latter noun itself is employed in a *relative* manner, and the noun with which it is in relation is "Grammar."

The *relation* between two words is not always the same. Thus between the words "I am" and "water," there may be a great number of different relations, as "I am *in* the water," "I am *upon* the water," "I am *under* the water," "I am *before* the water," "I am *behind* the water," "I am *near* the water." To express these different relations we must employ in discourse different signs.

These relations are denoted sometimes merely by the places which the words occupy in a proposition; sometimes by the different terminations which are given to the same word; sometimes, finally, by certain words placed between the word which is employed in a relative manner and that which is in relation with it. These words are called *Prepositions*, from a Latin word which signifies "*to place before*," because that in Latin as in English, they are *placed before* the noun which completes the relation.*

In these words, "a horse of pasteboard," the nouns "horse" and "pasteboard" are in relation with each other,

* In some other languages, in the Turkish, Basque, and Greenlandish, for example, these words are placed *after* the consequent term; hence we cannot properly give them the name of Prepositions.—AUTHOR.

and the nature of this relation is determined by the Preposition "*of*." In the other example, "I am writing a lesson in Grammar," the verb "*I am writing*," and the noun "*a lesson*," are in relation, and this relation is denoted by the place which the noun occupies immediately after the verb. The noun "*lesson*," moreover, is in relation with the noun "*Grammar*," and the nature of this relation is determined by the Preposition "*in*." Lastly, in all the examples, "I am in the water," "I am upon the water," "I am under the water," "I am before the water," "I am behind the water," "I am near the water," the verb "*I am*" and the noun "*water*" are in relation; but the nature of each of these different relations is determined by the several Prepositions, "*in*," "*upon*," "*under*," "*before*," "*behind*," "*near*."

A relation always supposes two things; these

two things are called *the two terms of the relation*; the first is called the *Antecedent*, the second, the *Consequent*. In these words, "a horse of pasteboard," the two terms of the relation are "*horse*" and "*pasteboard*," "*horse*" is the Antecedent, and "*pasteboard*" the Consequent. The

Preposition which is employed to point out the nature of the relation which exists between the two terms, is called the *Exponent*.*

Exponent of a relation.

In this sentence, "Moses gave the law of God to the Jewish people," there are three relations. The first has for its Antecedent term "*gave*," and for its Consequent term "*the law*."

The second has for its Antecedent "*the law*," and for its Consequent "*God*."

The third has for its Antecedent "*gave*," and for its Consequent "*the Jewish people*."

* This denomination is borrowed from Arithmetic. In that science, the Exponent is that number which expresses the relation existing between two other numbers. *Three* is the exponent of the relation of *twelve* to *four*.—AUTHOR.

In the first relation there is no Exponent.

In the second the Exponent is the Preposition "*of*."

In the third the Exponent is the Preposition "*to*."

The same word which serves as the Consequent term to one relation, may serve at the same time as Antecedent to another. Of this, we have seen an example in the proposition, "I am writing a lesson in Grammar," where the word "*lesson*" serves at once as Consequent to "*I am writing*," and Antecedent to "*Grammar*." In this example, "I have bought a table of mahogany," we find the two following relations: first relation; Antecedent, "*I have bought*," Consequent, "*a table*;" second relation; Antecedent, "*a table*," Consequent, "*mahogany*;" we see that the word table serves at the same time as Consequent to the first relation, and Antecedent to the second.

[If the example previously given, "Moses gave the law of God to the Jewish people," were translated into Latin, we should have, "*Moïses dedit legem Dei populo Judaïco*."

The first relation has for its Antecedent term "*dedit*," and for its Consequent "*legem*."

The second has for its Antecedent "*legem*," and for its Consequent "*Dei*."

The third has for its Antecedent "*dedit*," and for its Consequent "*populo Judaïco*."] Cases.

Each of these relations has its Exponent; but this Exponent is not, as in English, a separate word; in the first, it is the final *em* of the word "*legem*;" in the second, the final *i* of the word "*Dei*;" in the third the final *o* of the words "*populo Judaïco*." These terminations are what are called *Cases*. We shall consider this subject further hereafter.

In a great many languages, both in those which admit Cases, as the Turkish, Basque, etc. and in those which do not admit them, as the Persian, the relation between two

nouns is denoted by placing the Consequent term immediately before the Antecedent,* and making, as it were, but a single word; this may even take place in regard to several nouns forming different successive relations. Thus, in the Basque language instead of saying: "The ornaments of the altars of the churches of the Indies," they express themselves in a manner nearly equivalent to the following: "Indies altars churches ornaments.† The Consequent term of a relation may also be called the *Complement*. If the nature of the relation is determined by a Preposition, the Consequent term of this relation is the Complement of the Preposition; if there is no Preposition, the Consequent term is the immediate Complement of the Antecedent.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE ADVERB.

There is no relation which may not be expressed by a Preposition followed by its Complement, or by an immediate Complement; but it is sometimes the case that instead of employing a Preposition and its Complement, we make use of a single word which combines at once the signification of both. Thus, instead of saying, "to live in tranquillity," "to walk with slowness," "to write with rapidity," "to speak

* In this case the denominations *Antecedent* and *Consequent* would seem to be contradictory to the order of the words; but they preserve their propriety in relation to the order of the ideas. In the example cited from the Basque language, it is the idea of the ornaments which first presents itself to the mind and which is modified by the idea of the altars, as this in its turn is modified by the idea of the churches, and the idea of the churches by that of the Indies.

† The use of our Possessive Case is somewhat similar. Thus we say "God's house," instead of "the house of God."—TR.

in a bold manner," "to be rich to excess," we may say, "to live tranquilly," "to walk slowly," "to write rapidly," "to speak boldly," "to be excessively rich;" these words are called Adverbs.

Every Adverb is equivalent to a Preposition followed by its Complement; but it is not true that every Preposition followed by its Complement can in all languages be exchanged for an Adverb; for there are in every language, Adverbs to which there are no equivalent single words in other languages. Thus the Latin Adverbs "*dextrorsum*," "*sinistrorsum*," can be rendered in English only by these expressions, *to the right*, *to the left*, which includes Prepositions followed by their Complements. In Arabic, on the contrary, there is no Noun, Verb, or Adjective, which may not become an Adverb. Thus, in Greek, by means of a peculiar termination, all names of places might become Adverbs, and the Greeks said in a single word, *from Athens*, *to Athens*, in these expressions, "*to come from Athens*," "*to go to Athens*." Adverbs serve to express the circumstances which accompany an action, such as circumstances of time, place, instrument, and manner. They are also used to modify the Attribute contained in the Verb, and also the Adjective which is itself an Attribute.* Thus we say, "he writes tolerably," "he has

* Gebelin will have it that the Adverb modifies only the action or the mode of existence comprehended in the Verb, and says that in these phrases, "he is extremely handsome," "he is truly king," it is the Verb and not the Attribute which is modified by the Adverb. I think this to be incorrect; as the Abstract Verb merely denotes the existence of the Subject with relation to an indefinite Attribute, it is not susceptible of any modification except the circumstantial modifications of time or duration, like those which are found in the Arabic Verbs signifying *to be in the morning*, *to be with duration*, *to be in the evening*.

Gebelin says further, that Adverbs, in their absolute sense, are never employed except with Verbs. But it is so with all circumstantial expressions; they always modify a Verb. And the reason that Adverbs are used in an absolute sense with Verbs, is that these Verbs contain an Attribute, which the Adverb modifies; as "he

died courageously," "he has been severely beaten," "he is extremely prudent," "he is very rich." Many Adverbs are themselves susceptible of modification by other Adverbs. Adverbs which may be modified by other Adverbs, are those which express a quality susceptible of increase or diminution. Adverbs which serve to modify others are those which express *quantity*, as *more*, *less*, *very*, *little*, *too*, *exceedingly*, *extremely*, *as*, etc. Thus we say, "*more briefly*," "*very wisely*," but we cannot say "*more*" or "*very first*."

Those Adverbs of quantity which serve to modify Adverbs of quality, may also modify each other. For example, we say very properly, "he is infinitely more wise."

Certain Adverbs, and especially those which denote circumstances of place, may be used as the Complements of Prepositions. Thus we say, "go from hence to Rome," "he came from thence in a very short time," "from whence came you."*

paints admirably," i. e. "he *is painting* admirably." The Adverb, then, never modifies the Verb, but always the Attribute, and though it apparently modifies Concrete Verbs, it is only because they contain an Attribute. What difference then is there between an Adverb and a Preposition followed by its Complement? None; for in those languages which have no Preposition, but possess in its stead a multitude of Cases, all these Cases may be regarded as Adverbs. On the other hand, it is certain that a language may make use of Adverbs altogether; but in general, the union of a Preposition and its Complement in an Adverb, takes place only when the Noun which is the Complement expresses a vague, or abstract idea, or quality; it takes place but rarely when the Noun is Appellative, and in most languages never occurs when the Complement is a *Proper* noun. In Greek, there is an exception in regard to names of places. From the fact which I have presented, that there is no difference between a Preposition followed by its Complement and an Adverb, it must not be supposed that in every language we can always employ indifferently the Preposition followed by its Complement, or the corresponding Adverb. Usage may in this respect have introduced delicate shades of signification to which it is necessary to conform; but these shades of difference introduced by custom do not impeach the principle, which is confirmed by a comparison of different languages.

* We have previously asserted that Adverbs are equivalent to a

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE CONJUNCTION.

The different kinds of words which we have hitherto considered, Verbs, Nouns, Articles, Adjectives, Pronouns, Prepositions, and Adverbs, unite to form a Proposition and to determine the relations which exist between different terms of the same Proposition. But as the different terms of the same Proposition are in relation with each other, so also have different Propositions, relations to each other which it is necessary to express in discourse. Sometimes a Proposition is opposed to that which precedes it, sometimes it depends upon it as a necessary condition, sometimes it serves as its Complement. Each of these characters must be denoted by a peculiar sign, which shall indicate the mutual dependence of these Propositions, and the nature of their relations. Let us explain this by examples: "God spake, and every thing was made; he commanded, and every thing was created." "God spake," is one complete proposition; "every thing was made," is another as complete as the former. The word "*and*" which joins them, belongs to neither; it serves merely to connect them and to denote that

Proposition and its Complement; it may therefore appear extraordinary that Adverbs should be used as complements to Prepositions. Our wonder will, however, cease when we consider that it is not uncommon for a Preposition to have for its Complement another Preposition, itself followed by its Complement. Thus we say, "the lightning descends from on high," etc.

The way to analyze this mode of construction is to consider the second Preposition with its Complement, as forming a single whole; and in fact, "*on high*" is equivalent to "*a high place*." In the same way the Adverbs "*hence*," "*thence*," "*whence*," may be considered as Nouns and as equivalent to "*this place*," "*that place*," "*what place*." Similar examples are found in Latin, as "*dehinc*," "*exinde*," "*desursum*," etc.

the production of all things was a consequence of the word of God. The same must be said of the two other propositions, "he commanded," "every thing was created." Each singly has a perfect signification; the word "*and*" which unites them, denotes that the cause of the effect expressed by the second was the command of God expressed by the first.

Another example: "Cicero in his youth was covered with glory, but his old age was disturbed by the misfortunes of the republic." There are here two complete Propositions; the word "*but*" belongs to neither; it indicates the contrariety between the thought expressed by the first Proposition and that contained in the second.

"You will dine here tomorrow, if you wish to do me a pleasure." Here also are two Propositions; one is, "you will dine here tomorrow," the other, "you wish to do me a pleasure;" the word "*if*" which connects these two Propositions, shows the conditional relation existing between them.

"God desires that we should love our neighbor." The first Proposition is, "God desires;" the second, "we should love our neighbor." Indeed we can express the same idea under another form by saying, "Let us love our neighbor, God desires it," and under this form we can easily perceive the distinction between the two Propositions. The word "*that*," which connects them, indicates that the second is the complement of the first.

"It will rain tomorrow, or it will blow very violently; for the barometer is falling." Here are three Propositions; the two first are joined by the word "*or*," indicating doubt and alternative; they are both connected with the third by the word "*for*," which denotes that the two first are a consequence of the third; that the falling of the mercury in the barometer is the fact which makes me judge that it will either rain tomorrow or will blow very violently.

Although these words "*and*," "*or*," "*if*," "*that*," "*for*," "*but*," have very different significations, they have all nevertheless, a common use, viz. to *connect* different Propositions and to show that they have a relation to each other;* it is hence that they are called *Conjunctions*; but Conjunctions do not merely in a vague manner denote a relation, they also determine the *nature* of the relation.

We may frequently by means of a Conjunction unite several Propositions into one; thus we may say, "God made us to worship and serve him," which is equivalent to these two Propositions, "God made us to worship him and he made us to serve him." "Be neither avaricious nor prodigal," is equivalent to these, "be not avaricious and be not prodigal." "It is not man who is to be feared but God," is equivalent to, "it is not man who is to be feared, but it is God who is to be feared."

[Conjunctions do not only denote that relations exist between different Propositions, they moreover determine, as we have said, the *nature* of these relations; they are, therefore, the Exponents of the relations existing between two Propositions which are the terms of these relations, the Antecedent and the Consequent, in the same manner as Propositions are the Exponents of relations existing between two Nouns or between a Noun and Verb.

But these relations are, moreover, frequently denoted by a variation in the form of the Verb in that Proposition which serves as the Consequent term, or even in the form of the Verbs of both Propositions.

The same thing takes place, as we have already hinted,

* The Conjunctions *and* and *neither* are also employed to connect the *parts* of a Subject or of a Simple, Complex Attribute. Examples: "to love God and at the same time to follow the dictates of our passions is an impossibility." "To fear neither God nor man, nor the testimony of one's own conscience is the character of a villain who deserves to be banished from society."

in regard to the relation between a Verb and a Noun. In some languages, this relation, although determined by the Preposition, is still further denoted by the Case in which the Consequent or Complement of the Preposition is put. Thus in Latin, "*eo ad urbem*," *I go to the city*; "*venio ab urbe*," *I come from the city*. The nature of the relation subsisting between "*eo*," *I go*, and "*urbe*," *the city*, is determined both by the Preposition "*ad*," *to*, and by the final *em* of the word "*urbem*." The nature of the relation subsisting between "*venio*," *I come*, and "*urbe*," *the city*, is determined both by the Preposition "*ab*," *from*, and by the final *e* of the word "*urbe*."

The case is the same with two Propositions forming the two terms of a relation of which the Conjunction is the Exponent. Thus if we say, "*I desire that you would learn your lesson*," there are two Propositions in relation; the Antecedent is, "*I desire*," the Consequent, "*you would learn your lesson*." The Exponent is "*that*;" it determines the nature of the relation, viz. a relation of subordination; but this relation is also denoted by the form of the Verb "*you would learn*."

We say likewise, "*mankind would be happy, if they were virtuous*." The Conjunction "*if*," determines the nature of the relation between these two Propositions, viz. a relation of supposition; but, besides, the nature of the relation is denoted by the form of the Verb "*would be*."

These variations in the form of Verbs, are what are called *Modes*; we shall discuss them hereafter.]

CHAPTER XII.

OF THE INTERJECTION.

All the species of words of which we have hitherto treated, unite in completing the representation of our thoughts. There is another species of words which do not at all express our thoughts, but are the almost spontaneous expressions of our sensations. Thus a man who is in pain, cries out, "*Ah!*" A man in a moment of astonishment expresses his surprise by the word "*Oh!*" A man whose mind is entirely engrossed with a feeling of sorrow and woe, expresses it by "*Alas!*" These and similar words are called *Interjections*.

CHAPTER XIII.

MIXED WORDS.

The reader may be at a loss to determine to what class he must refer certain words, which seem either not to belong to any of the classes which I have named, or else to belong to several at the same time.

I begin by making some remarks upon the words "*my*," "*thy*," "*his*," "*our*," etc. which are Pronominal
Adjectives. commonly, though not very correctly, denominated *Possessive Pronouns*. If we attend to the definition which has been given of Pronouns, we shall clearly see that these are not *Pronouns*, but that they are *Adjectives*, bearing the same relation to Pronouns that the Adjectives "*national*," "*heavenly*," etc. do to the Nouns "*nation*," "*heaven*," etc. With reference to the Pronouns from which they are derived, we

may denominate them *Pronominal Adjectives*. They are equivalent to the Determinative Article "*the*," together with the Preposition "*of*," having for its complement the corresponding Personal Pronouns, "*me*," "*thee*," "*him*," etc. "*My book*" is the same as "*the book of me*," or "*belonging to me*;" "*our book*" is the same as "*the book of us*," etc. Many languages have no Pronominal Adjectives, supplying their place in the above way, by Pronouns placed in relation with the Nouns and forming the Consequent terms of these relations. Thus they say, "*the book of me*," "*the life of us*."

[Let us pass to another species of words, which also are often numbered among the Pronouns; I mean the words "*this*," "*that*," "*these*," "*those*," and all in other languages which correspond more or less nearly to these words. If we attend to their signification, we shall perceive that they are synonymous with these expressions, *this person*, or *this thing*, etc. and that, consequently, they comprise the import of a Demonstrative Article and a Noun. They are, therefore, in English, genuine Nouns, which designate beings by a very general idea, limited only by the import of the Demonstrative Article which they contain. I shall not enlarge further upon these words, because I have already discussed them above.*

In the class of Pronouns, moreover, certain words of a very different nature have been generally ranked, whose usage must first be explained, that we may see to what class of words we ought to assign them.

It often happens, that in order to develope, to restrict or to modify the idea denoted by any Noun or Pronoun we employ a secondary Proposition, which is introduced into the principal Proposition. This Proposition may be called *Con-*

* Vide Supra. Chap. IV. p. 27.

junctive. Thus I say, "God, who knows all things, is acquainted with our most secret thoughts." The words "who knows all things," form a Conjunctive Proposition, and this Conjunctive Proposition modifies the idea of "*God*," who is the subject of the principal Proposition, "God is acquainted with our most secret thoughts." I say in like manner, "good men, whom I am very desirous of pleasing, will know how to appreciate my labor." The words "whom I am very desirous of pleasing," form a Conjunctive Proposition; they modify the idea contained in this expression, "good men," which is the subject of the principal Proposition; "good men will know how to appreciate my labor." It is the same with this sentence, "she, whom you love, despises the affection which you have for her." Here are two Conjunctive Propositions; the first, formed of the words "whom you love," modifies the idea expressed by "*she*," which word is the subject of the principal Proposition, "she despises the affection;" the second, formed of the words "which you have for her," modifies the idea expressed by the word "*affection*," which is the Complement to the Verb in the principal Proposition.

The words "*who*," "*which*," "*whom*," in the above sentences, called by most grammarians Conjunctive
Adjectives. *Relative Pronouns*, evidently perform the function of a *Conjunction*. They serve to connect the Conjunctive, with the principal Proposition. It is even possible in many cases to give such a turn to the expression, as that we can easily substitute a Conjunction in place of these words. Thus, when I said, "God, who knows all things, is acquainted with our most secret thoughts," I might have expressed the same thought by saying, "God is acquainted with our most secret thoughts, *for* he knows all things." When I say, "you who disapprove this action, yet imitate it," I might say, with

equal propriety, "you imitate this action, *although* you disapprove it."

But these words, "*who*," "*which*," etc. not only perform the office of a Conjunction; they also recall the idea expressed by some preceding word. In general, it is the nature of these words, to belong at the same time both to the principal and the Conjunctive Proposition. In certain languages, as the French, Latin and English, the words "*who*," "*which*," etc. or those which correspond to them, indicate by their form whether, in the Conjunctive Proposition, they perform the office of Subject or that of Complement of a Verb or Preposition. In English, for example, if this Conjunctive performs the function of Subject, we make use of the word "*who*;" if it serves as Complement to the Verb in the Conjunctive Proposition, as Complement to a Preposition, or as Attribute to the Verb "*to be*," we make use of the word "*which*" or "*whom*." Let us illustrate this by examples: "Homer, who has served as a model to all the greatest poets, is an inexhaustible source of beauty and sublimity;" "*who*," serves as Subject to the Conjunctive Proposition; it connects it with the principal Proposition, and at the same time recalls the idea of "*Homer*." If I say, "Homer, whom the greatest poets have taken for their model, is an inexhaustible source of beauty and sublimity," "*whom*" serves as Complement to the Verb "have taken" in the Conjunctive Proposition; it connects this Proposition with the principal Proposition and at the same time it recalls the idea of "Homer." "We know not that which we may one day be;"* "*which*" connects the Conjunctive with

* We commonly use in English the word "*what*" in place of "*that which*," of which two words it is the equivalent; so that it would be more strictly English to say, "we know not *what* we may one day be," than as in the text.—TR.

the principal Proposition, and serves at the same time as Attribute to the Abstract Verb "*we may be.*"

The subject of a Preposition, the complement of a Verb and the complement of a Proposition being always a Noun,* or a Pronoun, the words "*who*," "*which*," etc. besides their Conjunctive import, do, moreover, represent beings in a very vague and indefinite manner, expressing neither their nature, their qualities, nor the person under which we regard them in discourse. They are then properly speaking neither pure Nouns, Pronouns nor Adjectives.

But, since these words make of the whole Conjunctive Proposition a sort of Adjective, which qualifies a being denoted by a Noun or Pronoun belonging to the principal Proposition, I think it more accurate to give them the name of *Conjunctive Adjectives*. The sense is the same, whether I say, "a just king makes his people happy," or "a king, who is just, makes his people happy."

In other respects, the consideration of the words "*who*," "*which*," etc. belongs rather to the grammar of the *English* language and of those languages which subject this Conjunctive to rules of agreement, as the Latin, German, etc. than to *General Grammar*. In place of this Conjunctive we might employ a simple Conjunction; this would then serve only to connect the Conjunctive, with the principal Proposition, and the subject or the complement of the Conjunctive Proposition might be expressed by a word independent of the Conjunction. Thus in Italian "*che*," is indeclinable; it corresponds alike to the "*who*," the "*which*," and the "*whom*," of the English. "Dio che ha creato il mondo, ha fatto lutto di niente;" "lutte le cose che vediamo sono l'opra di Dio." In the first of these sentences, the Pronoun "*egli*," the subject of the Verb "ha creato," is omitted, but

* I here include under the denomination of Nouns, the Infinitives of Verbs.

the third person of the Verb supplies its place. In the second, the Pronoun "*le*," complement of the Verb "*vediamo*," is omitted, because the Conjunctive form of the Proposition renders it unnecessary.


There are other languages in which the Conjunctive does not prevent our expressing the subject of the Conjunctive Proposition or the complement of the Verb of the same Proposition, by a Pronoun. Thus in Arabic, they say, "man *who* *he* is weak, has need of help from God;" "the man *whom* I see *him*, is one of my friends;" "the man *whom* I labor for *him* does not generously requite my pains." This Conjunctive, however, possesses in Arabic the variation of gender and number, which constitutes it in fact an Adjective.

We may observe something similar in the German, in which when the subject of the principal Proposition is a Personal Pronoun which also serves as subject to the Conjunctive Proposition, this Pronoun is repeated after the Conjunctive Adjective, although this last is declined with gender, number, and case. Example: "Ich der ich meinen vater liebe, kann sein Elend nicht ausehen;" "I who love my father cannot look upon his misery;" literally, "I *who* I love, etc." In a like case in English, we content ourselves with denoting the subject of the Conjunctive Proposition by the person of the Verb; "I who *am*;" "thou who *art*;" "we who *are*." In Hebrew the Conjunctive has no variation of gender, number or case.

The words "*who*," "*which*," etc. are not the
Other Conjun-
tive Words. only words which connect the function of a
 Conjunction with another design. There are Conjunctive
 Nouns and Adverbs, as well as Adjectives; and a charac-
 teristic of these words is, that we can substitute for them an-
 other form of expression in which shall be found the words
 "*who*," "*which*," etc. Thus, "*when*," "*where*," "*what*,"

"*how*," "*as*," and many others, are Conjunctive words. "I shall finish *when* I please;" that is, "I shall finish *at the time at which* I please;" "I know not *where* I am; i. e. "I know not *the place in which* I am." "I do not know *what* to do;" i. e. "I do not know *the thing which I ought* to do." "I should like to know *how* he makes himself beloved;" i. e. "I should like to know *the means by which* he makes himself beloved." "He does *as* he says;" i. e. "he does *in the way which* he says."

As to the affirmative word "*yes*," the negatives ^{Negative, Affirmative, and Prohibitive Adverbs.} "*no*," and "*not*," and the prohibitive "*not*," are they not Adverbs? Some have denied this, and have made of such words a peculiar class; yet it does not seem to me absolutely necessary to take this step. "*Yes*," is equivalent to, "*in truth*;" we may hence regard it as an Adverb. "*No*," is rather more remote from the nature of an Adverb; yet we may resolve it into "*In negation*." The same may be said of "*not*," when used simply to deny, as in this example: "I do not believe it." "*Not*," performing the function of a prohibition, i. e. serving to prohibit, as when it is said, "do not touch me," does not differ essentially from "*not*" negative; the difference of sense is less in the Adverb than in the mode of the Verb which in a prohibitive expression is always the *Imperative*.]



PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL GRAMMAR.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

OF NUMBERS.

Proper Nouns, as we have seen in the first part of this Grammar, designate beings by the idea of their individual nature; each designates but a single being. Not so with Appellative Nouns; they denote of themselves not individual, but the nature common to all the individuals of the same species: and they are as properly used to designate collectively all the beings which belong to one species, as to designate a certain number or even a single one only of that species. Thus the word "*man*" is found in each of these three propositions, "all men are destined to die," "several men have seen this prodigy," "some man, I know not who, has stolen my purse," although the first of these propositions relates to the human race considered as a whole, the second, to several individuals only of this race, and the third, to but a single individual. According as the number of the individuals, to whom we have reference, is definite or indefinite, in order to represent that number we make use of the numeratives, "*one*," "*two*," "*three*," "*ten*," "*twenty*," "*hundred*," etc. or of words which denote some number above unity but still indefinite, such as "*several*," "*some*."

It is the same with Abstract Nouns. The qualities or the actions which they express, may be considered as united or as separate. Thus, the word "*virtue*" denotes by a common idea all the laudable qualities of the heart, as the word "*vice*" denotes all its evil propensities. Hence it is that we may say with equal propriety, "all the virtues," "several virtues," "some virtues," "one virtue."

In most languages nouns undergo some variation, either in form or termination, by which it is at once perceived whether they are applied to a single individual or to several.*

The form designed to denote a single individual is called *Singular*; that which denotes several individuals is called *Plural*. Sometimes, there is a particular form to denote that we have reference to only *two* individuals; this is called *Dual*. Lastly, there are some languages in which certain forms of the Plural denote a *great* and others a *small* number.

These forms are what is called *Number*. In English we have but two, the *Singular* and the *Plural*.

We say "*horse*" in the Singular, and "*horses*" in the Plural.

[Besides the difference in termination which distinguishes the number, several languages employ further for this purpose, certain words which precede the noun and fix their signification to the Singular or Plural number. Thus, in English, the Singular is very often preceded by the numera-

* The diversity of Number may also be denoted by a particular word and not by a change in the form of the Noun; this method is employed in the Chinese and Japanese languages. In Malay, it is sometimes sufficient in order to denote the Plural, when it is not otherwise denoted by some numerative, merely to repeat the noun twice. Thus, to express "*horses*," they say, "*horse-horse*." It is singularly worthy of remark, that in this language, nouns primarily denote the *Plural*, and that some accessory sign is necessary in order to restrict them to the expression of the Singular.

tive "a,"* or the Articles "this," "that;" the Plural by "these," "those."

These words, which, for the most part, perform also the function of Articles, are particularly necessary for the distinction of Numbers, in those languages in which the Plural differs very little from the Singular. Such a language is the French, in which most Plurals differ from the Singular only by the addition of an *s* at the end of the word, which *s* is, besides, very often silent in pronunciation. What difference would there be between "*la vertu*" and "*les virtus*," "*le vice*" and "*les vices*," "*le vin*" and "*les vins*," "*une vie*" and "*des vies*," if the Singular and Plural were not distinguished from each other by the use of the words "*le*," "*la*," "*les*," "*une*," "*des*?" On the contrary, where the forms of the Plural are more clearly distinguished from those of the Singular, the Article is the same for both Numbers. Such is the constant Article "*al*" of the Arabians; and such also, the English Article "*the*."]]

Pronouns, as well as Appellative Nouns, designate beings; they must therefore be susceptible of the variation of Number. Their forms are different in the Singular and Plural. In most languages, the Singular Pronouns are words even *totally* different from those which denote the Plural. In English, "*I*," the Singular Pronoun of the first person has no kind of resemblance to "*we*," the Plural Pronoun of the same person; "*thou*," the Singular Pronoun of the second person, has no more resemblance to "*you*," the Plural Pronoun of the same; nor have "*he*," "*she*," "*it*," the Singular Pronouns of the third person, any resemblance to the corresponding Plural Pronoun "*they*."

Adjectives in most languages, as for instance, the Latin and French, take different terminations

Number of
Pronouns.

Number of
Adjectives.

* Vide Supra, Part. I. Chap. 5. p. 29, Note.

to distinguish the Numbers. Thus, the French say, in the Singular, "*royal*," in the Plural, "*royaux*;" for example, "*le sceptre royal*," and "*les ornemens royaux*."

There are languages, however, such as the Persian, Turkish and English, in which the Adjectives preserve invariably the same termination, whether they qualify a Noun in the Singular or in the Plural number.

Number of Verbs. The distinction of number occurs in the Verb.

But although the Plural is generally distinguished from the Singular, and although in some languages there is further a *Dual* number, yet this distinction does not properly belong to the Verb, as it signifies nothing which can be numbered. But the use of the Verb being to connect the Subject with the Attribute by the idea of existence, this difference of Number of which the Verb is susceptible, serves as a mark, by which to discover the Subject and Verb which are related to each other. Thus, I say in English, "*my horse is young*," "*my horses are young*."

CHAPTER II.

OF GENDERS.

Gender of Nouns.

Nature has established in animals of the same species a distinction into two sexes, male and female. This distinction must necessarily be expressed by language, but there are several different modes of doing it. One consists in connecting with the name of the animal a word which may denote its sex, as when we say, "*a male child*," "*a female child*." Another way is to give distinct names to the male and female of the same species, as "*the bull*" and "*the cow*," "*the ram*" and "*the ewe*." A third

consists in a change in the form or termination of the Noun, a change by means of which the name of the male becomes that of the female, as in the words, "hero," "heroine;" "actor," "actress;" "lion," "lioness." Strictly speaking, only this last mode of distinguishing the sexes, can appropriately be called "*Gender*." Words which denote the male sex are of the *Masculine Gender*; Masculine and Feminine Gender. those which denote the female sex, of the *Feminine Gender*.

A great many beings have no distinction of Neuter Gender. sex; such are stones, metals, the stars, etc. There may, therefore, be a Gender designed to characterize beings which have no sex. This Gender really exists in some languages and is called "*Neuter*," a word which in its proper signification denotes that which is neither Masculine nor Feminine.

Lastly, beings which are distinguished by their Common Gender. sex, may be considered in a general way without regard to this difference, as when we say, "all men are equal," "horses are employed in ploughing and in drawing loads." There may hence be a Gender designed to characterize this mode of regarding beings, in which there is a difference of sex, in a general point of view and without reference to this difference. This may be called "*Common*" Gender.

[In *Latin* and *Greek* are found all the four Genders; but the *Common Gender* is found, in Latin, only in the Pronouns of the first and second persons, and in the Greek, only in the same Pronouns and in certain Adjectives.

In *French* there is no Neuter Gender. The Common Gender occurs, as in Latin, only in the Pronouns of the first and second persons.

In *Persian*, *Chinese*, and some other languages, the sex is always denoted by a separate word. There is therefore no

distinction of Genders and the grammatical distinction of *sexes* only takes place in regard to those beings in which *nature* has actually established the distinction.

In *English*, the case is the same, except as it respects the Pronoun of the third person, which has three Genders, Masculine, Feminine and Neuter;* these three Genders give this Pronoun the capacity of being employed with reference, the first, to beings of the male sex, the second to those of the female sex, and the third to those which have no sex, or which are considered without respect to their sex.]

The employment of Genders ought, as we have already intimated, to be limited to the expression of the distinction of sex, or the abstraction of all consideration of sex, or the total absence of this distinction; but it is far from being thus limited. In languages which admit but two Genders, all Nouns are either Masculine or Feminine, even though they designate beings which are neither male or female; and it is often impossible to conjecture the reason for assigning them one Gender, rather than the other. In several languages which have but two Genders, the Feminine is frequently employed in place of the Neuter. Even in languages which admit a Neuter and a Common Gender, in which it would have been easy to refer all beings which have no sex, or whose sex is not immediately apparent, to the Neuter Gender, this method which it would seem analogy could not but suggest, has not been followed; and the names of beings of this description are found distributed

* In saying that the English language admits not the distinction of Gender, our author has committed a gross mistake. Even in the unusually confined sense in which he uses the term *Gender*, viz. change of the *termination* of Nouns in order to distinguish the sexes, (see page 68) many of our Nouns admit of the variation of Gender. Several Nouns form their feminine by the addition of *ess*, as lion, lioness; host, hostess; poet, poetess, etc.; others by the addition of *ne*, as hero, heroine, etc. Tr.

under the Masculine and Feminine as well as the Neuter and Common Genders. Such is the caprice of some languages, that the German word "*weib*," which signifies *woman*, is of the *Neuter*, and not of the *Feminine* Gender. Further, in almost all languages which admit the distinction of Genders, there is no rule but custom for distinguishing the words which belong to each Gender.

[Even languages which admit the distinction of Genders, make use of the three different methods, of which we have spoken above, to distinguish the sexes.

Each sex of those animals which are nearest connected with the necessities of man and with his employments is almost always characterized by a particular word, which is absolutely independent of that which represents the opposite sex. Thus in English, we say, "a horse" and "a mare," "a bull" and "a cow," "a ram" and "a ewe," "a cock" and "a hen." In French, however, masculine nouns of this description often undergo only a slight variation in order to form the feminine, as, "*chien*," "*chienne*," "*chat*," "*chatte*."

As to those animals whose use is less common, or who on account of the places which they inhabit, fall less under our observation, as fishes and birds, or whom their diminutive size removes still further from our observation, we generally, in English, employ a single Noun to designate both Genders, Masculine and Feminine, so that when we wish to distinguish the sexes, we are obliged to connect with it the word "*male*," or "*female*." Thus we say, "an elephant," "a bee," etc. Do we wish to distinguish the sexes? we say, "a *female* elephant," "a *male* elephant," "a *female* bee," "a *male* bee," etc.

In some languages, the distinction of Genders is denoted less by the form or the termination of Nouns, than by the Articles and other words, which as we have before observed,

determine the *Number*. The French, for example, employ for the Masculine, the Articles, "le," "ce," or "ces," and for the Feminine, the Articles "la," and "cette." In the plural, the Articles "les," and "ces," and the word "des," are common to both Genders.]

As Pronouns designate beings, they, are like the Nouns, susceptible of the distinction of Gender.*

As Adjectives and Verbs do not designate beings, they are not themselves susceptible of the distinction of Genders. They may, nevertheless, and in many languages, do admit of different *Genders* as they admit different numbers. This difference of Gender in Adjectives and Verbs helps us to discover more readily the Nouns to which they are related.

[In some languages, Adjectives are susceptible of different Genders and Verbs are not; in others, this diversity of Genders occurs in Verbs as well as in Adjectives. Some languages admit it neither in Verbs nor Adjectives, although the Nouns receive it.

In French, for example, as in Latin and Greek, Adjectives have different Genders, Verbs have not. The French say, "cet homme est laid," "cette femme est laide." In English, in Persian, in Turkish, in Chinese, etc. neither the Adjectives nor the Verbs are susceptible of this distinction.]

* In all languages with which I am acquainted, the Pronoun of the first person is of the *common* gender; and that of the second person is of the same gender in by far the greatest number of languages. But most admit two or even three distinct genders for the Pronoun of the third person.

CHAPTER III.

OF CASES.

We have already seen* above that a Noun may be in relation with another Noun, with a Verb or with an Adjective. We have seen also that the nature of this relation may be determined in several ways. Sometimes it is determined by a Preposition, as in these examples, "the love of country," "to come to Rome," "faithful to God." Sometimes it is determined by the respective places which the two words in relation occupy in a proposition, as in these, "Charlotte loves Sophia;" "Sophia loves Charlotte." Lastly, sometimes this relation is determined by a variation in the termination of the Noun which serves as consequent Declension. term to the relation, or of that which serves as antecedent, or even of both. Sometimes, moreover, several of these modes are employed at once.

Take, for example, these two nouns, "the book," and "God." I wish to express a relation, the antecedent term of which is "the book," and the consequent "God," and the nature of which is a relation of *property*. I express it in English by employing the Preposition "*of*," which I place between the two terms of the relation and say, "the book of God." In Latin, "book" is "*liber*," and "God," "*Deus*;" but to express this relation, I must change the termination of the word "*Deus*," and say, "*Dei*;" I say then, "*liber Dei*," or "*Dei liber*," as I choose, for as the termination is sufficient to distinguish the antecedent from the consequent in the two terms of the relation, I am free to dispose them either way without causing any difference of sense.

* Vide Supra Part I. Chap. 9.

If instead of a relation of *property*, expressed in English by the Preposition "*of*," I wished to express a relation which should indicate the *end* of an action, I should employ in English the Preposition "*to*," as in the following phrases, "to be faithful to his friends," "to give alms to a poor man." In Latin "faithful" is "*fidelis*," and "friends," "*amici*." To denote that the word "friends" is here the consequent term of a relation of which "faithful" is the antecedent, and at the same time to point out the nature of this relation, I must change the termination *i* of "*amici*" into *is* and say, "*fidelis amicis*." In the other example, "to give alms to a poor man," the Verb "to give" is the antecedent of two relations, the first of which has for its consequent, "alms," and the second, "a poor man." "Alms" in Latin is "*eleemosyna*," and "poor man" is "*egenus*;" but to denote that the word "alms" is here the consequent term of a relation of which "to give" is the antecedent, I must change the termination *a* of "*eleemosyna*" into *am*; and to denote that "a poor man" is the consequent term of another relation of which also "to give" is the antecedent, I must change the final *us* of "*egenus*" into *o* and say, "*dare eleemosynam egeno*." These terminations express at the same time the nature of the relation, and in Latin, where the terminations prevent our confounding consequents with antecedents, instead of being obliged, as in English, to place the two consequent terms after the antecedent, we may, if we choose, place one or both of them before the antecedent. We may say, "*eleemosynam egeno dare*," or "*egeno dare eleemosynam*."

These variations in the terminations of Nouns are called *Cases* from a Latin word which signifies "end," or "conclusion," because that in Latin it is at the end of Nouns that these variations occur.*

* I am aware that Latin writers appear to have understood by the

The employment of Cases is not absolutely necessary. Indeed, there need be no such thing, as we may observe in the English, the French, and many other languages, in which Prepositions or some other means, such as the disposition of words in a sentence, are employed to indicate and determine relations.* Those languages which admit cases have not all the same number. The Romans had six, the Greeks but five, and the Arabians have but three. In the Swedish, on the contrary, in the Lappish, in the Hungarian, in the Greenlandish, and in the Basque languages, there is a much greater number.

[If the number of Cases were equal to that of the relations which may exist between Nouns and the different parts of speech to which Nouns may serve as complements, Prepositions would be of no use, and doubtless languages which admitted such an abundance of Cases, would have no Prepositions. Each Case, would then at the same time that it pointed out the consequent term of a relation, perform the function of an exponent and determine precisely the nature of

word "*Cases*," rather the *circumstances* which accompany an action and the relations which exist between the *ideas* expressed by words, than *inflexions* or *variations* designed to characterize and represent these circumstances and these relations. If we adopt this signification of the word "*Case*," we must of necessity admit with Sanctius that there are Cases in all languages, or rather we must say that Cases do not belong to *languages*, but to the nature of things and to the mutual relation of things and ideas. I do not think, however, that even in this case, we should be obliged to say with this Grammarian, that the natural Cases are six in number. But further, I believe that we ought to take the word "*Case*" in the sense which the greater part of our Grammarians give to it and which seems to be authorized by the word *πτῶσις* which the Greek Grammarians employed to express the same idea. In this sense we may say that some languages have Cases, while others have none. If we were to confine ourselves to the most rigorous signification of the word "*Case*" we should say that in some languages, Nouns admit of *inflexions* or *variations* designed to express *Cases*, while these signs or Exponents of Cases are entirely wanting in others.

* Vide Supra Part I. Chap. 10, p. 47, Note.

that relation ; every Case would then comprise the import of a Preposition and its complement, and would thus be genuine Adverbs. The number of Cases being on the contrary very much below the number of possible relations, the same Case is necessarily employed to point out the consequent terms of different relations ; whence it results, that in order to determine the nature of the relations there must also be exponents, i. e. Prepositions. Thus in Latin, the Case called Accusative serves as consequent term to several relations, the exponents of which are the Prepositions, "*ad*," "*in*," "*per*," etc. The same Case may also be employed sometimes with and sometimes without a Preposition. The Latin Accusative furnishes an example of this also.

What I have said relates only to those Cases which serve to point out the consequent terms of relations. Nouns being often employed without any dependence upon what precedes, as subjects of propositions, as antecedent terms of relations, or as compellatives, there must be inflexions designed to denote these various functions.

With these remarks, I think we may institute a division of Cases, in a general way, into *Adverbial*, *Complementary*, and *Absolute* Cases.

Adverbial
Cases.

I call those *Adverbial* Cases, which never serving as complement to a Preposition, always contain the exponent of the relation of which they form the consequent term ; such in Latin and German is the Genitive, and such in Latin alone the Dative.

Complementary
Cases.

I call those *Complementary* Cases, which, whether necessarily or only in certain circumstances, admit the employment of an exponent in order to determine the nature of the relation of which they form the consequent term. The Accusative and Ablative in Latin, are Complementary Cases.

Lastly, I give the name of *Absolute Cases* to those which serve only to denote circumstances, Absolute Cases. in which the Nouns are entirely exempt from antecedent dependence; such are the Nominative and Vocative in Latin.

In the Arabic language there are but three Cases; one *Absolute*, the second *Complementary*, the third *Adverbial*.

The Absolute Cases are not necessarily confined to two. There may be, and there are in fact, in some languages, several forms of Nominatives and Vocatives, either to distinguish the rank and quality of those of whom or to whom we speak, or to characterize the different natures of Propositions, as Active, Passive or Neuter, Indicative, Interrogative, Imperative, Suppositive, Conditional, etc. The subject might also be denoted by different Cases in principal or subordinate, complementary or incidental Propositions. Such variations would be genuine *Modes in Nouns*, as we shall see when we define the nature and use of Modes in Verbs. Thus, in Latin, in direct Propositions, whether Principal, Subjunctive or simply Conjunctive, the Verb being in one of the personal modes, the subject is put in the Nominative; and in complementary Propositions, the Verb being in the Infinitive, the subject is put in the Accusative; and lastly, in those Propositions which are usually called *Absolute*, but which I prefer to call *Adverbial*, the Verb, if there be one, is always in the participial form, and the subject as well as the attribute always in the Ablative, whether there be a Verb or not.

That I may make myself better understood, I shall give examples of these various Propositions in Latin.

DIRECT PROPOSITIONS. "Deus nobis haec otia FECIT." "Sic tibi cum fluctus subterlabere Sicanos, DORIS AMARA suam non INTERMISCEAT undam."

COMPLEMENTARY PROPOSITION. "Spero SE ESSE VEN-
TURUM."

ADVERBIAL PROPOSITIONS. "HIS AUDITIS, tacuere omnes." "EO CONSULE, bellum cum Samnitibus gestum est."*

In Greek, in Adverbial Propositions, the subject and attribute are in the Genitive.

Nouns and Pronouns are the only words which can serve as consequent terms to a relation. Hence they alone are from their *nature* susceptible of Case.† Adjectives may nevertheless admit the variation of Case, as they do that of Gender and Number. These variations are so many peculiar marks by which to distinguish to what Nouns they are related.

The combination of all the variations of which a Noun, Pronoun or Adjective is susceptible in order to denote Gender, Number, and Case, is called *Declension*; and to recite a Noun, Pronoun or Adjective, passing successively through each of these variations, is called *to decline* it.

CHAPTER IV.

AUGMENTATIVES AND DIMINUTIVES.

Individuals of the same species may be compared with each other as it respects their size, their extent, their age, their beauty, their deformity, etc. These accessory qualities which do not at all change the idea of the nature common

* The principle here involved will be developed more at length hereafter, Part III. Chap. 6.

† The Infinitives of Verbs are also susceptible of the variation of Cases. The Cases of the Infinitive are known under the peculiar name of *Gerunds*. I do not discuss them here, that I may not anticipate what I have to say of the Modes of Verbs.

to each individual, may be, and generally are, expressed by Adjectives.

Nevertheless, in some languages *all* Nouns, in others certain Nouns only, by means of the addition of syllables or some change in their form, add to the idea expressed by the primitive Noun, those of great or small size, of beauty or deformity. This sort of formation is not very frequent in English. We say however, "*lamb*," "*lambkin*;" "*man*," "*mannikin*;" "*herb*," "*herbelet*;" "*animal*," "*animalcule*," etc. Many of this kind of terminations are borrowed from the Italian. In this latter language *all* Nouns may form Augmentatives and Diminutives which, besides the accessory idea of large or small size, include moreover that of beauty or deformity, respect or contempt.

This power of forming Augmentatives and Diminutives may also be extended to Adjectives and Verbs, and even to attributive Verbs; for all these words contain the idea of a quality or mode of existence, which without any change in its nature, may receive various modifications. Thus in English, from the Adjective "*red*," we form what may be called the Diminutive "*reddish*;" from "*green*," "*greenish*," etc.

[In Arabic, all Nouns, all Adjectives, the Demonstrative Articles, the Conjunctive Adjective, and even several Verbs form Diminutives, and it is possible that in some languages this power may be general in regard to all parts of speech except Prepositions and Conjunctions.]

CHAPTER V.

OF DEGREES OF COMPARISON.

Adjectives denote qualities. These qualities are susceptible of the modification of *more* or *less*, as "more lovely," "less lovely." They may be considered either simply, without any reference to intensity, as "lovely;" or by comparing the degree of intensity which they possess in one subject with that which they possess in another, as "Alexander was more fortunate than Hannibal;" or by comparing the degree of intensity of two different qualities in the same subject, as "this woman is more beautiful than modest;" or as reaching a very high degree of intensity but without any comparison, as "he is very wise;" or lastly, as surpassing in a certain subject the degree of intensity which they possess in any other, as "Socrates was the most wise of all the Greeks." This is what is called *Degrees of Comparison*. Each of these Degrees may be a degree of *more* or of *less*; for we may say, "more wise," "less wise;" "very wise," "little wise;" "the most wise," "the least wise."

These degrees of comparison are not always denoted by an Adverb; they are sometimes denoted by a simple change in the form of the Adjective, as in English, "wise," "wiser," "wisest." So, also, in Latin, "wise" is "*sapiens*;" "wiser," "*sapientior*;" "very wise," and "wisest," "*sapientissimus*."

Sometimes also the quality joined to the idea of comparison or intensity is expressed by a word totally different from that which expresses the same quality without these accessory ideas. Thus we say, "good," "better," "excellent," which is the same as "good," "more good," "very good;" "bad," "worse," which is the same as "bad," "more bad."

The expression of the quality without comparison and without any regard to greater or less intensity is called, "*Positive*;" the expression of the same quality with a comparison of different degrees of intensity, is called, "*Comparative*;" the expression of the same quality with an intensity exceeding that which it possesses in any other subject is called, "*Superlative*." We may call the word which denotes a high degree of intensity without any comparison, "*Intensive*."

Positive, Comparative, Superlative, and Intensive Degrees.

[It is easy to see that we might also distinguish a *Diminutive* Degree, a *Minorative-Comparative* Degree, etc.; but as custom has not introduced into languages, at least not into those with which we are acquainted, peculiar forms to express these inverse degrees of intensity in Adjectives, I have not comprised them among the Degrees of Comparison and have given them no distinct names.]

Adverbs as well as Adjectives, admit Degrees of Comparison.

Verbs and especially *Neuter* Verbs which express simple qualities or modes of existence may also admit the same Degrees.

CHAPTER VI.

OF TENSES.

Every judgment which we form of those things which are the objects of our thoughts, has reference to *time*, either present, past, or future. We consider the qualities which we attribute to them, either as belonging to them at present, or as having belonged to them, or as to belong to them at some future time. This circumstance of time in no wise

alters either the nature of the subject or that of the attribute ; it only modifies the idea of the existence of the subject and its relation to the attribute.

Since the existence of the subject and its relation to an attribute are denoted by the Verb, by modifying this and giving it different forms, we may express these various circumstances of time. Such modification occurs in most languages. Thus we say in English, "it rained," if we speak of time past ; "it rains," if of time present ; and "it will rain," if of time future.

These forms, designed to point out circumstances of time, are called "*Tenses*."

It must be confessed, however, that these modifications are not essential to the nature of the Verb. The Verb might be immutable, and circumstances of time might be expressed by Adverbs or some other means, even simply by the order of narration.

This latter mode is employed in several languages in which the form of the Verb is immutable, and in this way also people who are imperfectly acquainted with English often express themselves. When a negro, for example, says, "yesterday me go to the river to find water, me find the water frozen, me not able to break the ice ; to day me go again, find little places ice be broken ; tomorrow, perhaps, ice wholly thaw, make no more fire," we understand him as well as if he had said, "yesterday I went to the river to find water, and found the water frozen, and was not able to break the ice ; today I went again and found little places in which the ice was broken ; tomorrow, perhaps, the ice will wholly thaw, and we shall make no more fire."

Observe, moreover, that we sometimes form, in respect to the relation of certain subjects to certain attributes, general judgments which are independent of time, and which we perceive to be true in past, present, and future time. When

we say, "the universe is the work of God," "Gustavus is Abel's brother," these our judgments are independent of every circumstance of time.

Hence arise in Verbs two sorts of Tenses; *Indefinite*, expressing the existence of the subject and its relation to an attribute in an indefinite manner, i. e. without denoting any particular time; the other *Definite*, expressing the existence of the subject and its relation to the attribute, and determining also the period of time, past, present, or future.

It does not follow, however, that there are in all languages certain peculiar forms to express *indefinite* time, and others to express *definite* time. On the contrary, in some languages, the *Definite* Tense is often employed to denote an indefinite time, and the nature of the proposition can alone inform us whether a certain form is employed in a definite or indefinite manner.

If it be asked, for example, "how does William eat his soup?" and some one answers, "he eats it voraciously," we understand that at the present time William is eating his soup. If, on the contrary, it be asked, "is William fond of turnips?" and some one replies, "he eats indifferently almost every kind of vegetables," it is plain that this cannot mean that at that precise moment he is eating almost every kind of vegetables, but that his taste and constitution are such that almost all kinds of vegetables are alike agreeable to him. Yet, in both phrases the same form of the Verb is employed, viz. "*he eats*;" the sense of the phrase alone informs us whether it denotes a definite time or not.

All circumstances of time may be reduced to *Present, Past, and Future Tenses*. It is impossible that the existence of any thing should not be connected either with the present moment, with some time anterior or with some time which has not yet arrived. Nevertheless, all past

time, or all future time is not alike remote from the present. If I say, "William was born in 1791, commenced learning to read in 1796, learned to write in 1798, has just studied General Grammar, is at present studying the Latin Grammar, is about to commence the study of the Greek language, and will then learn Mathematics," it is seen that in this sentence are recounted several past events, some of which are of older date than others, together with several future events more or less remote from the present moment.

Past, Future,
Near, and Re-
mote. These different degrees of anteriority and posteriority may be denoted by different forms.

Thus we say in English, "*I have just read* the biography of Cesar, *I read a long while since* that of Pompey, *I am at present reading* that of Cicero, and *I am going to read immediately* that of Cato of Utica, after which *I must read* the lives of the emperors down to the foundation of Constantinople." "I have just read," denotes a *near Past*; "I read a great while since," a *remote Past*. "I am going to read," expresses a *near Future*; "I must read," a *more remote Future*.

Absolute and
Relative
Tenses.

Verbs may have different forms of Past and Future Tenses, not only for the reason that Past or Future events are more or less remote from the Present, but because we may view Past or Future events under two different relations of time. The first of these relations always has reference to the Present, the very moment in which we are speaking, and events are past, present or future, in relation to this period, as when I say simply, "I have supped," "I am supping," "I shall sup." The second always has reference to a different period from that at which we are speaking, and this period is itself past or future. In this case we always express several past or several future events, and one of these past or future events forms a new period, with reference to which the other events we speak

of, are considered as past, present, or future. This needs to be illustrated and rendered plain by examples.

Examples of the Past.

"Peter supped when Paul dined." The two events, Peter's supper and Paul's dinner are *past* in relation to the moment at which we speak ; but besides this, each is considered as *present* in relation to the other, because they occurred at the same time.

"Peter was supping when Paul entered." There are here also two events *past* under the first relation, but *present* under the second, i. e. with respect to the relation they have to each other ; but a peculiar circumstance to be observed is, that one of the two events, viz. Peter's supper, had commenced before Paul's entrance, and thus this first event was already partly past when the other was present.

"Peter was about to sup when Paul entered." Considered under the first relation, the two events are past ; considered under the relation which they have to each other, the first, Peter's supper, was still future when the second, Paul's entrance, was present.

"Peter had supped when Paul entered." The two events are, as in the preceding example, past under the first relation ; but under the second, the case is different ; Peter's supper was entirely past when Paul's entrance was present.

Examples of the Future.

"Peter will sup at the time that Paul will dine." With reference to the moment at which I speak, Peter's supper and Paul's dinner are two future events ; but I further consider them with reference to each other as present to each other, because they will occur simultaneously.

"Peter will be supping at the time that Paul will enter." The two events considered merely under the first relation are future ; regarded under the second, they are present,

but with this circumstance which distinguishes this example from the preceding, that Peter's supper will be partly present and partly future when Paul's entrance will be present.

"*Peter will be near supping at the time that Paul will dine.*" Under the first relation Peter's supper and Paul's dinner are future; but viewing these two events under the relation which they will bear to each other, Peter's supper will still be future when Paul's dinner will be already present.

"*Peter will have supped at the time that Paul will dine.*" Here the case is entirely different; the two events are, it is true, future under the first relation; but, considered under the second, Peter's supper will be already past at the time that Paul's dinner will be present.

I call every Tense, whether Past or Future, which expresses only the simple relation to the time of speaking, an *Absolute Tense*, and every Tense, Past or Future, which besides this general relation, expresses another relation to some event either past or future, I call a *Relative Tense*.

The *Absolute Past* is likewise *Indefinite*, if it does not at all determine the degree of the remoteness of the past event from the moment at which I speak; as, "I have read Virgil."

It is *Definite* if it does determine the degree of this remoteness; and then it is either *near*, as "I have just read Homer," or *remote*, as "I once saw Fontainebleau."

The *Relative Past*, is either *anterior*, as "I HAD SUPPED when he entered;" or *simultaneous*, as "I SUPPED when he dined;" or *posterior*, as "I WAS GOING TO SUP when he returned from the chase."

The *Relative Simultaneous Past* might also be called *Anterior Present*.

The *Absolute Future* is likewise *Indefinite* if it does not express the degree of the remoteness of the future event from the moment at which I speak, as when I say, "I shall go to England."

It is *Definite*, if it does express the degree of this remoteness, and then it is either *near*, as "I am just going to sup;" or *remote*, as "I shall know this when I am old."

The *Relative Future* is either *anterior*, as "I SHALL HAVE SUPPED when he will dine;" or *simultaneous*, as "I SHALL GO to Italy, when we shall be at peace;" or *posterior*, as "I SHALL BE ON THE POINT OF DEPARTING, when my brother will arrive."

The *Relative Simultaneous Future* might also be designated by the name of *Posterior Present*.

The *Anterior* and *Posterior Relative Pasts and Futures* may also be subdivided still further; they may be either *near* or *remote*; but for want of peculiar forms in the conjugation of the Verb to express these shades of the relations of time which events have to each other, we express them, as we have expressed many of the preceding examples, by periphrasis.

Near Anterior Relative Past. "I HAD JUST SUPPED when he sat down at the table."

Remote Anterior Relative Past. "I HAD SUPPED A GREAT WHILE AGO, when he returned."

Near Posterior Relative Past. "I WAS JUST GOING TO SUP when the house took fire."

Remote Posterior Relative Past. "I WAS YET FAR FROM GOING TO BED when he fell asleep."

Near Anterior Relative Future. "HE WILL HAVE JUST SUPPED when you shall have set down to table."

Remote Anterior Relative Future. "I SHALL HAVE SUPPED A LONG TIME AGO when he shall have returned."

Near Posterior Relative Future. "I SHALL BE ON THE POINT OF SUPPING, when the show shall have finished."

Remote Posterior Relative Future. "I SHALL BE VERY FAR FROM GOING TO BED, when I shall have supped."

It is very far from being the case that we have in English a peculiar form of the Verb for each of these circumstances of time. It is not at all probable that there is any language which multiplies the forms to such an extent; but it is necessary to view all these shades of difference as possible in order to classify the different forms of Pasts and Futures which each language does present. Nothing can be more various than the number of Tenses in different languages; the manner in which these Tenses are formed is likewise extremely various. Sometimes it is by a slight change at the end or in some other part of the word; and sometimes by the union of two or more Verbs. We may find examples of both these modes of forming Tenses in English. From the Verb "to love" by a change in the termination is formed "I loved." By the union of the Verb "to have" with the word "loved," are formed "I have loved," "I had loved," "I shall have loved," etc.

When we wish to express some circumstance of time for which a language does not furnish a peculiar form, we have recourse to Adverbs or to some other form of expression, as we have seen in many of the examples previously presented.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE PERSONS OF VERBS.

The Verb denotes the existence of the subject and its relation to an Attribute. That we may discover with the more facility the Subject and Verb which are in relation with each other, the Verb in many languages admits a distinction of Genders and Numbers. It then takes in a Proposition the same Gender and Number as the Noun to which it is related. This circumstance renders it easier to understand discourse, permits greater liberty of construction and affords more abundant resources for harmony. But besides this distinction of Gender and Number there is another which obtains more generally and contributes more effectually to perspicuity in discourse.

The Subject of a Proposition is always either the person who speaks, the person who is spoken to, or else a person or thing distinct from both. In the first case the subject is expressed by "*I*," the Pronoun of the first person; in the second by "*thou*," the Pronoun of the second person; in the third, either by the name of the thing, or if it be not named, by "*he*," "*she*," or "*it*," the Pronouns of the third person.

The *Verb* also takes different forms according as the subject is of the first, the second, or the third person. This difference is more or less strongly marked. In French, for instance, it is often scarcely perceptible. Thus, in these words, "*je lis*," "*tu lis*," "*il lit*," the difference is imperceptible in pronunciation. In the plural, however, it is strongly marked, "*nous lisons*," "*vous lisez*," "*ils lisent*."

In Latin, in Greek and many other languages, the difference is much more marked, as in "*lego*," "*legis*," "*legit*," "*legimus*," "*legitis*," "*legunt*." These varying terminations

being sufficient in Latin to denote whether the subject be of the first, second, or third person, it is generally altogether useless to express the subject, when it is only [a Pronoun. Thus instead of saying, as in English, "*I read*," "*thou readest*," "*ego lego*," "*tu legis*," the Romans commonly said "*lego*," "*legis*."

[It must not, however, be thought that this variation in the termination of the Verb is absolutely indispensable in order to distinguish the persons. If the subject be expressed we may do without this distinction. Thus we might say in English, "if thee live with him, he also willingly live with thee," instead of, "if thou livest with him, he also willingly lives with thee." Such a mode of expression would undoubtedly be repugnant to custom and to the genius of the English language, but yet would not render discourse unintelligible.]

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MODES OF VERBS.

All the operations of our minds have for their object the relations between things and their qualities. We consider things which fall under our observation, and we reflect upon the ideas which we have conceived of them, only in order to discover the qualities which belong to them; and the end of this employment of our faculties is to put it in our power to form a judgment. When we have once formed this judgment, the work of the understanding is finished, and then commences the operation of the will, whose movements are determined by our judgments, whether correct or incorrect. Thus the exercise of our mental faculties commences with

doubting and ends with *willing*; and these two extremes are connected by the *judgment*.

Suppose some one shews me a jewel of gold, ornamented with pearls and diamonds, which he offers to part with to me at a moderate price. I begin by examining whether the metal is in reality gold, whether the stones with which it is set are genuine or counterfeit, of a good quality or inferior, whether the work of the artist corresponds to the value of the material, and lastly, whether there is any proportion between the true value of the jewel and the price demanded for it. If, after this examination, I judge that the jewel is really valuable, and that the price at which it is offered to me is only moderate, this judgment is followed by the desire of possessing it, and by the determination to purchase it.

We have before said that every assemblage of words composed of a subject, a verb, and an attribute, forms a Proposition. It is time to remark that there are various kinds of Propositions which correspond to the different states of mind through which we successively pass in the use of our intellectual faculties. We commence by *doubting*, from doubt we pass to *judgment*, and the judgment leads us to the *will* or determination. These three states of mind must be represented by language; hence they give rise to three kinds of Propositions which we may call "*Deliberative*," "*Affirmative*," and "*Volitive*."

Different kinds of Propositions.

Three classes, according as they express doubt, judgment or will.

These three primitive classes of Propositions have several subdivisions.

To the class of "*Deliberative*" Propositions belong *Interrogative*, *Hypothetical-Interrogative*, *Conditional* and *Suppositive* Propositions. "*Affirmative*" Propositions may be either *Absolute* or *Hypothetical*. Last-

Subdivisions of these classes.

ly, “*Volitive*” Propositions are either *Imperative*, *Optative*, or *Concessive*.*

Among these Propositions there are some which are correlative, i. e. which can never stand alone, but always have a reciprocal and immediate relation to each other. This character peculiarly distinguishes Hypothetical Propositions, which are always in relation with a Conditional or Suppositive Proposition.

Interrogative Proposition. “Do you love study?”

Hypothetical-interrogative Proposition. “Should you love study, if . . . ?”

Conditional Proposition. “If you love study . . . ?”

Suppositive Proposition. “If you would love study”

Absolute affirmative Proposition. “I love study; I do not love idleness.”

Hypothetical affirmative Proposition. “I should love study, if”

Imperative Proposition. “Study your lesson.”

Optative Proposition. “May this child love study.”

Concessive Proposition. “Let the thing be as you suppose it.”

Observe I. that what essentially distinguishes the Conditional from the Suppositive Proposition is that the condition expressed by the Suppositive Proposition is regarded as not being likely to occur, while the Conditional Proposition expresses only simple uncertainty. Suppose you should hear

* I have not divided “*Affirmative*” Propositions into *Positive*, as “I love,” and *Negative*, as “I do not love,” first, because Negative Propositions are genuine affirmations of a Negative Attribute; second, because all kinds of Propositions may become negative and consequently negation does not form a Mode of the Verb, and because that in all languages in which the Verb has a negative form, as in the Turkish, for example, this form, as I shall show hereafter, constitutes a *Derived Verb* and not a Mode. For the same reason I admit neither a *Prohibitive*, nor *Deprecative* Mode. These two Modes are but negative forms of the Imperative and Optative.

me say to some one, "if you love me I shall be satisfied;" you would be, like myself, in a state of uncertainty whether I was loved by him whom I addressed or not; but if I should say, "if you loved me, I should be satisfied," you would perceive that I believed myself not to be loved. Although this distinction is not always scrupulously regarded, it is not on that account any the less correct.

II. The sense of Conditional and Suppositive Propositions such as, "if you love study . . . , " "if you would love study . . . , " is not complete, unless the correlative Hypothetical Proposition be expressed. Let it be expressed by saying, "if you love study, I am satisfied," "if you would love study, I should be satisfied," and the sentence is complete.

III. Interrogative, Affirmative, Imperative, Optative, and Concessive Propositions may become Hypothetical, from their relation to a Conditional Proposition, as "shall you love your children, if you have any?" "I shall love Eugenia, if she is docile and studious." "Study, if you wish to be learned," etc.

Hitherto I have considered Propositions only in relation to the state of our intellectual faculties, of which state they are the expression and representation, and this would be sufficient if every Proposition in discourse formed an isolated whole, without immediate connexion with any other. But it is not so. More frequently several propositions are found so linked together that their sense depends in a great measure on their union; and we cannot separate them without destroying the picture which their intimate combination produces. We have already seen examples of this in the Conditional and Suppositive Propositions which are in their nature correlative.

We may divide Propositions, with respect to these relations which they have to each other, into several classes,

such as *principal, complementary, subjunctive-complementary, incidental, adverbial, conjunctive* and *subjunctive* Propositions. These distinctions are not, like the preceding, inherent in the nature of Propositions, but belong to their disposition in discourse, and are only accidental. We will give examples of these different kinds of Propositions.

A principal and a subjunctive-complementary Proposition, "I WISH that CHARLOTTE MAY LEARN her lesson."

A principal and a complementary Proposition, "I BELIEVE that CHARLOTTE IS LEARNING her lesson."

Incidental Proposition, "I know, SAID THE KING, the services you have rendered to the state." "A prince, THOUGH HE BE POWERFUL, must remember that he is a man."

Adverbial Proposition, "GOD WILLING, I will come and spend the summer at Paris." "I ask, THIS BEING SETTLED, what part I am to take in this business."

Conjunctive Proposition, "Sophia, WHO IS LEARNING TO WRITE, begins to employ her time profitably." "Julia, WHOM HER MOTHER HAS JUST WEANED, cannot yet speak distinctly." "I have written this for the use of my children, WHO WILL DERIVE BENEFIT FROM IT, as I TRUST."

Subjunctive Proposition, "It is possible THAT I MAY HAVE FORGOTTEN SOME IMPORTANT OBSERVATIONS."

It is well to remark that what essentially distinguishes, at least in English,* the subjunctive-complementary from the

* In *Latin*, Propositions simply *complementary* are ordinarily denoted by the Infinitive; but this Mode is frequently employed to express Propositions whose sense is really *subjunctive*. In such case, the sense of the Verb in the principal Proposition determines the true character of the complementary Proposition; as in these sentences: "Dico Ciceronem fuisse bonum civem." "Volo, fili mi, te esse Dei et patriae religiosum cultorem." In such cases, it is the same with the Latin, as with languages which have no Subjunctive Mode.

simply complementary Proposition, is that the first always contains the idea of future time, and a greater or less degree of uncertainty; while a simply complementary Proposition, on the contrary, always expresses a real affirmation. The difference between Conjunctive and Subjunctive Propositions is the same. Since discourse must be the exact picture of the operations of the mind, language must be possessed of some means to characterize each Proposition so as to point out whether it expresses *doubt*, *affirmation*, or *will*.

It is not less necessary that there should be different forms of expression to denote the nature of the relations which exist between the different Propositions, whose combination should form a united, perspicuous whole.

These different kinds of Propositions are distinguished sometimes by the order observed in the disposition of the subject, verb, and attribute, sometimes by conjunctions, and lastly, sometimes by the different forms which the Verb assumes according to the nature of the Proposition. These forms, which are the chief subject of this chapter, Modes of Verbs. are called *Modes*. The following example will show how important is this distinction of Modes, and how much it contributes to the perspicuity of discourse.

Suppose that instead of saying, "I wished, said he, that my brother, who understands law better than I do, should be present at that conference, in order that, in discussing this business with him, you might, if it had pleased God, have reconciled the interests of the two parties, and that we might not have had the painful task of carrying the controversy into a court of justice," I should say, "I would wish he said, that my brother who understands law better than I do, will be present at that conference in order that, in discuss this business with him, you would be able, if it shall have pleased God, reconciling the interests of the two parties, and that we shall not have the painful task that we

should carry the controversy into a court of justice," I should not make myself understood. The reason is, that I have destroyed all the economy of the sentence by not employing the proper form or Mode for each of the Verbs which characterize the different Propositions which enter into its composition.

There might be as many modes as there are different kinds of propositions. But, perhaps, there is no language which multiplies the Modes of Verbs to such an extent. The number of modes varies greatly in different languages; there are even some in which the Verbs have no Modes.

The Modes whose use is common to almost all languages, are the *Indicative*, *Imperative*, and *Subjunctive*.

Each Mode may have all the Tenses before enumerated.

Each of the Modes just named, supposes a subject, expressed or understood, connected by the Verb with an attribute; they are also susceptible of distinction of persons, and for this reason I call them *Personal Modes*.

Impersonal
Modes.

But besides these Modes there are others, in which the Verb in some sort ceases to be a Verb, or to speak more correctly, in which it loses some of the qualities of a Verb and adds to those which it retains, the qualities of a Noun or Adjective.

The Verb denotes the existence of the Subject with relation to an Attribute. This design of the Verb always supposes a Subject, and, for this reason, in each of the Modes of which we have spoken, the Verb admits a distinction of gender, number, and person, which serves to make it agree with its particular Subject; but we may also employ the Verb as joining the idea of existence to an Attribute without pointing out the *Subject* in which the attribute exists. The idea of existence is then considered abstractly, without reference to a subject. This Mode is called *Infinitive*. Such in

English are the words, "*to be*," "*to read*," "*to become*." The infinitive partakes of the nature of the Verb, in that it always contains the idea of existence as found in a subject; and for this reason it may have different Tenses, as "*to read*," "*to have read*." It has neither gender, number, nor person, because it is not related to any determinate subject, of which we can say that it is of such a gender, such a number, or such a person.*

The Infinitive has some resemblance to the abstract noun, since it always designates an action or mode of existence; but there is this difference between them, that the abstract noun designates the action or mode of being without any accessory idea, while the Infinitive designates it as existing in some subject. We may perceive the difference between them by comparing the significations of the words "*love*" and "*to love*." They both express the same modes of existence, the same disposition of the heart. In the word "*love*," this is considered abstractly without relation to any subject, and does not in any degree perform the function of an attribute. In the Infinitive "*to love*," which is synonymous with "*to be loving*," this quality becomes attributive, because it is connected with the idea of existence, and hence necessarily supposes a subject although none is expressed.† The resemblance of the Infinitive to an abstract

* There are languages in which the Infinitive Mode often performs the office of a Personal Mode, the subject being clearly pointed out, as for instance in Latin: "*Credo Deum esse omnipotentem*;" "*Volo vos esse justos*;" and we might hence think that the Infinitive was susceptible of gender, number and person. But it is only accidentally and by a kind of abuse that it is substituted for Personal Modes; which happens also when it is constructed with a subject in the Nominative, as "*ego flere, ille vero ridere et cachinari*." We might, however, say in regard to this latter construction that there is some Verb understood, as "*capere*." If the Infinitive admitted the distinction of genders, numbers, and persons, it would no longer be fit to fulfil its principal and primitive design.

† With all due deference to De Sacy, it seems to me that he does

noun is such, that in several languages, as in the vulgar Greek for example,* the Verb has no Infinitive Mode; the abstract noun takes its place.

We may nevertheless observe a characteristic which distinguishes these two kinds of words and which is amply sufficient to show their real difference. It is that the abstract noun designates an action without any determination of an active or passive sense, while the Infinitive is limited to one of these points of view exclusively. "The love of God," for example, may according to circumstances mean either the love which God has towards men or that which men owe to their Creator. In the first sense we say, "the love of God is gratuitous; it adds nothing to his felicity;" we say in the other sense, "the love of God does not exclude fear." I may say likewise, "education is a duty of fathers and mothers," and then the abstract noun "*education*," is used in an *active* sense, and signifies *to take proper care to form the body, mind and heart of children*: in this proposition, "education is the greatest of blessings," the same noun is used in a *passive* sense and signifies *to receive the care* we have just mentioned.

On account of the resemblance of the Infinitive Mode to an abstract noun, this mode may in some languages take Articles before it; it may also serve as subject to a proposition and as complement to a Verb. Thus, we say, "TO JUDGE others is an easy matter;" I wish TO READ.

not in this paragraph *establish* any distinction (whether there be one or not) between the noun "love," and the Infinitive "to love;" for it is just as impossible to conceive of the former without relation to some subject though indefinite, as of the latter. TR.

* It is the same with the Arabic; the Arabic Verb has in reality no Infinitive Mode. The abstract Noun which performs its office receives indifferently an active or passive sense. This truth hitherto unknown to the grammarians who have given us the elements of that language, is placed in its proper light in my Arabic Grammar.

Since the Infinitive may serve as complement to a Noun or a Verb, it must be susceptible of the variation of Cases in those languages in which the Noun admits it. The Cases of the Infinitive are called *Gerunds*. Each Tense of the Infinitive may have Gerunds.

The Infinitive being considered as a Noun, becomes on that account in some languages the complement of a preposition. But a preposition and its complement may, as we have before seen, be expressed in an equivalent manner by an Adverb. It is then possible that a Preposition and the Infinitive which serves as its complement should be exactly represented by a single word, which should perform the function of an Adverb. This kind of word exists in some languages, as for example, in the Latin. It is called a *Supine*. The Supine of the Romans can scarcely ever be translated into other languages, except by the Infinitive Mode.*

There is yet another Mode of the Verb which is very similar to the Adjective. In this mode which is called *Participle*, the Verb expresses the subject, but in an indefinite and conjunctive manner, together with its existence with relation to a determinate or indeterminate attribute.† This mode, therefore, partakes of the nature of the Verb, inas-

* *Venit coenatum*, he is come to sup; *Horribile est visu*, it is horrible to be seen. *Coenatum*, to sup, *visu*, to be seen, are Supines, one Active, the other Passive.

Quintilian observed the relation which I here enforce between Supines and Adverbs. Speaking of Passive Verbs, he says: *Quaedam simile quiddam patiuntur vocabulis in Adverbium transeuntibus. Nam ut noctu et diu, ita dictu et factu. Sunt enim hæc quoque verba participalia quidam; non tamen qualia, dicto, facto que.* See Instit. Orat. Lib. I. Chap. 4.

† In order to judge correctly of the nature of the Participle we must examine it, not in Attributive Verbs, but in the abstract Verbs; we shall then perceive that it does not necessarily contain an attribute, but that it comprises only the Conjunctive "*who*," or "*which*," and the abstract Verb; in Attributive Verbs it contains, besides, an attribute; but this it contains in common with every other mode of such Verbs.

much as it expresses *existence*; and for this reason may have different Tenses: but it partakes also of the nature of the Adjective, inasmuch as the Conjunctive "*who*" or "*which*" is always understood in connexion with it, as with the Adjective.

Examples.

"The breezy call of *incense-breathing* morn,
The swallow *twittering* from her straw-built shed,
The cock's shrill clarion, or the *echoing* horn,
No more shall rouse them from their lowly bed." GRAY.

"The swallow *twittering*," i. e. *the swallow WHO TWITTERS*, etc.

"On the other side, Satan, *alarmed*,
Collecting all his might, *dilated* stood,
Like Teneriffe or Atlas, *unremoved*." MILTON.

"Satan *alarmed*," i. e. *who was alarmed*. "*Dilated*," *who was dilated*, etc.

As the Participle always includes the import of a Conjunctive Adjective, it may have like Adjectives, *genders*, *numbers*, and *cases*; as it always comprehends the idea of *existence*, it may have *Tenses*.

The Infinitive and Participle may be called *Impersonal Modes* in opposition to those Modes which are called *Personal*.

[It may be observed that *Modes* in Verbs have a design analogous to that of *Cases* in Nouns. Cases indicate the relations which the Nouns in a Proposition have to the other words which compose it; Modes, in like manner, determine the relations between the several Propositions which form a sentence or paragraph. As Cases are often assisted in their functions by Prepositions, so Modes very frequently cannot accomplish their design without the aid of Conjunctions.* Lastly, which is the trait of closest resemblance, Prepositions

* See above, Part I. Chap. 11, p. 43.

supply the place of Cases in languages which do not admit these variations, and Conjunctions may also supply the place of *Modes*.

By pursuing this observation, I might apply to Modes the distinction into *Absolute* and *Relative*,^{Absolute and Relative Modes.} as I have applied it to Cases. There are some Modes which are necessarily Relative, as the *Conditional*, *Suppositive Modes* etc. There are others which are sometimes Absolute, sometimes Relative.*

Lastly, it may be remarked that the same form often serves for several Modes. Then these Modes take their name from their most frequent use, without excluding by this denomination the other uses to which they are put.†

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE VOICES OF VERBS.

The Attributive Verb, besides the idea of existence with relation to some Attribute, also comprises the Attribute. This Attribute always denotes either an *action* or a *quality*. In the Attribute which expresses the idea of an *action*, this action may be considered with reference to a Subject who acts and as performed by him, and then the Attribute is called *Active*; or with reference to the person or thing upon whom the action falls, and as performed upon that person or thing, without any reference to the agent, and then the Attribute is called *Passive*. If the Attribute express only a

* See above pp. 72, 73.

† We may apply to Modes what Priscian said of Cases: "*Multas et diversas unusquisque casus habet significationes, sed a notioribus et frequentioribus acceperunt nominationem.*" Prisc. Lib. 5. de Casu.

quality, a mode of being belonging to the Subject, it is called *Neuter*, a word which denotes that it is neither Active nor Passive. In this example, "I shall read that book," which is equivalent to "I shall be reading" etc., the Attribute is Active; for "to read," is here an action of the Subject. In this example, "that book will be read," the Attribute is Passive; for "to read," is here an action of which the book is the object and which will be performed upon the book by some agent. If I say, "this book cost one dollar," the Attribute is Neuter; for "cost" is neither Active nor Passive.

From the two different points of view in which the same action may be regarded, naturally arise two forms called *Voices*, one Active, the other Passive. Neuter Attributes may give rise to a third Voice devoted to Neuter Verbs.

There is not in this respect, however, any uniformity in different languages. Some, like the Coptic, have but a single Voice; others have two or even three without a limitation of either to an Active, Passive, or Neuter signification, exclusively. In Latin, for example, all those Verbs are commonly called *Active Verbs* whose Infinitive terminates in *re*; as "*amare*," to love; "*legere*," to read; "*docere*," to teach. Yet "*vapulare*" is a Passive Verb, for it signifies "*to be beaten*," which assuredly is not an action of the Subject: "*constare*," to cost, "*valere*," to be able, are Neuter Verbs; "*praestare*," signifying to exceed in value, is Neuter; signifying to pay, it is Active. Verbs whose Infinitive terminates in *i* are commonly called *Passive*; as "*amari*," to be loved; "*legi*," to be read; "*doceri*," to be taught: yet "*sequi*," to follow, "*hortari*," to exhort, are certainly Active. "*Lætari*," to rejoice, is a Neuter Verb.*

* It is true these last have been distinguished by the name of *Dependent Verbs*; but it would have been better to have generalized the observation and to have remarked that Passive and Neuter Verbs

We must, therefore, carefully distinguish the Voice of a Verb from its signification. To facilitate the distinction, I denominate that an *Active* Verb which contains an Attribute in which the action is considered as performed by the Subject; and that a *Passive* Verb which contains an Attribute in which the action is considered as suffered by the Subject and performed upon it by some agent. I call that voice a *Subjective* Voice which is generally appropriated to the Active Verb, and that an *Objective* Voice which is generally appropriated to the Passive Verb. As to the Neuter Verbs, if they possess a peculiar form, I call it a *Neuter* Voice.

I Subjective, Objective, and Neuter Voices.

The exactly correspondent form of any Verb which is Active in one language must be Active in every other. The correspondent form of every Passive Verb in one language, must in like manner be Passive in every other. But a Verb whose form is Subjective in one language may have, as its correspondent Verb in another, one whose form is Objective; and a Verb whose form is Objective may correspond to another whose form is Subjective. Thus, "*sequi*," an Active Verb, has the Objective form in Latin and corresponds to "*to follow*" in English, which has the Subjective form.

In some languages the Objective is derived from the Subjective Voice, by a variation in the *termination*, as in Latin, "*lego*," *I read*; "*legor*," *I am read*; or even in the form of the Verb, as in Turkish, "*sevmek*," *to love*; "*sevilmek*," *to be loved*: in other languages it is formed by the union of the Verb "*to be*," with the Passive Attribute, as in English, "*to be read*."

[The change of the Active into a Passive Attribute is of

are sometimes found under each of these two forms: and further, instead of denominating these forms Active and Passive, they might have been called *forms in o* and *in on*.

great utility in discourse. There are three uses of the Passive Attribute.

The first and principal use of the Passive Voice is, to express an action without pointing out the Subject who acts, which we are frequently obliged to do, sometimes because we do not know the Subject who acts, and sometimes because we do not wish to let those whom we address know it. Thus, I might say, "Charlotte has been vexed, for she is crying," because I perceived by her tears that she had experienced some vexation, without knowing who had been its cause. So also I might say, "it is affirmed that Ganganelli has been poisoned," either being ignorant to whom the crime was to be attributed, or not judging it best to let it be known.

Sometimes we employ the Passive Voice, although at the same time we express the Subject by whom the action was performed; and this is the second use of the Passive. We have recourse to this form of Proposition, particularly when we wish to fix the attention of those whom we address upon the person or thing who is the object of the action, rather than upon the subject who performs it. Then, the Subject is expressed, merely as a circumstance of the action, by means of a Preposition to which it serves as complement. If I were relating the story of the life of Britannicus, I might terminate it by saying, "Britannicus was poisoned at the table of Nero, and by Nero himself." My principal object is Britannicus, and on that account I make use of the Passive and express the Subject as a circumstantial term by saying, "by Nero himself." If, on the contrary, it were my design to detail the crimes of Nero, I should say, "Nero poisoned Britannicus at his own table;" because I should be less solicitous to tell the cause of the death of Britannicus than to tell the crime of Nero.

This second employment of the Passive is especially fre-

quent in those languages in which the construction is fixed, and admits but few inversions.

Thirdly, and lastly, the Passive is employed to vary the expression and to give beauty to discourse.

The employment of the Passive is not however absolutely necessary. There are languages, such as the Coptic, for instance, which have no Passive Voice. In that case, when the Subject who acts is unknown, or when the person speaking does not wish to express it, he makes use of a vague and indefinite Subject. This Subject is generally the Plural Pronoun of the third person. Thus, instead of saying, "Charlotte has been vexed, for she is crying," it would be said, "they have vexed Charlotte, for she is crying."

This form of expression is also common even in languages which admit a Passive Voice. Thus, in Latin, it was customary to use "ferunt," *they say*, although "fertur," *it is said*, might have been employed. In English the use of the word "they" as a vague and indefinite subject is frequent.

Some languages have peculiar words designed to express the Subject in a vague and indefinite manner. Such are the words "*on*" in French, and "*man*" in German. By the help of these, the Active Voice may be employed without determining the Subject.]

The combination of all the variations of which a Verb is susceptible, in denoting the Voices, Modes, Tenses, Genders, Numbers, and Persons, is called a *Conjugation*; and to recite a Verb, passing successively through each of these variations, is called *to conjugate it*.

Of Verbs, some are Absolute, others Relative. Absolute and Relative Verbs. Those are called *Absolute* which in themselves contain a perfect sense, as "*I sleep*," "*I wake*." Those are called *Relative* which require a complement, as "*I possess*," "*I see*," "*I regard*; for, to complete the sense, we

must add the thing which is *possessed, seen, or regarded*; and though the complement of these Verbs is sometimes suppressed, it is only because those whom we address can easily supply it.

Often, the same Verbs may be employed, sometimes in an Absolute, at others, in a Relative sense. Thus we say, "I have watched since yesterday morning," using the word "*watch*" in an Absolute sense, and also, "I, have watched this young man lest he should do some foolish thing," using the same word in a Relative sense.

Doubly Relative Verbs. Several Verbs require two complements. Such is the Verb "to give," which necessarily supposes a thing given and a person to whom it is given. We may denominate these *Doubly Relative Verbs*.

Transitive and Intransitive Verbs. Relative Verbs are connected mediately or immediately with their complements. I call those

Transitive Verbs which are immediately connected with their complements, and the others *Intransitive*. Thus, in English, "*to read*," is a Transitive Verb, for it takes its complement immediately: "I am reading Shakespeare;" "*to come*" is an Intransitive Verb, because it takes its complement with the intervention of a Preposition; "I come from Rome," "I come from Paris."*

A Verb may therefore be Transitive in one language, while its correspondent Verb in another is Intransitive; for as is seen from the definition I have given of these two denominations, they really belong, not to the signification of the Verb, but to the manner in which it is connected with its complement. "*To come*," is Intransitive in English; it is Transitive in Arabic: "*to salute*," is Transitive in English; in Arabic, Intransitive.

* The relation which exists between a Verb and its Complement, may be regarded as a sort of authority which the Verb exercises over its complement; and for this reason we say that the Verb *governs* its complement.

[With respect to *Transitive* Verbs, the Verb which is the Antecedent term of a relation determines at the same time the nature of that relation, or, which is the same thing, it performs at the same time the function of an Exponent. If the complement of the Verb be denoted by one of those inflexions of Nouns called *Cases*, this inflexion in reality performs the office of Exponent. With respect to *Intransitive* Verbs, the nature of the relation is determined by a Preposition. A Verb which has two complements is generally Transitive with respect to one and Intransitive with respect to the other. Thus, in English, "*to give*," is Transitive in relation to the thing given, and Intransitive in relation to the person to whom it is given. Example: "I have given alms to this poor man." In some other languages the Verb "*to give*" is transitive in relation to the person to whom something is given, and Intransitive in relation to the thing given. However, this difference is generally occasioned by some slight shade of difference in signification. Thus in Latin, "*dare poculum Tityro*," and "*donare Tityrum poculo*," phrases which mean nearly the same thing, though the Verb "*dare*" is, nevertheless, not the exact synonyme of "*donare*." The first expression signifies "to give a cup to Tityrus;" the second, "to reward Tityrus with a cup."]

The person who is the Subject of a Verb may at the same time be its Complement, as "I am burning myself;" "you are deceiving yourself;" "he killed himself;" the Verb is then *Reflexive*. The Reflexive Verb may take a peculiar form; it may also take the Subjective form.

Reflexive
Verbs.

[We may add to the principal signification of a Verb, a great many accessory significations, by means of some change, addition or suppression in the form of the Verb. Thus the same Verb may have an affirmative or a negative form, forms which denote emulation or a reciprocity of action

between two subjects, an action merely commenced, or the desire of performing the action denoted by the Verb ; others which denote frequent repetition or intensity of action ; others still, which denote that the subject who acts occasions the action by means of some one else whom he causes to perform it, or that he acts only under the influence of some one else, who is the primary cause of the action, or lastly, that he feigns an action or quality which he does not perform, or does not possess : " I strike ;" " I do not strike ;" " I endeavor to strike harder than he ;" " I strike somebody who is striking me ;" " I begin to strike ;" " I wish to strike ;" " I am in the habit of striking ;" " I strike with vigor ;" " I cause my son to be struck by his mother ;" " I am compelled by Peter to strike Paul ;" " I pretend to strike."

Derived forms
of Verbs.

There is no one of these accessory significations which does not give rise, in some language or other, to peculiar forms, and these forms are very often capable of being either Active or Passive.* In languages which have no peculiar forms to connect these accessory ideas with the principal one, they are expressed by means of circumlocution ; and in truth, all these forms are only elliptical expressions.

The same observation is applicable to those languages in which the Verb takes a great many different forms from comprising its complement, or even its two complements, if they are Pronouns, within itself. I know of only one language, the Basque, which thus incorporates into the body

* The Latin language furnishes examples of such forms derived from a primitive Verb. In this language there are Verbs of a *Frequentative* form, as "*dictito*," "*lectito*," "*factito* ;" others of an *Inchoative* form, as "*lucesco*," "*ardesco*," "*obdormisco* ;" *Intensive*, as "*capesso*," "*incesso* ;" *Desiderative*, as "*parturio*," "*mincturio*," "*esurio* ;" *Frequentative* and *Diminutive* at the same time, as "*cantillo*," "*sorbillo*," etc.

of the Verb, the Pronouns which serve as its Complements; but perhaps there are others which possess a similar system of conjugation. In the Basque, the Verb has different forms to express "*I surrender myself*;" "*I surrender thee*," "*I surrender him*," "*I surrender you*," "*I surrender them*," etc.

Every Verb, employed in a personal Mode, necessarily has a Subject. But it very often happens that we are witnesses of effects whose causes are unknown to us or that we wish to express the effects without expressing the cause otherwise than indefinitely. Then we commonly employ as Subject the Pronoun of the third person, and in languages in which this Pronoun has three Genders we generally take the *Neuter*. Thus, when we say in English, "*it thunders*," "*it rains*," "*it snows*," it is clear that the Pronoun "*it*" denotes in a vague and indefinite manner, the Subject of which the Attribute is *thundering*, *raining*, *snowing*. It is as though we had said, "the cause which produces the thunder, the rain," or "the snow, thunders, rains or snows."

As we have just said, in English and many other languages, when we wish to express the Subject vaguely and indefinitely, we make use of the Pronoun of the third person; but in languages in which the inflexions of the Verb are so sonorous that it is not necessary to express the Pronoun, we content ourselves with employing the third person of the Verb. Thus we say in Latin, "*pluit*," "*grandinat*," "*nigrit*," *it rains, it hails, it snows*; "*ventum est*," *he is come*, "*itum est*," "*pugnatum est*" etc.

This form is commonly called *Impersonal*; but this denomination is incorrect and inadmissible, since these Verbs are really in the third person. It would be much better to call the Verbs which are used only in this form, *Verbs of the third person*.]

PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL GRAMMAR.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

OF SYNTAX.

It is not enough, in order to speak with propriety, to know the various forms of which a word is susceptible ; we must also know what use to make of these various forms in order to connect together the different parts which compose discourse, and in what order to dispose these different parts. The rules which ought to be followed for these two purposes, form what is called *Syntax*. The first only of these two parts of Grammar, is, however, more frequently called Syntax, and the second *Construction*, although these two words, one of which is Greek and the other Latin, properly signify the same thing, the art of *disposing* and *arranging* the different parts of discourse.

Difference between Syntax and Construction.

All rules of Syntax relate to two things, *Agreement* and *Government*. Nouns, as they designate beings by the idea of their nature, are susceptible of various *Genders* and *Numbers* : Adjectives, Articles, Pronouns, and Verbs, in some languages admit the same variations of Gender and Number, and as these variations are designed only to denote the relations of these words to

Proper Syntax.

Rules of Agreement. Nouns, one object of the rules of *Agreement* is to teach in what cases, Articles, Adjectives, Pronouns, and Verbs ought to take the same *Gender* and *Number* as the Nouns to which they are related.

In those languages in which Nouns admit *Cases*, Adjectives also admit them, and here is a new object of rules of *Agreement*.

Nouns, Adjectives, and Verbs often have Nouns or Verbs as their Complements. The rules of *Government* teach in what manner the relation which exists between the Antecedent and Consequent terms should be denoted. They teach also what is the proper form of those words which serve as complements to Prepositions.

Propositions also have relations of Government to each other; some are principal, others subordinate; some indicative, others subjunctive; some suppositive, others conditional: their relations are expressed by Conjunctions and by Modes of Verbs. The rules which determine the employment of Modes constitute a part of the rules of *Government*. None of these rules properly belong to General Grammar, as each language follows, in regard to the rules of *Agreement* and *Government*, a course peculiar to itself.

CHAPTER II.

OF CONSTRUCTION.

It is with Construction as with Syntax. It follows no general rule common to all languages. We may, however, in all languages bring discourse to a Construction which shall seem conformable to the operations of the mind, if not to the order of our sensations.

Natural Construction.

In this construction, the Subject is always presented first, then the Verb, then the Attribute.

In the Subject and the Attribute, the Article immediately precedes or follows the Noun ; the Adjective or Conjunctive Proposition which modifies the Noun comes immediately after it ; the Complement of a Noun, Verb, Adjective or Preposition directly follows the word of which it is the Complement, and the Preposition must be placed between the two words which form the terms of the relation of which it is Exponent ; lastly, Adverbs, expressing circumstances, must be regarded as Prepositions followed by their Complements.

As to the mode of arranging different complements of the same word, it is much more arbitrary. Take an example :

“ By this means you will place yourself in the attitude of quiet expectation that heaven will befriend you, and that it will dissipate the cloud of ill fortune which crosses the happiness of your life and obliges you to conceal your origin.”

Let us construct this phrase according to the natural order.

“ You will place yourself, by this means, in the attitude of quiet expectation that heaven will befriend you, and that it will dissipate the cloud of ill fortune which crosses the happiness of the life of you, and which obliges you to conceal the origin of you.”

The construction of the English language is very near the natural construction. It happens, however, somewhat frequently, especially in poetry, that we place the complement before the Noun or Verb to which it belongs. This kind of subversion of the common order of Construction is called *Inversion*. Of this, several examples may be found in the following lines :

“ A raven, while, *with glossy breast,*
Her new laid eggs she fondly prest,
 And, *on her wicker work* high mounted,
Her chickens prematurely counted,

(A fault philosophers might blame,
If quite exempted from the same,)
Enjoyed at ease the genial day." COWPER.

Languages, in which the forms of Nouns and Verbs have many more variations, and in which the terminations, which make these variations, are more sonorous, depart still further from the natural construction and more frequently make use of Inversion without occasioning any obscurity, because the forms of words sufficiently indicate the relations of Agreement or Government which connect them with each other.

Whatever may be the propensity of our language to follow the natural construction, it often allows the orator Inversions as great as are authorized by those languages which possess more resources to remedy this derangement of Construction. These Inversions, however, are not found in common language, and the considerations to which they give rise belong rather to the oratorical art than to Grammar.

CHAPTER III.

OF ELLIPSIS.

The object of language is to communicate to others our knowledge or the judgments of our minds. As thought is very rapid, it is natural that we should endeavor to express it as briefly as possible. To attain this end we often suppress a part of the words which would be necessary to express our thought completely, without depriving discourse of any of its perspicuity, inasmuch as the tone, gesture, or turn of the phrase supplies the suppression. This is what is called *Ellipsis* or an *Elliptical sentence*. These lines of Shakspeare present examples of Ellipsis :

"Show men dutiful?"

Why so didst thou. Seem they grave and learned?

Why so didst thou. Come they of noble family?

Why so didst thou. Seem they religious?

Why so didst thou," etc.

i. e. do men show themselves dutiful? Why so didst thou show thyself. Do men seem grave and learned? Why so didst thou seem, etc.

It is the same with the following:

Hamlet. "What! looked he frowningly?"

Horatio. A countenance more

In sorrow than in anger.

Ham. Pale, or red?

Hor. Nay! very pale.

That is, *Ham.* Did he look frowningly? *Hor.* He had a countenance more in sorrow than in anger. *Ham.* Was it pale or red? *Hor.* Nay, it was very pale.

The Ellipsis is very commonly employed in discourse. To be convinced of this, it is only necessary to call to mind what we said when speaking of Prepositions, that Prepositions were only the Exponents of relations existing between Antecedents and Consequents.* Analyze ever so little any common phrase, and you will frequently find Prepositions which have indeed a complement, but which apparently have no antecedent.

Suppose I read on the title page of a book, "London, Longman and Co." These words convey no meaning, unless I call to mind the Antecedent of the relation of which "London," and "Longman and Co." are the Consequents: "*This book is sold in London by Longman and Co.*"

If I read the word "*Paris*" upon a letter, I immediately fill up the Ellipsis in my mind thus: "*This letter is to be carried to Paris.*"

* See above, Part I. Chap. 9, p. 44.

Lastly, if I observe upon a monument the inscription, "to the memory of Washington," I immediately fill up the Ellipsis thus: "*This monument is consecrated to the memory of Washington.*"

In these examples, there is an Ellipsis of all the essential constituent parts of a Proposition, of the Subject, the Verb and the Attribute: only a single circumstantial term is expressed, which might be connected with many different Propositions; yet no obscurity is occasioned, because the circumstances accompanying these fragments of Propositions determine their sense.

It is the same in many other cases, and whenever a Proposition appears to want any one of its essential terms, we must immediately have recourse to an Ellipsis in order to complete the sentence. On leaving a friend, I say to him, "Adieu!" In common usage "adieu" is a single word; it is a noun: therefore, in order to complete the Proposition to which the word belongs, we must restore the Subject "I," the Attributive Verb "say," and the Preposition and its complement "to you;" for the sense is, "I say to you, Adieu!" But if we ascend to the origin of the word "Adieu," we find it to be composed of the French words *a* and *Dieu*, meaning "*to God.*" The sense, therefore, originally demanded a Verb as Antecedent of the relation which had for its consequent "*God,*" and for its Exponent "*to.*" in fact, the primitive meaning of this elliptical expression was, "*I commend you to God.*" "Good morning," "good evening," are only fragments of these Propositions, "*I wish you a good morning,*" "*I wish you a good evening.*"

St. Paul said that in the latter times there would come some "forbidding to marry, to abstain from meats:!"* the meaning is, "forbidding to marry, *commanding* to abstain from meats." This Ellipsis is founded on the fact that every

* 1 Tim. 4: 3.

prohibition is a negative commandment, and that consequently the Verb "*forbid*," really includes the idea of *commanding*.*

We frequently find an Ellipsis of the Verb "to be." There are some languages, as the Arabic and Hungarian, in which this Ellipsis is even frequently prescribed by Syntax. In English this Ellipsis is made only to give vivacity to discourse, as in these lines :

"Whence, then, those thoughts,—those towering thoughts that flew
Such monstrous heights! from instinct and from pride." YOUNG.

"Whence those thoughts," i. e. "whence *are* those thoughts"—"from instinct and from pride," i. e. "*they are* from instinct and from pride."

Sometimes the Verb which should serve as Antecedent to another Verb is suppressed, and this latter is expressed under the form of a complement, that is to say, in the Infinitive; thus in Latin :

"Iamque dies infanda aderat: *mihi sacra parari*
Et salsae fruges, et circum tempora vittae."

(Æn. L. 2, lines 132—3.)

It may further be observed that when we reply in the negative to a question, we very often content ourselves with using the words, "no," "nothing," "never," etc.

The following lines contain examples of this :

Proteus. Valentine?

Valentine. No!

Pro. Who then, his spirit?

Val. Neither.

Pro. What then?

Val. Nothing. SHAKESPEARE.

* A similar Ellipsis is found in these lines of Virgil.

"His fœtus, non legatos, neque prima per artem
Tentamenta tui pepigi." (Æneid. L. 8.—line 143—4.)

The word "*mihi*" must be supplied as Antecedent to "*legatos*."

So also these lines.

"What is that honour? Air, a trim reckoning! Who hath it? He that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No! Doth he hear it? No! Is it insensible, then? Yea! to the dead," etc.

SHAKSPEARE.

These two examples contain a great many kinds of Ellipsis, but I confine myself to that of which we are now treating.

"No," i. e. *it is not Valentine.*

"Neither," i. e. *it is neither Valentine nor his spirit.*

"Nothing," i. e. *it is nothing.*

In the second example.

"No," i. e. *he doth not feel it.*

"No," i. e. *he doth not hear it.*

"Yea," i. e. *it is insensible.*

I might make many more remarks upon this subject, but I think what has been said will be sufficient to guide those, who will take the pains to consider these few examples with attention, to a proper understanding of the subject.

CHAPTER IV.

OF ANALYSIS.

I have now attained the end which I had proposed to myself, viz. to prepare every person who is studying either his native or any other language, to understand the nature of all the words which enter into the composition of discourse, and the relations which exist between different *words* in the same Proposition, or between the different *Propositions* which compose a sentence or paragraph. My work would, however, be incomplete, were I not myself to give examples

of Grammatical Analysis. These, at the same time that they may serve as models to those who may wish to imitate them, will give me an opportunity to cast more light upon the principles of this book, by means of their application, and to collect in the compass of a few pages, most of the results of the first two parts of the book. In order to render the utility of my general principles in reference to Grammatical Analysis, the more apparent, one of my examples will be taken in the English and another in the Latin language.

But before beginning this analysis we must retrace our steps in order to consider anew the constituent parts of Propositions, and to look at them in two different points of view which we have not yet distinguished; I mean with separate reference to Logic and Grammar. This distinction is absolutely necessary in order to determine the rules of *Agreement* and *Government* which form the peculiar Syntax of each language; and though I have delayed till this time to speak of it, it has only been that I might not overload the first two parts of this Grammar with difficult details.

We have before said that every Proposition supposes a Subject, a Verb and an Attribute. We have also said that the Subject and Attribute may be either Simple or Compound; and that when Simple they may be either Complex or Incomplex. What has before been said in order to develop these principles, may be again read, and it will be useless to repeat it here. We may add, however, that whenever the Simple Subject is Complex, we may distinguish a Logical and a Grammatical Subject.

Logical and
Grammatical
Subject.

The Subject is Complex when the nature of the thing it denotes is determined by several ideas, which all unite to form the total idea of the Subject. We gave an example of it in the following Proposition, "autumnal peaches, which are very much exposed and arrive to perfect maturity, are an

excellent fruit." This Complex Subject is itself the *Logical* Subject; for the Logical Subject is composed of all the collective ideas which unite to determine the nature of the thing in question, and of all the words which express these different particular ideas. The *Grammatical* Subject, on the contrary, consists only of those words which express the principal idea, an idea which serves as a kind of basis for all the rest, and which the accessory ideas only develop, enlarge, restrict, or modify. In the example cited the Grammatical Subject is "*peaches*."

Apply this distinction to another example :

" The moon,
Rising in clouded majesty, at length,
Apparent queen, unveiled her peerless light,
And o'er the dark her silver mantle threw." MILTON.

The Subject is Simple, for it denotes but a single thing, "*the moon*." It is Complex, for it expresses this thing by several ideas, "*the moon, rising in clouded majesty, apparent queen*," and this is the Logical Subject: the Grammatical Subject is "*moon*."

Logical and
Grammatical
Attribute.

The same principles are applicable to the Attribute. When the Simple Attribute is Complex, we may distinguish the Logical from the Grammatical Attribute.

The Attribute is Complex when the quality which it denotes is determined by several ideas which all unite to form the total idea of the quality. We gave as an example of the Complex Attribute that which is found in the following Proposition: "*Peaches are more agreeable to the taste than the other fruits which nature presents us in the same season*." This Complex Attribute is also the Logical Attribute; for the Logical Attribute is composed of all the collective ideas which unite to determine the quality in question, and of all the words which express these particular ideas. The Grammatical Attribute, very different from the Logical Attribute,

consists only of those words which express the principal idea of this quality, which idea all the others develope, enlarge, restrict, or modify. In our example, the Grammatical Attribute is "*agreeable*."

In applying this distinction to the following example, "the mind of man is limited to such a degree, that, far from being well acquainted with things at a distance from him, he knows himself and the beings which surround him, only in a very imperfect manner," we shall see that the Logical Attribute is composed of the words "limited to such a degree" together with all that follows to the end of the sentence, while the single word, "limited," constitutes the Grammatical Attribute.

The Compound Subject and Attribute are, as we have seen, only the union of several Subjects having the same Attribute, or of several Attributes belonging to the same Subject. A Proposition whose Subject or Attribute is Compound may be divided into as great a number of Propositions as the number of particular Subjects or Attributes, independent of each other, which the Subject or Attribute comprehends. In each of these particular Subjects or Attributes, if they are Complex, we may distinguish the Logical from the Grammatical Subject or Attribute.

We must here, however, make an important observation, lest, in some cases, we should deprive the Grammatical Subject or Attribute of a part of the words which actually belong to it.

When the Subject of a Proposition is formed of several ideas, from their nature independent of each other, but which nevertheless constitute but a Simple Subject because the Attribute does not belong separately to each of the beings contained in the Subject, but only belongs to them collectively, there is then but one Logical Subject: as to the Grammatical Subject it is composed of all the words which

express the principal ideas, independent of each other. Thus, in the example elsewhere given ; " the love of virtue and hatred of virtuous men are irreconcilable sentiments," there is but one Logical Subject, and the Grammatical Subject is formed of the words "*love*" and "*hatred*."

It is the same with the Attribute when it is formed of several ideas independent of each other, but which nevertheless form but a Simple Attribute, because it is these collectively and not each separately which belongs to the Subject. Thus in this Proposition, " those of our relations to whom we owe equal affection are our parents, who gave us being, and our children who have received it from us," the Grammatical Attribute is formed of the words "*parents*" and "*children*."

All that we have said of the Subject and Attribute is equally applicable to Complements.

Whenever a Complement is Complex, we must distinguish the Logical from the Grammatical Complement.

We have before examined the Complements of Prepositions and of Verbs, and have seen that every Complement is the second term of a relation. After this definition, and after what we have said in relation to the Subject and Attribute, it can scarcely be necessary to say that the Logical Complement is composed of all the words necessary to express the particular ideas whose union forms the total of the idea which serves as second term to the relation ; and that the Grammatical Complement comprises only the words employed to express the principal idea of this second term ; an idea which is developed, expanded, restricted, or otherwise modified by the accessory ideas.

Let us take the following sentence as an example. " I love those children, who, by applying themselves to their duty, testify affection and regard towards those who take charge of their education." The Verb " to love " is a Relative Verb ; it therefore requires a Complement. It has here

for its Complement, "children who" etc. to the end of the sentence. This Complement is Complex, and as a whole it forms the Logical Complement: the Grammatical Complement is "children."

Another example: "I have come to Paris to learn the French language." "I have come," is antecedent to two consequents. The first is "*Paris*:" the two words "to Paris" form the Logical Complement; the single word "Paris" is the Logical and Grammatical Complement of the Preposition "*to*." The second is, "learn the French language;" it is Complex; it forms the Logical Complement of the Preposition "*to*;" but the Grammatical Complement of this Preposition is the single word "*learn*," and this word is itself the Antecedent of a second relation of which the Consequent or Logical Complement is, "the French language," and the Grammatical Complement is "*language*."

The Compellative,* or that part of speech which denotes the person whom we address may also be Incomplex, as in this example,

"Farewell, *my sovereign*."

or Complex, as in this,

"Farewell, *my Hector and my Troy's true hope*."

The Complex is itself the Logical Compellative; but the Grammatical Compellative consists Logical and Grammatical Compellative. only of the words which express the principal idea. In the first example, "*sovereign*" is both the Logical and the Grammatical Compellative; in the second, the Grammatical Compellative is the single word, "*Hector*."

It follows from all this, that a Logical Subject, Attribute, Complement, or Compellative often includes one or more subordinate or Conjunctive Propositions, which, like the principal Proposition, are composed of a Subject, Verb and Attribute.

* See above, Part I. Chap. 1, p. 15.

Apposition and
Appositive.

Let us proceed to an observation in respect to a mode of determining the sense of Nouns or Pronouns, to which I give the name of *Apposition*. We have previously seen that an idea expressed by a Noun, and especially by an Appellative Noun, may be determined, restricted, or modified, either by another Noun placed in relation with the first, by an Adjective or by a Conjunctive Proposition which the Conjunctive Adjective "*who*," "*which*" or "*whom*" connects with this Noun. Thus we fix the meaning of the word "horse" in the following expressions, by saying, "a horse of pasteboard," "a black horse," "the horse which I use in my cabriolet," "the horse which you gave me."

But we may also fix the idea expressed by a Noun, whether Appellative or Proper, by expressing anew the same idea by one or more other Nouns, which add nothing to the meaning of the first Noun, but, by presenting the same person or thing in different points of view, increase the energy and perspicuity of discourse. I call this mode of collecting together several different Nouns, *Apposition*, from a Latin word which signifies *to place near*. These words have to each other, not a relation of Government as in this example, "a horse of pasteboard," but one of simple Agreement: they neither add any thing to, nor take any thing from the idea expressed by the principal Noun, in which respect they differ from the Adjective, and from the Conjunctive Proposition, which performs the function of an Adjective. They are then employed only as *Appositives*.

Here are several examples of Apposition.

"Louis, your brother, the lieutenant-colonel, is dead."

"This gentleman is Hamilton, your cousin, my sister's husband, the General's eldest son, formerly ambassador to Lisbon."

"I bequeath £100 to John, Francis' son, Peter's nephew, my godson."

Apposition may likewise take place between Nouns and Pronouns. The following is a correct sentence: "I, the sister and wife of influential magistrates, the mother of one of the most distinguished orators at the bar, am now forsaken and destitute."

The Appositive may almost always be changed into a Conjunctive Proposition without occasioning any alteration in the sense.

Whenever the Verb is in a Personal Mode, it belongs to a Proposition which must have its Subject and Attribute; but it is otherwise when the Verb is in the Infinitive Mode. This Mode, in which the Verb resembles a Noun, makes it capable of becoming the immediate complement of a Verb or Preposition. Under this form, it does not constitute a Proposition, and consequently does not require the expression of a Subject. We may always, however, consider the Infinitive, when it serves as Complement to a Verb or Preposition, as an Elliptical expression which may be resolved into a Complementary Proposition, either Subjunctive or Subordinate. "I wish to come;" "I go to see;" "I fear to die;" "I will go to counsel him;" "I aspire to excel him;" i. e. "I wish this, that I may come;" "I go for this, that I may see;" "I fear this, that I may die;" "I will go for this, that I may console him;" "I aspire to this, that I may excel him." We may then, in all these cases, call the Proposition an *Infinitive* Proposition.

There remains an important observation to be made upon a kind of Complex Attribute, one part of which is comprehended in an Attributive Verb and the other not. This occurs in the following examples: "I made my son priest;" "I have appointed Jeroboam king over Israel;" "God made Solomon the wisest prince on the

earth ;" " I find this horse too old ;" " God called him Abraham ;" so also in the following, in which the Attribute is Passive or Neuter : " my son has been made priest ;" " Jeroboam has been appointed king over Israel ;" " Solomon was made the wisest prince on the earth ;" " this horse has been found too old ;" " he was called Abraham ;" " it appeared too short ;" " he became more circumspect."

In order fully to comprehend the office performed by this kind of accessory, which is not, properly speaking, an Attribute, nor in reality a Complement of the Verb, but which I call a Sur-Attribute, we must observe that in many languages this accessory idea is comprehended in the Verb itself. Thus, in Hebrew, מָלַךְ *Malac*, signifies *to reign*, and הִמְלִיךָ *Himlic*, *TO CAUSE to reign*, or *to appoint king*. Even in English we may often substitute a single word for this sort of compound expression : in place of saying, " I have rendered it white" or " black," we may say, " I have whitened," or " blackened it." We may say " *to Latinise*," " *to Anglicise*," for " *to render Latin*" or " *English*," any expression borrowed from another language ; " to rarefy," " to liquefy," etc. for " to render rare," " liquid," etc.

In some languages, this accessory idea is expressed under the form of a circumstantial term, either as Complement of a Preposition or as an Adverb. We might say in English : " he has been appointed for king," which will give us an idea of this mode of expression.

We may always regard the Sur-Attribute as an Elliptical expression, that is to say, as the Attribute of a Proposition whose Subject and Verb are not expressed. By this principle, the examples we have given, might be developed thus : " I made my son, so that he was priest." " God appointed Jeroboam, so that he was king over Israel." " God made Solomon, so that he was the wisest prince on the earth." " I find this horse in such a state that he is too old." " God

called him so that his name was Abraham," etc. Besides relations composed of a word relatively employed and a complement which is necessary in order to determine with accuracy the signification of the Antecedent, we frequently express a great many other *accidental* relations, which are not necessary to complete the sense of a relative word, but by which are denoted various circumstances which have a more or less immediate relation either to the entire Proposition or some one of its constituent parts. In the following example: "I met, yesterday, to my great surprise, in Washington Street, as I was coming out of church and going home, my mind wholly occupied with something else, my eldest child," there is an essential and indispensable relation between the Antecedent, "I met," and the consequent, "my eldest child;" but the relation between this same antecedent and the other consequents, "yesterday," "to my great surprise," etc. is not of the same nature; it is only accidental. I call all such accessory terms of a Proposition, *Circumstantial Terms*. These Circumstantial Terms are sometimes Adverbs, as "yesterday," sometimes Prepositions with their Complements, as "in Washington Street," sometimes Conjunctive Propositions, as "as I was coming out of church," and lastly, sometimes Adverbial Propositions, as "my mind wholly occupied with something else."

With these remarks well digested, we shall find no difficulty in Grammatical Analysis.

CHAPTER V.

EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

I shall take for an example that magnificent exordium with which the immortal Bossuet commences his funeral eulogy upon Henriette Marie of France, queen of England ;* and if this Analysis shall deprive this piece of any of its grace and force, the reflecting reader will learn to perceive what the orator owes to the Logic which furnishes him with thoughts, and for what he is indebted to the oratorical art which teaches him how to dispose them.

“MY LORD,

He, who reigns in the heavens and by whom all kingdoms are upheld, to whom alone belongs glory, majesty, and independence, is, likewise, the only being who can boast of ruling kings and of giving them, when it pleases him, great and terrible lessons. Whether he raise up thrones or cast them down, whether he communicate his power to princes or withdraw it within himself and leave them but their own weakness, he teaches them their duty in a sovereign and dignified manner : for, in bestowing his power upon them, he commands them to use it, as does he himself, for the benefit of mankind ; and, by withdrawing it, he shows them that all their majesty is borrowed, and that they are not the less under his dominion and supreme authority for being seated upon a throne. It is thus that he instructs princes, not merely by means of language, but, also, by means of events and examples.”

* Unwilling to risk the occurrence of mistakes and inaccuracies in any attempt to analyse an example selected by myself from the range of English oratory, I have thought it more prudent and safe, to translate the above passage of Bossuet, together with its analysis by M. De Sacy. TR.

We will analyse successively the various Propositions which compose this paragraph.

First Sentence.

"My Lord, he who reigns in the heavens and by whom all kingdoms are upheld, to whom alone belongs glory, majesty, and independence, is, likewise, the only being who can boast of ruling kings and of giving them, when it pleases him, great and terrible lessons."

This sentence forms only a single Complex Proposition.

COMPELLATIVE. "My Lord."—The Compellative is not a constituent part of the Proposition.

SUBJECT. "He who reigns in the heavens and by whom all kingdoms are upheld, to whom alone belongs glory, majesty, and independence." This Subject is Simple and Complex: it is the Logical Subject: the Grammatical Subject is "*he*."

In this Logical Subject there are three Conjunctive Propositions, which all serve to define the Grammatical Subject "*he*:" 1st, "*who reigns in the heavens*,"—"who," Conjunctive Adjective, referring to "*he*," and is the Logical and Grammatical Subject; "*reigns*," i. e. *is reigning*; "*is*," Verb; "*reigning in the heavens*," Logical Attribute; "*reigning*," Grammatical Attribute; "*in the heavens*," circumstantial term; "*in*," Exponent of a relation of which "*reigning*" is the Antecedent; "*the heavens*," Consequent of the same relation and Complement of the Preposition "*in*."

2d, "*And by whom all kingdoms are upheld*." "*And*," Conjunction; "*by whom*," substitute for "*by him*," in order to render the Proposition, "*all kingdoms are upheld by him*," Conjunctive; "*all kingdoms*," Logical Subject; "*kingdoms*," Grammatical Subject; "*all*," Circumstantial Adjective, qualifying the Grammatical Subject; "*are*," Verb; "*upheld by him*," Logical Attribute; "*upheld*," Grammatical Attribute; "*by him*," Logical Complement of the

Verb; "*by*," Exponent of the relation of which the Verb is the Antecedent and Complement of the Verb; "*him*," Consequent of the relation and Grammatical Complement of the Preposition, "*by*."

3d, "To whom alone belongs glory, majesty, and independence." "*To whom*," substituted for "to him" in order to render the Proposition, "glory, majesty, and independence belong to him alone," Conjunctive. "*Glory, majesty, and independence*," a Subject composed of three particular Subjects. If three Propositions were formed of this one, each of the three Subjects, separate from the two others, would be a Simple Subject and would be both the Logical and Grammatical Subject. These three Subjects united form a Compound Subject which is both Logical and Grammatical. "*Belong*," i. e. *are belonging*; "*are*," Verb; "*belonging to him alone*," Logical Attribute; "*belonging*," Grammatical Attribute; "*to*," Exponent of a relation of which the Antecedent is, "*belonging*" and the Consequent, "*him alone*," and Grammatical Complement of "*belonging*;" "*him alone*," Logical Complement of the Preposition "*to*;" "*him*," Grammatical Complement; "*alone*," Circumstantial Adjective qualifying the Complement "*him*."

Bossuet said "*belongs*," and not "*belong*," because the Subject coming after the Verb, he made the Verb agree with the first only of the particular Subjects which form the Compound Subject.

In a language like the Hebrew in which a Simple Conjunction is employed instead of the Conjunctive Adjective, "*whom*," the Conjunctive Proposition we have just analysed would have been thus constructed: "God, *as* he reigns in the heavens and *as* all kingdoms are upheld by him and *as* glory, majesty, and independence belong to him alone."

VERB,—"*is*:" this Verb is here purely *Abstract*.

ATTRIBUTE—"likewise, the only being who can boast

of ruling kings and of giving them, when it pleases him, great and terrible lessons." The natural construction would be: "the only being who can boast of ruling kings and of giving great and terrible lessons to them, when it pleases him, likewise."

This Attribute is Simple and Complex: it is the Logical Attribute: the Grammatical Attribute is "*being*," "*Only*," is a Circumstantial Adjective which qualifies "*being*;" "*who can boast of ruling kings and of giving great and terrible lessons to them*," Conjunctive Proposition, serving to define the Grammatical Attribute, "*being*;" "*who*," Logical and Grammatical Subject; "*can boast*," i. e. *can be boasting*; "*can be*," Verb; "*boasting of ruling kings*," etc. Logical Attribute of the Conjunctive Proposition; "*boasting*," Grammatical Attribute; "*of*," Exponent of a relation between "*boasting*" and "*ruling kings*," and Grammatical Complement of "*boasting*;" "*ruling kings*," Logical Complement of the Preposition "*of*;" "*ruling*," Gerund from the Infinitive "*rule*," and Grammatical Complement of the Preposition "*of*;" "*kings*," complement of "*ruling*;" "*and*," Conjunction connecting the second Logical Complement of the Antecedent "*can boast*" with the first.

"*Of giving great and terrible lessons to them*," second Logical Complement of "*who can boast*;" "*of*," Grammatical Complement of "*boasting*," and Exponent of a relation between "*boasting*" and "*giving great*," etc.; "*giving great and terrible lessons to them*," Logical Complement of the Preposition "*of*," and Consequent of the relation; "*giving*," Gerund from the Infinitive "*give*" and Grammatical Complement of the Preposition "*of*;" "*great and terrible lessons*," Logical Complement of "*giving*;" "*great*," Adjective qualifying "*lessons*;" "*and*," Conjunction connecting the word "*terrible*" with the word "*great*;" "*terrible*," another Adjective also qualifying "*lessons*;" "*lessons*," Gram-

matical Complement of "*giving*;" "*to them*" another Logical Complement of "*giving*;" "*to*," Grammatical Complement of "*giving*" and Exponent of the relation existing between the Antecedent "*giving*" and the Consequent "*them*;" "*then*," Grammatical Complement of the Preposition "*to*" and consequent of the relation.

"*When it pleases him*," Conjunctive Proposition which forms a Circumstantial term of "*giving great and terrible lessons*;" "*when*" Conjunctive Adverb equivalent to *at the time that*; as Adverb it forms a circumstance of the action of giving, and contains, "*at*," the Exponent, and "*the time*," the Consequent of a relation of which "*giving*" is the Antecedent; as Conjunction it connects the Proposition, "*who can boast of giving*," with the other "*it pleases*;" "*it*," vague and indefinite Subject of the Conjunctive Proposition, "*when it pleases him*;" "*pleases*," i. e. *is pleasing*; "*is*" Verb; "*pleasing to him*," Logical Attribute; "*pleasing*" Grammatical Attribute; "*to him*," Logical Complement of "*pleasing*;" "*to*," Grammatical Complement of "*pleasing*" and Exponent of a relation of which "*pleasing*" is the Antecedent; "*him*," Consequent of the relation and Complement of the Preposition "*to*."

"*Likewise*," Adverb, equivalent to *in like manner*, and a circumstantial term which expresses a circumstance of the whole Proposition. The Proposition which it contains is the Exponent and "*like manner*" the Consequent of a relation of which the whole Proposition forms the Antecedent.

After thus minutely analysing this first sentence, I shall be more concise in the analysis of the following, but it will be easy to supply the details I omit.

Second Sentence.

"Whether he raise up thrones or cast them down, whether he communicate his power to princes or withdraw it with-

in himself and leave them but their own weakness, he teaches them their duty in a sovereign and dignified manner."

The natural construction would read thus: "He teaches princes their duty in a sovereign and dignified manner, whether he raise up thrones or cast them down, whether he communicate his power to them (i. e. to princes) or withdraw it within himself and leave them but their own weakness."

This sentence contains several Propositions, which must be separately analysed. The first is: "He teaches princes their duty in a sovereign and dignified manner," or according to the order of complements: "he teaches their duty to princes in a sovereign and dignified manner." This Proposition is Affirmative; "*he*," Subject; "*teaches*," i. e. *teaching*; "*is*," Verb; "*teaching their duty to princes, in a sovereign and dignified manner*," Complex Attribute; "*their duty*," Complement of the Verb, "*teaches*;" "*to princes*," Exponent and Consequent of a relation of which "*teaching*" is the Antecedent; "*in a sovereign and dignified manner*," circumstantial term, forming the Exponent and Consequent of a relation of which also "*teaching*" is the Antecedent. The single word "*teaching*" or "*teaches*" therefore serves as Antecedent to three relations whose several consequents are, first, "*their duty*," second, "*princes*," third, "*a sovereign and dignified manner*:" of the first relation there is no Exponent; of the second, the Exponent is the Preposition "*to*;" of the third, the Preposition "*in*." The first consequent is the direct complement of the Verb "*teaches*;" the second, its indirect complement; the third is only a circumstantial term.

"*Whether*," an adverbial expression: it has the import and effect upon the following Verb of a Subjunctive Proposition.

Second Proposition. "He raise up thrones." The Verb

in this Proposition is in the Subjunctive Mode because it is subordinate to the word "*whether*;" "*or*," Conjunction.

Third Proposition. "He cast them down." "*Whether*," adverbial expression.

Fourth Proposition. "He communicates his power to them." The Verb "*communicate*" is the Antecedent of two relations whose Consequents are, "*his power*," and "*them*;" "*or*," Conjunction.

Fifth Proposition. "Withdraw it within himself." The Verb "*withdraw*" is the Antecedent of two relations whose Consequents are "*it*" and "*himself*."

Sixth Proposition. "And leave them but their own weakness." There is here an Ellipsis of the word "*nothing*" or "no other thing" as Complement of the Verb "*leave*:" "*but*," indicates another Ellipsis: to complete the expression we might say, "if it be not that he leaves them their own weakness." On account of this Ellipsis, "*their own weakness*," really the Complement of the Verb in the latter Proposition, is apparently the Complement of the Verb of the previous Proposition. This Proposition includes therefore the three following: first, "*and leave them nothing*;" second, "*if it be not*;" third, "*that he leaves them their own weakness*."

Third Sentence.

"For, in bestowing his power upon them, he commands them to use it, as does he himself, for the benefit of mankind; and, by withdrawing it, he shows them that all their majesty is borrowed and that they are not the less under his dominion and supreme authority for being seated upon a throne."

The natural construction would be as follows: "For, he commands them to use his power, as he himself does, for the benefit of mankind, in bestowing it upon them; and he shows them, by withdrawing it, that all their majesty is bor-

rowed, and that they are not the less under his dominion and supreme authority for being seated upon a throne."

The Propositions of which this sentence is composed may be separated and analysed in the following manner.

First Proposition. For he commands them to use his power for the benefit of mankind, as he himself does, in bestowing it upon them." "*For*," Conjunction, which denotes that this sentence is proof of what was asserted in the preceding; "*he*," Subject; "*commands*," i. e. *is commanding*; "*is*," Verb; "*commanding them to use his power, as he himself does, for the benefit of mankind*," Attribute; "*them*," Consequent of a relation of which "*commanding*" is the Antecedent and which has no Exponent; "*to*," Exponent of a relation whose Antecedent is "*commanding*" and consequent "*use*," "*his power*," Consequent of a relation which has no Exponent and whose Antecedent is "*use*," "*as he himself does*," Conjunctive Preposition; "*as*," Conjunctive Adverb; "*he*," Subject; "*himself*," Appositive, in apposition with the subject;* "*does*," i. e. *is doing*, Verb and Attribute. This Conjunctive Proposition forms a circumstantial term of the Complement, "*to use his power*:" for, "*as*" is a Conjunctive Adverb, whose sense is, *in the manner that*: in its character of Adverb it comprehends the Exponent and Consequent of a relation whose Antecedent is, "*to use his power*:" as a Conjunction it connects the Complement, "*to use his power in the manner*," with the Proposition, "*he himself does*," "*for the benefit of mankind*" circumstantial term in which the Consequent "*the benefit of mankind*" is connected with the Antecedent, "*to use his power*" by the Exponent "*for*," "*in bestowing it upon them*," circumstantial term, the Exponent in which is "*in*" and the Consequent "*bestowing*" and which has for its Antecedent "*he commands*;"

* See above p. 120.

"it" immediate complement of "*bestowing*;" "*them*," Consequent of a relation which has for its Antecedent "*bestowing*" and for its Exponent "*upon*;" "*bestowing*," Gerund from the Infinitive "*bestow*."

Second Proposition. "And he shows them, by withdrawing it;" "*and*," Conjunction; "*he*" Subject; "*shows*," i. e. *is showing*; "*is*," Verb; "*showing them*," Attribute; "*them*" Consequent of a relation whose Antecedent is "*showing*" and which has no Exponent; "*by withdrawing it*," Circumstantial term which contains the Exponent and Consequent of a relation whose Antecedent is "*he shows them*."

Third Proposition. "That all their majesty is borrowed," Complementary Conjunctive Proposition forming the Consequent of a relation whose Exponent is the Conjunction "*that*" and whose Antecedent is, the Proposition, "*he shows them by withdrawing it*."

Fourth Proposition. "And that they are not the less under his dominion and supreme authority for being seated upon a throne," another Conjunctive Proposition, which has the same Antecedent as the preceding. All I shall remark upon this Proposition is that "*are*" is here an Attributive Verb, that "*for being seated upon a throne*" is a circumstantial term, which contains the Exponent and Complement of a relation of which "*they are not the less*," etc. is the Antecedent. It is evident that this circumstantial term is equivalent to the following Conjunctive Proposition, "although they are seated upon a throne:" the two circumstantial terms, "*in bestowing it upon them*," "*by withdrawing it*" are also equivalents of the Conjunctive Propositions, "when he bestows it upon them" and "when he withdraws it."

Fourth Sentence.

"It is thus that he instructs princes, not merely by means of language, but also, by means of events and examples."

First Proposition. "It is thus." "*It*," vague and in-

definite Subject ; “*is*,” here Attributive Verb ; “*thus*,” circumstantial term, that is to say *in this manner*.

Second Proposition. “That he instructs princes, not merely by means of language, but, also, by means of events and examples.”

This Conjunctive Proposition logically contains two, for, after the Conjunction “*but*,” we must supply the words, “*that he instructs princes* :” the whole of this Proposition serves to define and explain the vague subject “*it*,” for the sense is : “this, that he instructs princes (or “the instruction which he gives to princes”) not only by means of language, but also by means of events and examples, is in this “manner” or “way.”—The parts of which this Proposition is composed require no further explanation.

I here conclude this model of Analysis which I have protracted only so far as was necessary in order to render the principles I have followed intelligible from reiterated application, and to impress them strongly upon the memory.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.

Example of Analysis in the Latin Language.

In order to give beforehand an idea of the way in which I apply the principles of General Grammar to the analysis of the Latin language, I will present in a few words the system of cases in that language, and the grand distinction I make between Propositions, with reference, not to their logical, but wholly to their grammatical relations.

Nouns in Latin have six cases. The reader may again examine what I have before said on the subject of the nature

and use of these Grammatical inflections.* These Six Cases of the Latins are called Nominative, Genitive, Dative, Accusative, Vocative and Ablative.

The *Nominative* always marks the subject of a Proposition whose Verb is in a Personal Mode, as, "*Cato locutus est*," *Cato has spoken*.

The *Genitive* marks a Noun which is the complement of another noun, or, what is the same thing, the second term of a relation whose first term is also a noun. Example: "*Filius Catonis*," *Cato's son*.

The *Dative* marks a noun which is the complement of an Adjective or a verb, and which expresses the person or thing who is the end of an action. Examples: "*Addictus Catoni*," *attached to Cato*; "*Dare aliquid Catoni*," *to give any thing to Cato*.

The *Accusative* characterises the Noun which serves as the immediate complement of a Verb and upon which the action of the Verb directly falls, as in this example: "*Occidi Catonem*," *I have killed Cato*. This same case marks also the complement of several Prepositions. Examples: "*Veni ad Catonem*," *I have come to Cato*; "*Introëvit in urbem*," *he entered into the city*. Lastly, the subject of every Proposition whose verb is in the Infinitive Mode is put in the Accusative, as, "*Putabam Catonem esse venturum*," *I thought that Cato was about to come*, i. e. *that Cato would come*.

The *Vocative* is used for that part of speech only which we have denominated the compellative, as "*Cato, dic nobis quid sentias*," *Cato tells us what you think*.

The *Ablative* marks the place whence any thing is taken, whence any thing comes, the means or instrument by which any thing is done. It is the opposite of the Dative; for the Dative marks the object or end towards which any thing tends

* Vide supra, pp. 45 and 69 seq.

and the Ablative the point from which any thing proceeds, as, "*Exiit Româ*," he *departed from Rome*. It is frequently employed adverbially in circumstantial terms, as "*Calamo et atramento scribere*, to *write with pen and ink* ; "*fuste percutere*," to *strike with a club* ; "*pedibus ire*," to *go on foot* : "*curru vehi*," to *be carried in a chariot*, etc. The Ablative also marks the complement of various Prepositions : examples ; "*A Catone arguitur*," he *is blamed by Cato* ; "*sub Catone militavit*," he *has served under Cato*.—Lastly, this Case characterises the subject of every Proposition whose Verb is in the participial mode and in the Ablative of that mode. Example : "*Catone loquente, omnes in eum oculos defixos habebant*," *Cato speaking, or while Cato spoke, all had their eyes fixed upon him*.

Such is the primary and usual employment of Cases in the Latin language. There are cases in which they seem to have deviated from their primitive use, but I shall not go into a discussion of them here, nor shall I examine the subject of the agreement, in respect to Cases, of Adjectives with nouns or of the subject with the Attribute.

Three of these cases may, as we have just seen, characterise the subject of a proposition : these are the Nominative, Accusative and Ablative. The form under which the verb appears in the Proposition, determines which of these three Cases belongs to the Subject.

If the verb be in a Personal mode, whether Indicative, Imperative or Subjunctive, the subject is in the Nominative. In this case the Proposition may be called *Direct*, whether otherwise it be Principal, or Conjunctive, or Subordinate, &c.

If the verb be in the Infinitive mode, the Subject is put in the Accusative, and then the Proposition is always complementary. As there are various forms of Complementary Propositions, I denominate this the Infinitive Complementary Proposition.

Lastly, if the Verb be in the Participial Mode, the subject is always put in the Ablative : the participle is also in the same Case. If the Verb be "*sum*" *to be*, which has no participle, the Subject and Attribute are expressed by putting both in the Ablative. Example : "*Cicerone consule,*" *Cicero* (being) *consul*.

As this form of Proposition always expresses a circumstantial term, which is exactly the same office as that of Adverbs, I denominate these Adverbial Propositions.

This distinction is, as it were, the key to all analysis of the Latin language, and, as I may remark by the way, it is equally applicable to the Greek language with the substitution of the Genitive for the Ablative.

Indeed whenever the Verb appears under either of these three forms, it belongs to a complete Proposition. When we have found the Verb, it serves as a guide to the discovery of the subject. When we have found the subject and Verb, it is easy to perceive what words are in agreement with the subject, and what are direct or indirect complements of the Verb. The Genitive marks the complements of Nouns ; the Ablative circumstantial terms ; Prepositions show the relation that exists between the various parts of a Proposition, of which relation they are the exponents ; lastly, Conjunctions or Conjunctive words determine the relations that connect the different Propositions which compose a sentence or paragraph.

Three important observations which yet remain to be made will very much facilitate analysis and the restoration of the natural construction.

I. In a sentence composed of several Propositions, the Verb of the principal Proposition is almost always in the Indicative mode.

II. Generally, Subordinate Propositions whose verb is in a Personal Mode begin with a conjunction or conjunctive word, which helps to distinguish them from the principal Proposition.

III. In order to bring a conjunctive Proposition into its natural Construction it is well, whenever the conjunctive word is declinable, to change it for another word which is not conjunctive, and which we can transfer to its proper place. Thus in order to construct this Proposition, "Quod ubi audivit Cæsar, castra movit," I change "*quod*" into "*id*" and say, "Cæsar movit castra ubi audivit *id*."

Let us now make an application of these principles and of this analytical method to the following passage from Cicero's first Cataline. The Analysis will be prosecuted under the form of a dialogue between a master *A.* and a pupil *B.*

"An invidiam posteritatis times? Præclarum verò populo Romano refers gratiam, qui te, hominem per te cognitum, nullâ commendatione majorum, tam maturè ad summum imperium, per omnes honorum gradus extulit, si propter invidiam, aut alicujus periculi metum, salutem civium tuorum negligis. Sed, si quis est invidiæ metus, nùm est vehementiùs severitatis ac fortitudinis invidia, quàm inertiae ac nequitiae, pertimescenda? An, cùm bello vastabitur Italia, vexabuntur urbes, testa ardebunt, tùm te non existimas invidiae incendio conflagraturum?"

"An invidiam posteritatis times?"

A. What is the Verb in this Proposition?

B. It is "*times*." It is in the second person Singular of the Present Indicative, from "*timeo*" I fear.

A. What is the subject?

B. As the Verb is in the second person Singular it must be the Pronoun of the second person, "*tu*," understood.

A. See whether the verb has a complement.

B. Yes; the word "*invidiam*" must be its complement, because this word is in the Accusative and there is no Proposition whose complement it can be: this word signifies, *hatred, jealousy*.

A. Has not the word "*invidiam*" a complement ?

B. I suppose that "*posteritatis*" Genitive of "*posteritas*" *posterity*, must be its complement.

A. Why ?

B. Because the Genitive usually marks a noun which is complement to another noun.

A. Is there not one word more ?

B. Yes—" *an*" which according to the dictionary signifies, *it is that*, but I do not know to what class of words it belongs.

A. "*An*" is an Adverb, giving an interrogative import to the sentence. There is no word in English which exactly corresponds to it. Sometimes we mark an Interrogative sentence merely by the tone with which we pronounce it, and in writing by the note of interrogation (?); sometimes we give an interrogative form to the Proposition by placing the Pronoun which is, or represents, the Subject after the Verb; and lastly, we sometimes employ the expression, "*is it that.*"—Construe and translate.

B. "*An times invidiam posteritatis?*" *Is it that you fear the hatred of posterity?*

A. You may, as I said before, translate it as you have done, or in one of these other ways : *You fear the hatred of posterity? Fear you, or, do you fear the hatred of posterity?* But, observe that you will express the thought and feeling of the orator much more exactly by preserving in the English the inversion that occurs in the Latin, and saying, *Is it the hatred of posterity that you fear?*—Read.

B. "*Praeclaram verò populo Romano refert gratiam.*"

A. Why do you stop there ?

B. Because I think I have found the Verb of this Proposition; and besides, there is a comma: the verb is "*refert*," 2d pers. sing. of the Present Indicative, from "*refero*," *to render, to return*, and the Subject must be "*tu*" understood.

A. Very well. Has this verb a complement ?

B. Since it signifies, *to return*, it must have two ; for we return something to somebody. The first appears to be "*gratiam*" *thanks*, which is in the Accusative and the second "*populo*" *people*, which is in the Dative : the Accusative marks the thing which is the object of the action of the Active Verb and the Dative the person or thing which is the end of the action.

A. Is there not some word in agreement with these complements ?

B. "*Præclaram*," Accusative Singular Feminine from the Adjective "*præclarus*," *noble, fine*, must agree with "*gratiam*:" "*Romano*" and "*vero*" appear to be two Adjectives from "*Romanus*" *Roman*, and "*verus*," *true*, in the Dative Singular masculine, and consequently agree with "*populo*."

A. You are right in regard to "*præclarum*" and "*Romano*;" but "*vero*" bears a mark which should have shown you that it was not an Adjective.

B. I did not pay attention to the accent : "*vero*" is an indeclinable word* signifying, *but* ; hence it is a Conjunction.

A. Construe and translate, taking care to put the conjunction in its proper place.

B. "*Verò* refers *gratiam præclaram populo Romano*," *but you return fine thanks to the Roman people.*

A. Proceed.

B. *Qui tu, hominem per te cognitum, nullâ commendatione majorum, tam maturè ad summum imperium, per omnes honorum gradus extulit, si.*

A. Why do you go any farther ? Have you not the Verb and Subject ? What are they ?

* In reality "*vero*" is only the Ablative of "*verus*" employed adverbially : so "*verum*" is the Accusative of the same word or perhaps the Nominative Neuter.

B. The verb must be "*extulit*" third Person, Sing. Perf. Indic. from "*effero*" to raise. The Subject must be in the Nominative Sing. Masculine: it is "*gradus*."

A. You are mistaken: read your Proposition over again.

B. "*Qui te . . .*"—it is "*qui*" a conjunctive Adjective, in the Nom. sing. masculine that is the Subject: "*qui extulit*."

A. What is the Complement of the verb "*extulit*?"

B. "*Te*," *thee*, "*hominem*," *man*, "*cognitum*," *known*; for all these words are in the Accusative and are in agreement with each other.

A. Why are these words in agreement?

B. "*Cognitum*" agrees in Gender, Number and Case with "*hominem*," because it is a Qualificative Adjective, or, what is the same thing, a Participle, qualifying the Noun "*hominem*." As to "*hominem*," I suppose it is an Appositive of the word "*te*," and hence agrees with it in number and case.

A. You are right. But why do you not also add to the Complement of the Verb the words "*summum imperium*?"

B. Because I see that they are governed by the Preposition "*ad*."

A. Resume the construction and proceed.

B. "*Qui extulit, te hominem cognitum, ad summum . . .*"

A. That will not do. As you have put the words "*hominem*" and "*cognitum*" together, you will be obliged to place by themselves the Proposition and its complement "*per te*," whose connexion with "*hominem cognitum*" is denoted by a comma before "*hominem*" and another after "*cognitum*."—Begin again, and translate word by word.

B. "*Qui*" *who*, "*extulit*" *has raised*, "*te*" *thee*, "*hominem*" *a man*, "*cognitum*" *known*, "*per*" *by*, "*te*" *thee*, "*tam*" *so . . .*

A. You have paid no attention to the fact that the Verb *to raise* must have two complements: for we raise somebody to something.

B. I recollect: "who has raised thee; a man known by thee, "*ad*" to, "*imperium*" command, "*summum*" supreme, "*per*" through, "*omnes*" all, "*gradus*" the degrees, "*honorum*" of honors, "*tam*" so, "*maturè*" early.

A. You have forgotten the words "*nullâ commendatione majorum*."

B. I do not know where to place them.

A. Is there a Verb in these words?

B. I see none.

A. Let us take these words one after the other, and see what they are.

B. "*Nullâ*," *no*, is an Adjective in the Ablative Sing. Feminine; "*commendatione*" is a Noun in the same Case, of the same Gender, and in the same Number, which signifies *recommendation*; "*majorum*,"—is it not an Accusative?

A. What word is there which can govern an Accusative?

B. I was mistaken: it is the Genitive Plural of "*major*" *greater*; but this Adjective in the Plural is used as a Noun and signifies, *ancestors*: "*majorum*" is therefore the complement of "*commendatione*;" thus the words mean, *no recommendation of ancestors*.

A. That is not sufficient to connect them with the rest of the sentence; since they are in the Ablative they must form a circumstantial term: in order to express the import of the Ablative we must employ in English a Preposition.

B. Perhaps the sense is, *with no recommendation of ancestors*, i. e. *with no recommendation on the score of ancestry*.

A. That is the meaning. We may, as you know, reduce this sort of circumstantial term to an Adverbial Proposition. You are aware that when there is no verb in an Adverbial Proposition, the Subject and Attribute are in the Ablative, and that in this case the Participle of the Verb "to be" must be supplied. Thus the construction would be as follows: "*commendatione*," *the recommendation*, "*majorum*" of ances-

tors (BEING understood) "*nullá*" none.—Begin that sentence again, and leave this circumstantial term in the place it occupies in the Latin.

B. "*Qui*" who, "*extulit*" has raised, "*te*" thee, "*hominem*" a man, "*cognitum*" known, "*per*" by, "*te*" thee, (i. e. by yourself alone,) "*commendatione*" the recommendation, "*majorum*" of ancestors, "*nullá*" being none (i. e. without any recommendation on the score of ancestry,) "*ad*" to, "*imperium*" the command, "*sumum*" supreme, "*per*" through, "*omnes*" all, "*gradus*" the degrees, "*honorum*" of honors, "*tám*" so, "*maturè*" early.

A. Let us finish our sentence.

B. "*Si* propter invidiam, aut alicujus periculi metum, salutem civium tuorum negligis." "*Si*," Conjunction; the Verb is "*negligis*," the Subject "*tu*" understood; "*salutem*" is the complement of the Verb and the words "*civium tuorum*" Genitives Plural are the complement of "*salutem*;" "*propter*," Preposition; "*invidiam*," Accusative, is its complement "*aut*," Conjunction; "*metum*," Accusative, another complement of "*propter*;" "*alicujus periculi*," Genitives, complement of "*metum*."

"*Si*" if, "*negligis*" you neglect, "*salutem*" the preservation, "*civium*" of fellow-citizens, "*tuorum*" your, (of your fellow-citizens) "*propter*" on account of, "*invidiam*" hatred, "*aut*" or, "*metum*" the fear, "*periculi*" of danger, "*alicujus*" some (of some danger.)

A. "But truly you return fine thanks to the Roman people, who have raised you so early to supreme command, causing you to pass successively through every grade of rank, you who are known only by yourself, and derive no consequence from your ancestry, if on account of the hatred you might excite, or through fear of some danger you should neglect the preservation of your fellow-citizens!"

Observe that we should come nearer the Latin turn of ex-

pression and the rhetorical manner by translating it: "Fine gratitude truly you would testify to the Roman people, who have raised you," etc.

Pass to the next sentence.

B. "Sed, si quis est invidiae metus,"—

A. Why do you stop there?

B. Because I imagine that we have the Verb "*est*," and that the words "*si quis est invidiae metus*" form a Proposition.

A. You are right; but do you not see, 1st, that the word "*sed*," which you know signifies *but*, belongs to another Proposition; 2d, that the Proposition which begins with the Conjunction "*si*" cannot be the principal Proposition; 3d, lastly, that the fact that these words are between two commas denotes that they are a digression and are not in their right place.

Begin again, then, and continue to read without stopping, till you find the end of the principal Proposition.

A. "Sed, si quis est invidiae metus, nùm est vehementiùs severitatis ac fortitudinis invidia, quàm inertiae ac nequitiae, pertimescenda?" Perhaps I should have stopped at "*invidia*," but I read on to the note of Interrogation, because it seems to me that "*pertimescenda*" relates to "*invidia*," and I imagine it is the Attribute of the same Verb of which "*invidia*" is the Subject.

A. You are right, at least partly; construe.

B. "*Sed*," Conjunction; "*nùm*," Interrogative Adverb.

A. Ought you not to place the Subject and Verb before every other word?

B. I thought I must place "*nùm*" before the Subject, as we before placed "*an*," because both these words are designed to render the Proposition Interrogative.

A. Very well; proceed.

B. "*Nùm*," Interrogative Adverb; "*invidia*," Subject;

"*severitatis*," Noun in the Genitive and complement of "*invidia*;" "*ac*," Conjunction; "*fortitudinis*," another complement of "*invidia*;" "*est*," Verb: "*pertimescenda*," Nominative Sing. Feminine of the Future Passive Participle of "*pertimesco*" and Attribute agreeing in Gender, Number and Case with the Subject "*invidia*;" "*vehementiùs*," Adverb, comparative of "*vehementer*," circumstantial term; "*quàm*," Conjunction; "*inertiae ac nequitiae*:" these last words perplex me: I see plainly that "*inertiae*" is joined to "*nequitiae*" by the Conjunction "*ac*," and that they are two Nouns in the Genitive: I conclude from this circumstance that they are complements to another noun which I do not find.

A. Why are "*severitatis*" and "*fortitudinis*" in the Genitive?

B. Because they are complements of "*invidia*."

A. Well; the reason why "*inertiae*" and "*nequitiae*" are in the Genitive is the same; they also are complements of "*invidia*" which should be repeated after "*quàm*," i. e. "*quam invidia inertiae ac nequitiae*."

B. This would make then a new Proposition, for "*invidia*" being in the Nominative must be a Subject: where then is the Verb and Attribute?

A. I am glad you observed this difficulty: it is easy to solve it: it is only necessary to fill up the Ellipsis. Just as we have restored the Grammatical Subject "*invidia*" after "*quàm*" we must also restore to this Subject its Attribute "*pertimescenda*" and unite them by the Verb "*est*." Make this restitution, and translate word by word.

B. "*Sed*" but, "*nùm*" is it that, "*invidia*" the hatred, "*severitatis*" of severity, "*ac*" and, "*fortitudinis*" firmness, (i. e. the hatred which severity and firmness will excite towards you) "*est*" is, "*pertimescenda*" to be feared, "*vehementiùs*" more strongly, "*quàm*" than, "*invidia*" the ha-

tred, "*inertiae*" of sloth, "*ac*" and, "*nequitiae*" of carelessness, "*est*" is, "*pertimescenda*" to be feared.

A. We have left a Proposition behind which it is time to put in its place.

B. "*Si*" if, "*quis*" (in the sense of "*aliquis*" on account of the Conjunction "*si*") any, "*metus*" fear, "*invidiae*" of hatred, "*est*" is, (i. e. there is.)

A. Now translate a little more freely, placing the conditional Proposition as it stands in the Latin.

B. "But, if it is hatred which you dread, is that hatred which severity and firmness may excite more to be dreaded than that which will be excited by sloth and carelessness?"

A. Observe that there is an Ellipsis in the English as well as in the Latin; for in order to avoid all Ellipsis we should be obliged to say: "than that which will be excited by sloth and carelessness is to be feared."

Let us analyse the sentence that remains.

B. "An, cùm bello vastabitur Italia, vexabuntur urbes, tecta ardebunt, tùm te non existimas invidiæ incendio conflagraturum?" I have read the whole of this sentence because I see that the principal Verb is "*existimas*," the other verbs belonging to a Conjunctive Proposition, as I perceive by the Adverb "*cùm*" which is Conjunctive as well as by the comma placed after "*an*."

A. Construe in conformity with what you have just said, and translate at the same time.

B. "*An*" is it that, "*existimas*" verb of the 2d. Person Sing. Present Indic. which includes the subject "*tu*," you think, "*te*" thee.

A. See whether "*te*" may not be the subject of a complementary Proposition.

B. I observe "*te*" in the Accusative which seems to be the subject and "*conflagraturum*" in the same Case which may be the Attribute; but I see no Verb.

A. In what mode ought the Verb to be in a complementary Proposition whose Subject is in the Accusative?

B. It must be in the Infinitive.

A. Since you see no Verb in the Infinitive, may there not be one understood?

B. It must be "*esse*." I will go on: "*te*" thee, "*non*" not, "*esse*" to be, "*conflagraturum*" about to burn "*incendio*" in the fire, "*invidiæ*" of hatred, "*tum*" then, "*cum*" when, "*Italia*" Italy, "*vastabitur*" shall be laid waste, "*bel-lo*" by war, "*urbes*" the cities, "*vexabuntur*" shall be sacked, "*tecta*" the houses, "*ardebunt*" shall be in flames?

A. You can easily translate this in a manner more nearly English, preserving as far as possible the construction of the Latin text. Try.

B. "Think you then, that when Italy shall be laid waste, her cities abandoned to pillage, her houses wrapt in flames, you will not then be consumed in the fire of hatred?" i. e. "Think you, that you will escape the flames of the hatred you so much dread, when Italy shall be laid waste, her cities abandoned to pillage, her houses wrapt in flames?"

See how this whole passage has been translated by Mr. Guthrie.

"Dost thou dread the reproaches of posterity? A glorious proof of gratitude, indeed, to thy country, which without knowing thee only through thyself, without the merits of ancestors to speak in thy favor, so early raised thee through every gradation of subordinate trust, to her supreme seat of power. Should reproach however keen, should danger however dreadful, render thee remiss, when all that is dear to her sons is threatened? But, if thou art to dread reproach, art thou to dread it more on account of thy not being destitute of honesty and courage, than for sloth and pusillanimity? When Italy shall be desolated with war, her towns given up to her foes and her dwellings wrapt in flames, think, then,

in what a conflagration of reproach, thou thyself must be consumed !”

Although I have purposely selected a passage in Latin whose construction presents few difficulties, I am certain that there is no Latin sentence which may not easily be analysed in the same way, and, were I not afraid of being too prolix, I would make this evident by the application of this mode of Analysis to the exordium of the fine oration of Cicero for Archias or some similar oratorical passage. But I leave it to be made by those who, convinced that in the study of languages we cannot too closely associate the understanding with the memory, will approve the plan I propose, which I daily apply in teaching the French, Latin, Greek and Arabic languages, and the value of which I have discovered by the experience of years.

INDEX.

A or AN. This word is never an Article, 29 Note; It is a *Numerative* employed to denote the Singular number, 62.

ABSOLUTE. Words used in an absolute manner, 42; Absolute Cases, 73; Absolute Propositions in Latin, better denominated *Adverbial Propositions*, 73; Absolute Tenses, 80; Absolute Modes, 97; Absolute Verbs, 101.

ACTIVE. See **VERB** and **VOICE**. Active Attribute, 97; Uses of the change of the Active, into a Passive attribute, 100 seq.

ADIEU. Elliptical word, 112.

ADJECTIVE. Use of the Adjective, 34. Signification of the word Adjective, 35; The Adjective is not absolutely necessary, and Adjectives in one language have not always corresponding Adjectives in another, *ibid.* note; The Adjective must be connected with a noun, *ibid.* Employment of Adjectives with Appellative nouns, 36; with Abstract nouns, *ibid.*; with Proper nouns, *ibid.*; Two different functions of the Adjective, 37; Employed as Attribute of a Proposition, *ibid.*; or to qualify a noun contained in the subject, in the Attribute, or in some other part of the Proposition, *ibid.*; When the Adjective performs the function of Attribute to the Proposition, it is not joined to a noun, *ibid.*; When it performs the function of a Qualificative it must be connected with a noun, *ibid.*; Sometimes the noun is not expressed, and why, *ibid.*; Circumstantial Adjectives, 38; They effect only the Extension of Appellative nouns, 39; Qualificative Adjectives, 38; They affect both the Extension and Comprehension of Appellative nouns, 39; The Numeratives may be Circumstantial Adjectives as in English, 41; Every Adjective in Arabic may become an Adverb, 47; Adjectives may be modified by Adverbs, *ibid.*; Pronominal Adjectives, wrongly denominated *Possessive Pronouns*, 53; Many languages have no Pronominal Adjectives, their place being supplied by Pronouns, 54; Conjunctive Adjectives, 55; Wrongly denominated Relative Pronouns, *ibid.*; Why denominated Conjunctive Adjectives, 57; Their place may be supplied by a Simple Conjunction *ibid.*; Adjectives in some languages admit the distinction of number, 63; that of Gender, 68; that of Case, 74; and Degrees of Comparison, 76; Relation between the Adjective and Participle, 96.

ADVERB. What an Adverb is, 46; Every Adverb is equivalent to a Preposition followed by its complement, 47; The Adverbs of our language have not always equivalent Adverbs in another, *ibid.*; The Adverb never modifies the Verb, it always modifies the Attribute, *ibid.* note; Difference between the Adverb and a Preposition followed by its Complement. 48; In Arabic there is no Noun,

- Adjective or Verb which may not become an Adverb, 47 ; In Greek, proper names of places may form Adverbs, *ibid.* ; Adverbs serve to express the circumstances of an action, *ibid.* ; They modify the Attribute comprehended in the Verb and Adjective, *ibid.* ; Adverbs modified by other Adverbs, 48 ; Adverbs of quality, *ibid.* ; Adverbs of quantity, *ibid.* ; Adverbs serving as complements to Prepositions, *ibid.* ; Conjunctive Adverbs, 58 ; *Yes, no and not* are Adverbs, 59 ; Analogy between Adverbs and the cases of nouns, 71 ; Adverbial cases, 72 ; Adverbial Propositions in Latin, 73 ; Degrees of Comparison in Adverbs, 77 ; The infinitive sometimes becomes an Adverb, and is then denominated a Supine, 95.
- AGREEMENT. Part of Syntax, 107 ; Object of rules of Agreement, *ibid.* ; (See Syntax.)
- ANALYSIS GRAMMATICAL, 114 seq. ; Mode of Analysis in the English language, 124 seq. ; in the Latin language, 133 seq.
- ANTECEDENT. See Relation.
- APPOSITION, and APPOSITIVE, 120 ; Signification of these words, *ibid.* ; Examples of Apposition, *ibid.* ; The Appositive may be changed into a Conjunctive Proposition, 121.
- ARTICLE. What it is, 29 ; English Articles, *ibid.* ; A and An are not Articles, *ibid.* note ; Determinative Article, 30 ; Demonstrative, *ibid.* ; Employment of these two Articles, 31 ; Several languages have no determinative Article, *ibid.* ; Others employ instead of Determinative articles certain terminations to words, *ibid.* ; Frequent abuse of the Determinative Article, *ibid.* ; There may be many Demonstrative and Determinative articles, *ibid.* ; The Determinative Article affects the Extension of Appellative nouns, without influencing their Comprehension, 39 ; The Demonstrative Article affects both their Extension and Comprehension, *ibid.* ; Use of the Article with Proper names, *ibid.* ; Articles in some languages employed to characterise the Numbers, 63 ; and the Genders, 68 ; The Infinitive may take the Article, 94.
- ATTRIBUTE. What it is, 14 ; There can be no Proposition without an Attribute, 15 ; Simple Attribute, 21 ; Compound Attribute, *ibid.* ; The Simple Attribute is either Incomplex or Complex, *ibid.* ; Mode of discovering whether the Attribute be Simple or Compound, 22 ; It is the *Attribute* comprehended in the signification of the Verb, and not the Verb which is modified by the Adverb, 47 ; note ; Active Attribute, 97 ; Passive Attribute, *ibid.* ; Neuter Attribute, 98 ; Distinction between the Logical and the Grammatical Attribute, 116 ; Complex Attribute a part of which is Comprehended in an Attributive Verb, and the other expressed without the Verb, 121. (See Sur-Attribute.)
- AUGMENTATIVES, 74, & 75.
- CASES. What they are, 45 ; Use of Cases, 69 ; Examples of Cases, taken from the Latin language, *ibid.* ; Signification of the word *Case*, 70 ; Cases are not necessary ; mode of supplying their place, 71 ; Of the number of Cases in different languages, *ibid.* ; Analogy between Cases and Adverbs, 72 ; The same Case employed for several relations, *ibid.* ; Union of Prepositions with Cases, *ibid.* ; Adverbial Cases, *ibid.* ; Complementary Cases, *ibid.* ; and Absolute

Cases, 73; Employment of Cases to distinguish the kinds of Propositions, *ibid.*; seq. Examples of the employment of Cases to characterise different Propositions in the Latin language, *ibid.*; Cases belong appropriately to nouns and Pronouns, 74; are admitted also in Adjectives in some languages, *ibid.*; Analogy between the Cases of nouns and the modes of Verbs, 73 & 96; Cases of the Infinitive, called *Gerunds*, 95; The Participle may have Cases, 96; Theory of Cases in Latin, 133 seq.

COMMON. See **Genders.**

COMPARATIVE, 77; Comparative-minorative, *ibid.*

COMPELLATIVE. What it is, 15; Signification of the word, 16; All discourse supposes a compellative, *ibid.*; Compellative understood, inasmuch as it can readily be supplied, *ibid.*; Case designed to mark the Compellative, 72; Distinction between the Logical and the Grammatical Compellative.

COMPLEMENT. The Consequent Term of a relation is also called the *Complement*, 46; Complementary Cases, 72; Complementary Propositions in Latin, 73; Complement of Relative Verbs, 101; In what ways Verbs are connected with their Complements, 102; Complement of a Verb also called the *Regimen*, and why, 102 note; Two Complements belonging to the same Verb, 102; The Complement of a Reflexive Verb is the same as the subject, 103; Derived forms of Verbs which comprehend the complement, 104; Mode of arranging different Complements of the same word, 109; Distinction between the Logical and Grammatical Complement, 118.

COMPREHENSION of an Appellative noun, 26; The more *Comprehension* an Appellative noun possesses the less *Extension* does it possess, 27; Appellative nouns whose *Comprehension* is very limited, and whose *Extension* is almost boundless, 28; Determinative Articles and Circumstantial Adjectives influence not at all the *Comprehension* of Appellative nouns, 39.

CONJUGATION and to CONJUGATE. What it is, 101.

CONJUNCTIONS. Conjunctions connect together several Propositions which are in relation with each other, 49; They determine also the *nature* of the relation existing between them, 51; Some conjunctions serve also to connect together the different parts of a Simple or complex Subject or Attribute, *ibid.* note. We may, by means of Conjunctions, unite several Propositions into one, *ibid.*; Conjunctions are the Exponents of relations existing between the Propositions which form the Antecedents and Consequents of these relations, *ibid.*; Modes of Verbs often cannot perform their office without the assistance of Conjunctions, 96.

CONJUNCTIVE. Conjunctive Adjectives, 55; Reason for this denomination, 57; Conjunctive Nouns, Adverbs and Adjectives, 58.

CONSTRUCTION. Signification of the word, 107; Natural construction 108; Rules for Construction belong not to General Grammar, *ibid.*; Construction in English, 109.

DECLENSION and to DECLINE. What is understood by these words, 74.

DEGREES OF COMPARISON. What these are, 76; Occur in Adjectives, *ibid.*; and in Adverbs, 77; may occur in verbs, *ibid.*; These degrees are either of *more* or *less*, 76; Positive, Comparative, Su-

perative, Intensive, 77; Other Degrees which might be denominated Diminutive, Comparative, Minorative &c. *ibid.*

DIMINUTIVES, 74; Diminutive Degree of Comparison, 77.

DUAL. See Number.

ELLIPSIS or an *Elliptical Sentence*, 110; Ellipsis of the Antecedent of a Relation, 111; Ellipsis of the Subject, Verb, and Attribute, 112; Ellipsis of the Verb *to be*, 113; Ellipsis of a Verb which should serve as Antecedent to another Verb, *ibid.*

EXTENSION of an Appellative noun, 26; The extension of an Appellative noun is the less, the greater is its comprehension, 27; Appellative nouns whose comprehension is very limited and their extension almost boundless, 28; Demonstrative Articles as well as Qualificative Adjectives affect both the extension and comprehension of Appellative nouns, 30.

EXPONENT of a relation. What it is, 44; The Preposition performs the function of an Exponent, *ibid.*; Terminations of Cases performing the function of Exponents, 45; Conjunctions also perform the function of Exponents, 52.

FEMININE. See Gender.

FORMS. Derived forms of Verbs, 104; They annex accessory significations to the original signification of the Verb, *ibid.*; Impersonal form, 105.

GENDER. What it is, 64; Masculine and Feminine Genders founded upon the natural distinction of sex, 65; Neuter Gender founded upon the absence of that distinction, *ibid.*; Common Gender appropriated to designate the union of, or the abstraction of consideration of, the sexes, *ibid.*; The distinction of Genders does not find a place in some languages, 66; Abuse of Genders by a wrong employment of them, 66; Modes of designating the difference of sex, other than the variation of Gender, 64, 67; The difference of Genders is also in some languages denoted by the Articles, 67; Some languages do not apply the variation of Gender even to nouns, 65; The Infinitive mode of the Verb does not admit of the distinction of Gender, and why, 93; This distinction occurs in the Participle, 96.

GERUND. Case of the Infinitive, 95; Every Tense of the Infinitive may form Gerunds, *ibid.*

GOVERNMENT. A Part of Syntax, 107; Object of rules of Government 108; (See Syntax.)

IMPERSONAL. Impersonal Verbs, better denominated *Verbs of the third Person*, 105.

INFINITIVE. Mode of Verbs, 92; In what respect it partakes of the nature of the Verb, 93; It may have various Tenses, *ibid.*; It has neither Gender, Number nor Person, and why, *ibid.*; Similarity of the Infinitive to Abstract Nouns, and the characteristic which distinguishes it from these Nouns, *ibid.*; In many languages there is no Infinitive, 94; Essential distinction between the Abstract Noun and the Infinitive mode of the Verb, *ibid.*; The Infinitive may take Articles, *ibid.*; It may serve as Subject of a Proposition and as complement of a Verb, *ibid.*; It may have cases which are denominated Gerunds, 95; (See that word); The Infinitive serv-

ing as Complement to a Verb is an elliptical expression which may be resolved into a Complementary Proposition, 121.

INTENSIVE. Degree of Comparison, 77.

INTERJECTION. What it is, 53; Interjections do not represent thoughts but express our sensations, *ibid.*

INVERSION. Different kinds of Inversion, 109; Examples of Inversion 109, 110.

JUDGMENT of the Mind. In what it consists, 14.

MAN. German word employed as a vague and indefinite Subject, 101.

MASCULINE. See Genders.

MIXED. Mixed words, 53; (See *Pronominal and Conjunctive Adjectives, Nouns and Adverbs*).

MODES of Verbs, 86; Similarity of Modes to cases, 73, 96; Operations of the mind upon which the nature and use of modes is founded, 87 seq; Modes serve to denote the nature of Propositions, 91; and the relations which different propositions have to each other, *ibid.*; Importance of Modes, *ibid.*; Of the number of Modes, 92; The Modes in most common use in different languages are the Indicative, Imperative and the Subjunctive, *ibid.*; Personal Modes, *ibid.*; Impersonal Modes, *ibid.* (See *Infinitive and Participle*); Absolute and Relative Modes, 97; Frequently Modes cannot perform their function without the aid of Conjunctions, 96; The same form serves for several modes, 97.

NEUTER. Neuter Verb (See *Verb and Voice*); Neuter Gender (See Gender); Neuter Attribute, 98.

No. Negative Adverb, 59.

NOT. Negative Adverb, 59; Prohibitive Adverb, *ibid.*

NOUN. Use of nouns, 24; What a noun is, *ibid.*; Proper Nouns, *ibid.*; Appellative nouns, 25; Abstract nouns, *ibid.*; Comprehension of an Appellative noun, 26; Extension of an Appellative noun, *ibid.*; The greater comprehension an Appellative noun possesses the less is its extension, 27; It is the same with Abstract nouns, *ibid.*; Appellative nouns whose comprehension is very limited and whose extension is nearly boundless, 28; Some of these nouns join to the Signification of an Appellative noun a demonstrative power, *ibid.* and 54; Employment of Adjectives and Articles with Proper names, 39; Nouns made use of for numeration, 41; In Arabic every noun may become an Adverb, 47; Proper nouns in Greek become Adverbs, *ibid.*; Conjunctive nouns, 58; Nouns admit the distinction of numbers, 62; that of Genders, 65; and that of Cases, 69, 74; Similarity between the Abstract noun and the Infinitive Mode of the Verb, 93; Characteristics which distinguish them, 93, 94.

NUMBER. What it is, 62; Nouns are of different numbers, *ibid.*; Singular, Plural and Dual numbers, *ibid.*; Articles and Numeratives in some languages made use of to distinguish the numbers, 62, 63; Use of numbers in Pronouns, 63; in Adjectives, *ibid.*; in Verbs, 64; The Infinitive mode of the Verb cannot have the distinction of numbers, and why, 93; The Participle admits of the distinction, and why, 96.

NUMERATIVES. What they are, 41 ; These words may be either nouns or Adjectives, *ibid.* ; In English they are Adjectives, *ibid.* ; Note ; These Adjectives belong to the class of Circumstantial Adjectives, *ibid.* ; Collective numeratives, *ibid.* ; Numeratives do not constitute a peculiar class of words, 42.

ON. A French word expressing a vague and indefinite Subject, like *man* in German, 101.

PARTICIPLE. Mode of the Verb, 95 ; It partakes of the nature of the Verb and of the Adjective, *ibid.* ; It may have Gender, Number and Case, 96 ; It may also have Tenses, *ibid.*

PASSIVE. (See *Verb* and *Voice*) Passive Attribute, 97 ; Use of the change of the Active into a Passive Attribute, 99 seq.

PERSON. What is understood by Pronouns of the first, of the second, and of the third person, 33 ; Signification of the word *Person*, *ibid.* ; Persons of Verbs, 85 ; The distinction of Persons in Verbs not absolutely necessary, 86 ; The Infinitive Mode of verbs has no Persons and why, 93 ; Plural Pronoun of the third Person performing the office of a vague and indefinite subject, 101 ; Singular Pronoun of the third Person employed to represent an unknown Subject, 105 ; The third Person of the Verb employed, without expressing the Pronoun which is the subject, *ibid.* ; Verbs of the third Person, *ibid.*

PLURAL. See *Number*. Plural employed instead of the Singular, in the Pronoun of the second Person, 33 ; Different forms of the Plural to denote a greater or smaller number, 62.

POSITIVE, 77.

PREPOSITION. What it is, 43 ; Signification of the word *Preposition*, *ibid.* ; Prepositions determine the nature of relations, *ibid.* ; In some languages the words which correspond to our Prepositions are placed after the consequent term of the relation, *ibid.* note ; Preposition serving as Exponent to a relation, 44 ; Preposition and its Complement expressed by an Adverb, 46 ; Of the difference between a Preposition followed by its Complement, and an Adverb, 48, note ; Prepositions have sometimes Adverbs for their Complements, 48 ; A Preposition may have for its Complement another Preposition itself followed by its Complement, *ibid.* note ; Analogy between Prepositions and Conjunctions, 51 ; Employment of Cases and of Prepositions together, 72.

PRONOUN. What it is, 33 ; Pronouns of the first, second and third Person, *ibid.* ; Reflexive Pronoun, *ibid.* ; How the want of Reflexive Pronouns is supplied in Arabic, *ibid.* ; Plural Pronoun of the Second Person substituted for the singular, *ibid.* ; Multiplicity of Pronouns in some languages, and their use, 34 ; Possessive Pronouns, better denominated *Pronominal Adjectives*, 53 ; (See that word) ; Relative Pronouns, better denominated *Conjunctive Adjectives*, 55 ; (See that word) ; Pronouns are susceptible of the distinction of number, 63 ; of Gender, 68 ; and of the variation of case 74 ; Pronoun of the third Person, substituted for the subject or filling the place of an unknown subject, 105.

PROPOSITION. It is necessarily composed of a Subject, a Verb and an Attribute, 15 ; Relations between different Propositions, 94 ; Con-

junctive Proposition, its use, 54; Use of cases to designate the nature of different Propositions, 73 seq.; Direct, complementary, and adverbial Propositions, 73; Mode of characterising them by Cases in Latin, *ibid.* 74; Three primitive classes of Propositions which answer to the three consecutive states of mind through which man passes in the use of his mental faculties, 87; These three classes are called Deliberative, Affirmative and Volitive Propositions, *ibid.*; Subdivisions of these three primitive classes *ibid.*; Correlative Propositions, 88; Examples of different kinds of Propositions, *ibid.*; Characteristic which distinguishes Conditional from Suppositive Propositions, *ibid.*; Propositions which may become Hypothetical, 89; Propositions considered with respect to the relations which they hold to each other, in discourse, *ibid.*; In this point of view, Propositions are either *Principal*, or *Complementary*, or *Subjunctive-Complementary*, or *Incidental*, or *Adverbial*, or *Conjunctive*, or *Subjunctive*, 90; Examples of these various kinds of Propositions, *ibid.*; Characteristic which distinguishes Subjunctive-Complementary Propositions from Propositions simply Complementary, *ibid.*; Modes serve to point out whether Propositions express *doubt*, *judgment*, or *determination*, 91; They also serve to point out the Relations which different Propositions bear to each other, *ibid.*; Infinitive Propositions, 135; In Latin, the grammatical nature of Propositions is denoted by the case in which the Subject is put.

RELATION. Different kinds of relations, 43; Signs made use of to express the relations, *ibid.*; Every relation has two terms, an Antecedent and a Consequent, 44; Exponent of a relation, *ibid.*; The same word which serves as Consequent to one relation, may at the same time serve as Antecedent to another, 45; In very many languages the relation existing between two nouns, is denoted by placing the Consequent immediately before the Antecedent, 45; the Consequent term of a relation is also called the *Complement*, 46; Relations between different Propositions, 49, 89; (See Modes.)

RELATIVE. Words employed in a Relative manner, 43; *Relative Pronouns*, improper denomination of Conjunctive Adjectives, 55; Relative Tenses, 80; Relative modes, 97; Relative Verbs, 101; Doubly Relative Verbs, 102.

SEXES. The variety of Gender in Nouns is founded upon the distinction of sex, the absence of this distinction, and the abstraction and union of the sexes, 65 seq.; Other methods of denoting the difference of sex, 67.

SINGULAR. See *Number*.

SUBJECT. What it is, 14; There can be no Proposition without a subject, 15; Simple subject, 20; Compound subject, *ibid.*; The Simple subject is either Incomplex or Complex, *ibid.*; Mode of discovering whether the subject be Simple or Complex, 22; The Infinitive may serve as the subject of a Proposition, 94; Vague and indefinite subject, supplying the place of an unknown subject or of one which it is desired not to express, 105; *On* in French and *man* in German are vague and indefinite subjects, 101; Sub-

ject of a Reflexive Verb serving also as its Complement, 103; Unknown Subject, whose place is supplied by the Pronoun of the third person, 105; Distinction between the logical and the Grammatical subject, 115; When the subject is in the Nominative in Latin, it denotes that the Proposition is direct, 135; when in the Accusative, it denotes that the Proposition is infinitive-Complementary *ibid.*; when in the Ablative, it denotes that the Proposition is Adverbial, 136.

SUPERLATIVE, 77.

SUPINE. Observations on the Latin Supine, 95.

SUB-ATTRIBUTE. What it is, 121; Elliptical expression representing a Proposition whose Subject and Verb are not expressed, 122.

SYNTAX. What it is, 107; Distinction between Syntax and Construction, *ibid.*; All rules of Syntax relate either to Agreement or Government, 107; The rules of Syntax do not belong to General Grammar, 108.

TENSES. Theory of Tenses in Verbs 77, seq.; The variation of Tense is not absolutely indispensable, 78; Indefinite and Definite Tenses, 79; The same Tense is sometimes employed in a definite, sometimes in an indefinite manner, *ibid.*; All circumstances of time may be reduced to Past, Present and Future, *ibid.*; Various degrees of anteriority in Past Tenses and of posteriority in Future Tenses, 80; Different forms of Past or Future tenses designed to denote a double epoch, *ibid.* seq.; Absolute and Relative Tenses, *ibid.*; Absolute Indefinite Past Tense, 82; Definite Past, near or remote, *ibid.*; Relative Past, *ibid.*; it is Anterior, Simultaneous or Posterior, *ibid.*; Absolute indefinite Future Tense, *ibid.*; Definite Future near or remote, 83; Relative Future, it is Simultaneous or Posterior, *ibid.*; Both the Anterior and Posterior Relative Pasts and Futures may be further divided into Near and Remote, *ibid.*; The number of Tenses is very different in different languages, 84; Different ways of forming Tenses, 84; particularly in English, *ibid.*; How the absence of Tenses which are wanting in any language is supplied, *ibid.*; The infinitive may have different Tenses, 93; so also with the Participle, 96.

TERMS. Circumstantial, 123; What they are, *ibid.*

VERB. It serves to express the existence of the Subject and its connection with the Attribute, 15; There can be no Proposition without a Verb, *ibid.*; In some languages the Verb may be suppressed, 15; How its place is supplied, *ibid.*; Attributive or concrete Verbs, 17; Substantive or abstract Verb, *ibid.*; The Verb *to be* often employed as an Attributive Verb, *ibid.*; Attributive Active Verb, *ibid.*; Attributive Passive Verb, 18; Attributive Neuter Verb, *ibid.*; Verbs which signify *possession* classed with Active Verbs, 18 note; Every Verb, in Arabic, may become an Adverb, 47; Verbs are susceptible of the distinction of number, 64; and of Gender, 68; May have degrees of comparison, 77; Variation of Tenses in Verbs 78; Persons of Verbs, 85; Modes of Verbs, 86 seq. (See Modes.) What Verbs are Active, 99; What Verbs are Passive, *ibid.*; Latin Verbs denominated Deponent Verbs, 98 note; Absolute and Relative Verbs, 101; The same verb is employed sometimes as Ab-

solute, sometimes, as Relative, 102; In what way Relative Verbs are connected with their Complements, *ibid.*; Transitive and Intransitive Verbs, *ibid.*; The same verb may be Transitive with relation to one Complement and Intensive with relation to another, 103; Reflexive Verb, *ibid.*; Derived forms of Verbs, designed to connect accessory significations with the primitive signification, 104; Derived forms of Latin Verbs, *ibid.* note. All these forms may be either active or passive, 100; Derived forms of Verbs which include their complements, are found in the Basque language, 105; Impersonal Verbs, more properly denominated *Verbs of the third person*, 92.

Voices of Verbs, 97; Active, Passive and Neuter Voices, *ibid.*; Number of Voices in different languages, 98; Improperly in the employment of the Voices, 98; Proper way to distinguish the Voice of a Verb from its signification, 99; Active Voice with greater propriety denominated the *Subjective Voice*, *ibid.*; Passive Voice, with greater propriety denominated the *Objective Voice*, *ibid.*; Reasons for these denominations, *ibid.*; Mode of forming the Voices, *ibid.*; Three uses of the *Passive Voice*, *ibid.*, 100; Several languages have no *Passive Voice*, 101; How its place is supplied, *ibid.*

WHICH. Conjunctive Adjective, (See Conjunctive Adjective) 55; Different uses of the Conjunctive Adjectives, *who*, *which* and *whom*, 56 seq.; The Participle always contains an Ellipsis of one of the Conjunctives *which* and *who*, 96.

WHO. Conjunctive Adjective, (See Conjunctive Adjective) 55; Different uses of the Conjunctive Adjectives *who*, *which* and *whom*, 56; The participle always contains an Ellipsis of one of the Conjunctives *which* and *who*, 96.

WHOM. Conjunctive Adjective (See Conjunctive Adjective) 55; Different uses of the Conjunctive Adjectives *who*, *which* and *whom* 56.

YES. Affirmative Adverb, 59.

NOTE TO PREFACE. We have here retained the Preface to the 2d edition of these Principles of General Grammar, inasmuch as but a small number of alterations have been made in the edition we now present to the public, and those, besides, of little importance. They consist merely in a reformation of the style in some places, and the removal of some little obscurity in certain expressions. There has been, however, no change in regard to the principles or the general plan of the work.

The 2d edition of the "Principles of General Grammar" was translated into German and published in 1804 at Halle and Leipzig by Mr. J. Sev. Vater, then professor in the University of Halle and now professor and librarian in that of Königsberg. This learned continuator of the *Mithridates* of Adelung, is the author of Hebrew, Polish and German grammars, and of several other works relative to general Grammar and to the study of languages. He has just published at Berlin in Latin and German a catalogue of the languages of the world, under this title: "*Linguarum totius orbis index alphabeticus quarum grammaticæ Lexicæ Collectione vocabulorum recensentur Patria significatur, historia adhibetur.*" (Note to 3d Edition.)



